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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
This study intends to provide a fresh understanding of what the Somali Jihadi movement, al-
Shabaab, has become over the last 6 years in terms of social constituency, political project, links 
to foreign Jihadi supporters and military power. Data are those collected by the authors and in 
the public domain.  
 
The main finding of this analysis is that al-Shabaab found ways to evolve and get lessons from 
previous strategic mistakes. Near to be eradicated in January 2007, this group is today the 
most powerful one in Somalia. The main instruments for this resilience have been: highly 
debatable western and regional policies that allowed this movement that claims a global agenda 
to appear as the best defender of the Somali nationalism; the illegitimacy of its contenders in 
southern Somalia; and the ability to structure the organisation using economic and ideological 
resources in a very innovative and efficient manner, thanks to foreign support.  
 
Yet, as analysed hereafter, al-Shabaab is not deprived of strategic weaknesses. Its status 
within the Somali Islamist trend is subject to bitter discussions and al-Shabaab over the last 
year lost the support of very influential Salafi ‘ulemaa who before were sympathetic to its 
regional agenda. Its military tactics are often unproductive and may prove self exhausting. The 
fear it creates while governing populations also may push people to leave areas it controls. 
 
Although the movement is polarized by its military agenda, it has to rule population and get 
involved in many day-to-day problems that create the need for a more consistent administrative 
framework, and raise ambitions among its commanders. While it is eager to address local issues 
and restore law and order, its extremism is questioned by popular grievances, as illustrated by 
the reactions to the current drought. 
 
One concerning consequence of the Western misreading of the Somali crisis after 9/11 is the 
attraction created by Somalia for foreign Jihadists. Although most are either Somalis with a 
foreign passport or lost individuals (often recently converted or born again Muslims), two 
patterns should be considered. The Somali diaspora is playing a role that has become increasingly 
important both in funding that organisation or providing it with military and civilian cadres (even 
for short periods). The “genuine” foreign fighters are increasingly East African citizens 
(compared to 2007 and 2008) and this trend may likely produce Jihadi movements in Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa in the next two or three years.  
 
This work does not detail the policy implications of the analysis provided hereafter. To do so, 
other parameters should be put into discussion that were not part of the ToRs, such as the role 
of Ethiopia, the current policy of some Arab States, the ignorance of other political processes 
such as in Afghanistan and the problematic nature and dysfunctions of the TFG.  
 
 
 
1. Historical background to the development of al-Shabaab 
1.1. Al-Shabaab is a movement that merged four Somali groups and has been supported from 
its early days by foreign Islamists, including those linked to al-Qâ’idah. The four trends 
were a radical faction of the Salafi Islamist group al-I’tisaam (a heir of al-Itihaad), 
some Islamists who wanted the Islamic Courts to be militarily more efficient, Takfiir wa 
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Hijra and a cluster of Somali militants who had had an international experience of Jihad 
either in Afghanistan or elsewhere in the Arab world (maybe also in Chechnya). 
1.2. Already active in 2005, the group became public early 2006 when the war against clan 
factions started in Mogadishu. From that period on, this movement has always acted in 
an autonomous manner and built itself faster than other contending groups within the 
Islamic Courts because it was better organized, had financial support and an ambition.  
1.3. Al-Shabaab was nearly eradicated by the Ethiopian armed intervention in December 
2006. The Somali population considered it responsible for numerous targeted killings of 
military officers, civil society leaders and aid workers but also for the death of 
hundreds of their supporters due to irresponsible military tactics in December 2006. 
Yet, al-Shabaab succeeded to reinvent itself in 2007 as the most determined and 
uncompromising Somali movement opposed to Ethiopia, Western States and their local 
ally, the Transitional Federal Government.  
1.4.  Never ever was the support to al-Shabaab as popular as in those years. This period 
brought in the organisation many people who had little commitments to its global Jihadi 
agenda. However, al-Shabaab was able to use the nationalist fervour to get control of 
nearly eight regions of south central Somalia.  
1.5. The Djibouti process in 2008 provoked the strategic weakening of other Islamist trends 
and, paradoxically, the military reinforcement of al-Shabaab. Yet, the ideological debate 
was not won and al-Shabaab had to put more emphasis on the military confrontation 
against foreign forces (the AMISOM) than an implementation of an Islamic State. Jihad 
in that sense has become apolitical.  
1.6. Al-Shabaab can be described as a decentralized organisation as opposed to a 
fragmented one. Its formal structures are supposed to provide the movement with an 
institutionalized leadership and predictable patters of decision making.  
1.7. Its bureaucratic setting is both a transplant from outside (and foreigners indeed play a 
great role in those structures) but also a way to weaken arguments (such as clanism, 
warlordism and corruption) that have hampered all other armed groups or 
administrations in Somalia.  
1.8. Al-Shabaab kept united, first and foremost, because the (new) TFG has not increased 
its legitimacy and still subsists thanks to the foreign armed presence. Moreover, due to 
Western policies towards Somalia and al-Shabaab, there is no political space for 
dissidents: they have either to stay with al-Shabaab or join the TFG, this latter option 
being unacceptable for most Islamists, even moderates. 
1.9. Although different conceptions are sometimes publicly expressed and cleavages existed 
from the outset, the current leadership controls well the apparatus while the most vocal 
internal opponents in January 2011 did not even have a say on their body guards. 
Therefore, betting on any splits is an illusion under the current circumstances despite 
divergent agendas on the military strategy, policies towards the population and attitude 
in front of the international humanitarian community.  
 
 
2. Recruitment 
2.1. Recruitment varies over time and regions since it is decentralized and fluctuates 
according to the balance of forces in Mogadishu and the countryside. At the beginning, 
the concept was to recruit youth people (e.g. the name of the organisation) and use 
mostly religious discourses to convince them joining Jihad. The war situation and the 
Ethiopian/US/AMISOM presence enlarged the possibility of recruiting disenfranchised 
and frustrated youth who could be indoctrinated ideologically thank to a strong cadre of 
committed fighters and commanders. In certain areas also, al-Shabaab was able to use 
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conflicts to obtain the sympathy of some clans or sub-clans that were cornered at one 
point in the civil war and were eager to revenge (or so was the option proposed by al-
Shabaab). 
2.2. Al-Shabaab is a modern movement and its military cadres are more educated than TFG 
MPs. Their success in recruiting people is based on their ability to play religious 
emotions and engage a smart process of de-socialisation/re-socialisation. They offer 
more than a salary and a weapon: a way to live his/her faith within a community that 
shares the same values. One may compare this to a real conversion process, more than a 
brain washing one. 
2.3. Although compulsory recruitment occurs, voluntary enrolment is the norm. This success 
of al-Shabaab inside and outside the country is remarkable and therefore the most 
concerning. It is based on the ability to frame local and global aspirations and make 
people believe that Jihad is a way to reform the society, address all previous failures 
and get Somalia again some international attention.  
2.4. Yet, after nearly 4 years of continued fighting and debatable military tactics, al-
Shabaab popularity among the youth is at its lowest. Civilians (and not only educated and 
westernized Somalis) are leaving some areas controlled by this group. Emotions may play 
against al-Shabaab today but one should not exclude that al-Shabaab reasserts itself 
because of an increased foreign military presence.  
2.5. While at the beginning white foreign Jihadists were present alongside al-Shabaab, over 
the last year and half there seems to be many more East Africans volunteers. This 
concerning trend can be analysed in different manners: it could be seen as an outcome 
of 20 years of activism of al-Qâ’idah in East Africa; a mechanical effect of the counter-
terrorist policies enforced in the region and an effect of the increased Somali presence 
in East Africa (and South Africa) after the defeat of the Islamic Courts in December 
2006. To a large extend, Kenya has not profited from a better understanding of how 
radicalisation proceeds. It is going to pay the price for this misreading. 
2.6. The most concerning aspect is that al-Shabaab has taken root both in Somalia and the 
extended region. It has achieved so using different tactics of promoting Jihad in 
religious circles, eliminating potential opponents (either secular or religious) and 
providing a living for those who joined the organisation.  
2.7. The strength of al-Shabaab is to interact with the population mostly through religious 
duties: Shari’a, zakaah, sadaqa and the call for Jihad. Al-Shabaab fighters do not mix 
with the population, they create fear but also bring about predictable patterns of social 
and political behaviour that never existed for the last generation: people know what is 
prohibited and why so.  
2.8. Their media policy deserves attention especially at a moment the AMISOM and the TFG 
have developed a less notional information policy (?) through the media they control. Al-
Shabaab may be more credible outside the country than thought, because its opponents 
are not always subtle in the way they sell their own propaganda. 
2.9. Defectors are nowadays more numerous (this phenomenon started after the offensive 
launched in May 2009 against the TFG) but recruitment has also intensified throughout 
the same period. No political gain has been made because the AMISOM and the TFG 
lack a decent policy to show that reintegration within a normal society is possible.   
 
 
3. Military tactics 
3.1. Although it is difficult to argue that al-Shabaab follows a genuine military doctrine, a 
number of specificities are remarkable: the use of IEDs and suicide bombers, which are 
basically new war technologies for Somalia; a reshaping of the combat unit based on 9 
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elements, while the Somali army had developed 11 member units and Ethiopian army 6 
member unit; a clear focus on infantry at the difference of the common factional 
tactics that were coupling the use of foot soldiers and technicals in all environments; a 
high mobility of troops that could be explained by political motivations (in order to avoid 
creating local warlordism) but also by a need to compensate the limited number of 
fighters vis-à-vis the huge territory and population they need to control; a distinctive 
deployment of troops that are massed on the borders of the territory they control and 
not in the main urban centres they have taken over. 
3.2.  Although foreign influence is more strategic in the organisational structures of al-
Shabaab, many foreign fighters are involved alongside their fellow Somalis but do not 
seem able to produce major value added. One may consider that their participation in 
battle is part of their on-going training and necessary to avoid tensions between them 
and Somalis who usually have a strong sense of autochthony.  
3.3. The influence of the diaspora in the command structure is important and has not been 
often considered. That may explained why videos posted on websites close to al-
Shabaab have acquired a much better quality and provide elements to prove that what is 
described actually happened (dates, loses and so on).  
3.4. The 2011 late February early March military offensive launched by the TFG, AMISOM 
and Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaa’ah (and Ethiopian forces) proved once more that a sole 
military solution is absurd. Although al-Shabaab was seriously beaten and resorted to 
forced recruitment in emergency, its opponents have been unable to gain politically from 
those (costly) military achievements: relationships between the TFG and Ahlu Sunnah 
went from bad to worse since the TFG President refused to acknowledge the role of the 
latter. In Galgaduud, the fragile unity of the three main clans (Dir, ‘Ayr and Mareehaan) 
collapsed on the issue of the ownership of heavy weapons. Clan divisions just increased 
at a time some in Nairobi were expecting a national unity against al-Shabaab. 
3.5. This discrepancy between the diplomatic vision in Nairobi (al-Shabaab being the arch 
enemy of all) and the much more ambivalent attitude of clans and armed groups inside 
Somalia should deserve a proper analysis. Is the West more ideological than al-Shabaab? 
 
 
4. Economics 
4.1. Al-Shabaab has been smart to develop its own sources of funding and not depend of only 
a sole one. Outside the country, they benefit from the fame provided to them thanks to 
certain Western policies and videos of their achievements to get donations. To transfer 
those funds in Somalia, they use the customary methods as well as “white” commercial 
operations. 
4.2. Inside Somalia, they can get support from a large stratum of the business people that 
may sympathise with al-Shabaab; the veiled threat on many economic operators pushes 
them to pay their Islamic tax (zakaah), offer donations (sadaqa) and pay for services 
(qitma) offered by al-Shabaab. This latter also promotes certain economic activities and 
since security has improved dramatically in areas it controls, services have developed 
and employment increased.  
4.3. At the difference of other administrations in Somalia, they have developed and 
enforced a decentralized system of taxation that is reasonable and conducive for 
business. All major importers benefit from that situation since re-export is much easier 
and competitive today than anytime before (although internal consumption has 
drastically reduced due to the on-going fighting).  
4.4. Piracy and hijacking are two sectors that provide huge funds for Somalis. While there is 
no hesitation to underline the role of al-Shabaab in kidnapping aid workers and other 
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foreigners, the issue of piracy should be treated with caution since the TFG (and 
others) propaganda machine is absolutely willing to associate al-Shabaab with all criminal 
activities. The possibility of piracy money getting to al-Shabaab is likely but further 
hard evidence is needed, while public information on that topic is hardly convincing.  
4.5. Those taxes are in priority affected to counter the impact of the drought. Yet, in some 
areas, public works have been undertaken, roads rehabilitated and health centres 
improved. But all those efforts have had a clear benefit for the military apparatus 
though civilians are not excluded from those improvements.  
4.6. Despite economic downturn, al-Shabaab has been able to pay salary to all its members 
for years: this is an achievement that other Somali entities cannot claim. Yet, the lay 
population complains that al-Shabaab militias do not spend much money as other militias 
and that their presence provokes often an economic slowdown.  
4.7. Al-Shabaab seems willing to expand economic activities since it has understood that the 
population may first support those who improve its daily life. Changes of policy in that 
regard are likely in the near future if the military activities get less important. 
 
 
5. Relations with other Islamic groups 
5.1. Al-Shabaab relations with other Islamic groups have been at best tumultuous and more 
than often hostile. There were commonalities with al-Itihaad and al-I’tisaam but they 
evaporated when the fight became vital against Ethiopia. The relations with Takfiir wa 
Hijra were substantial but lately became a bone of contention in the public polemics 
between al-Shabaab and Salafi ‘ulemaa.  
5.2. Whatever is believed in the West, many Jihadi movements share the same motto but 
differ in its understanding. Most of the Somali Jihadists were interested in a regional 
Jihad (involving Ethiopia more than Kenya) but had little stamina for the global Jihad. 
This agenda came after 9/11 and the impact of the US counter-terrorist policy in 
Somalia. The sympathy they have always shown in front of foreign fighters is marked by 
ambiguities as reflected by the limited (yet lethal) support provided by some Somali 
militants to the 1998 and 2002 bombings in Kenya.  
5.3. Al-Shabaab arrogance and the need to find some kind of settlement among Islamists 
basically burnt the relations with al-I’tisaam. Over the last two years, steps were taken 
by key ‘ulemaa close to al-I’tisaam to criticize al-Shabaab. They were subjected to 
campaigns of defamation even in the USA led by an association Baraaruga Islaamka that 
promotes al-Shabaab views. This is its most important defeat, until now. 
5.4. The deterioration of those relations was also an indirect consequence of the competition 
with the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (based in Eritrea) and, later on, with 
Hisbul Islaam. The collapse of the fragile alliance that allowed the opposition to the TFG 
to take over Kismaayo in 2008 had lasting consequences. After months of tensions, when 
Hisbul Islaam figures were killed or bought by al-Shabaab, the former movement lost its 
last important bases and had to accept a merging. 
5.5. This did not happen as easily as thought because of Hasan Daahir Aweys’ character and 
his relative Islamist heterodoxy. In a matter of weeks, the old Islamist leader was 
appearing as very popular in the organisation and internal opponents were gathering 
behind him.  
5.6. The current leadership reacted in an astute manner and was able to contain the crisis. 
In order to do so, it had to take decisions on supporting the population affected by the 
drought and reasserting the movement into the mainstream Sunni Islam.  
5.7. The cost of this last policy was to jeopardise the relations with Takfiir wa Hijra seen by 
most Somalis as a sectarian movement that is un-Islamic. 
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5.8. The public expression of internal dissidence should not be overestimated compared to 
the other challenges faced by al-Shabaab: the drought that pushed many people to leave 
areas controlled by al-Shabaab and the ideological defeat within Salafi Islam.   
 
 
6. Administrations of regions 
6.1. The claim for an Islamic State does not make anymore the headlines of al-Shabaab 
websites. This movement may want, first, to control the capital city. But this silence 
may, more likely, be a hesitation on the practical consequences, especially the need to 
address the grievances of the population and its legitimate requests more than it does 
today. To a large extent, the continued situation of Jihad provides this organisation a 
very good excuse to escape many responsibilities linked to governing a population. 
6.2.  Through the routinisation of a number of processes, al-Shabaab has been able to build 
what we should call local administrations. The way it did it is not radically different of 
what some clan factions or claimed governments did in the past. Yet, in many regards, al-
Shabaab seems to do better than previous attempts. Clan sensitivities are considered in 
a more realistic and neutral way and corruption is much less apparent, while the Jihadi 
organisation builds again a public sphere and shows people that the authority cannot be 
manipulated (for long) through clan and personal networking.  
6.3. Al-Shabaab has invested in different sectors. A Shura made up of local people (close to 
the movement) is supposed to make decisions and works to address problems. Al-
Shabaab enforces a certain policy in the education, health and judicial systems. Not all 
decisions are marked by extremism or intolerance. While Jihad is promoted in schools, 
they have also tried to improve the quality of teaching. They also check the degrees of 
the health staff to make sure that they cure people and do not kill them. In the courts, 
though they intend to follow the Hanbali madhab, they still consider the Shafi’i one 
(which is dominant among Somalis).  
6.4. In their strategy of taking over a place, there is a component that could be described as 
distilling fear among the population. But they solve many problems and, though not 
popular, they are not described as the worst people on earth. Other Somalis may be.  
6.5. A 2011 January speech by al-Shabaab leader reminded commanders that though they 
enjoy a fair level of impunity, they are not allowed to overreact and create hostility 
against their organisation among the population. This move largely rhetorical constitutes 
also a way to cool down a number of riots that took place in areas that sympathised with 
al-Shabaab for years. The speech interestingly reminded that regional governors can be 
removed by the central command if they are not good enough… 
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 CHAPTER I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF AL-SHABAAB 
 
 
 
 
The emergence of Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujaheddin (hereafter al-Shabaab) in Somalia has led 
to widespread concern today, particularly in light of political developments in Yemen which make 
likely increased connections between Jihadists across the Red Sea, the bombing in Kampala in 
July 2010 that makes likelier the development of a Jihadi trend within East Africa, without even 
mentioning the further radicalisation of the Somali diaspora and, beyond it, of Muslim 
communities in Western countries.  
 
This movement has organised the public executions of dozens of people, the killing of Somali 
officials and African Union peacekeepers by suicide bombers, and called on foreign fighters to 
join the fray to build a sanctuary for enhancing the global Jihad led by al-Qâ’idah.1  
 
There are different narratives to make sense of the emergence of that movement in Somalia. 
The two main (serious) ones are built on different visions of internal and external dynamics of 
Somali political Islam, though both acknowledge the importance of taking into account local and 
more global trends.  
 
The first one emphasizes the role played by a cluster of militants – Somalis and non Somalis - 
who had gained experience in Afghanistan and were either members or associates of al-Qâ’idah. 
Those people succeeded for a number of reasons to hijack the Somali Islamist movement. By 
edging out its less puritan leaders, these militants were able to build a Jihadi organisation that 
was at the forefront of the offensive against the warlords in spring 2006, pushed the Islamic 
Courts Union (ICU) into a bloody confrontation with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
and Ethiopia later that year and continued bloody skirmishes until today while they control more 
than 8 regions in southern Somalia. This vision is reflected in a number of public reports and 
built a narrative that emphasizes a number of contradictions within Shabaab, national/global 
Jihadi agenda, insurgency/terrorism and the like2.  
 
This understanding does not lack arguments, especially if al-Shabaab websites have to be taken 
seriously3. An internet search provides many documents (whether genuine or not) on the intimate 
connections between al-Shabaab and al-Qâ'idah4. For example, the Long War Journal5 claims 
that it has videos showing Saleh Ali Saleh Naban (a key organiser of the 1998 bombings in 
                                                 
1 For an example of this doxa, see Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “The Strategic Challenge of Somalia’a al-
Shabaab”, Middle East Quarterly, vol. 16, n° 4, fall 2009. Evan F. Kohlmann, Shabaab al-Mujahideen: 
Migration and Jihad in the Horn of Africa, April 2009, among many others.  
2 Some analysts (even from a Conflict prevention international NGO) strangely enough suggested that 
counterterrorism could provide “a door through which longer term international re-engagement in peace, 
reconciliation and state reconstruction…should take place”, International Crisis Group, “Somalia: countering 
terrorism in a failed State”, May 2002, p. 2.  
3 Amazingly, in many analyses, no proper cross checking is made as if this organisation or its leaders would 
just say what they believe… 
4 For background on al-Qâ'idah, one can refer to the solid work of Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: 
al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New York, Vintage Books, 2006. Saleh Nabhan was killed in September 2010 
by US Special Forces. 
5 http://www.longwarjournal.org/ 
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Nairobi and Dar es-salaam) and Sheekh Mukhtaar Roobow Abuu Mansuur (then spokesperson for 
al Shabaab) visiting training camps; in another video  (2 September 2008), the same Saleh swore 
a bayat (loyalty oath) to al-Qâ'idah on behalf of al-Shabaab; and in a third (November 19, 2008) 
Ayman al-Zawahiri invited al-Shabaab members to fight until the establishment of "a State of 
Islam and Tawhid6".  
 
The authors of this work belong to a different school of thought. Their main differences with 
the first group of experts are based on several arguments. First, al-Shabaab should not be seen 
as a transplant of al-Qâ’idah from Afghanistan, but as a entity produced by the merging of 
different groups that were supportive of Jihad and were Salafis but had not the same 
understanding of those terms. Therefore, first and foremost, it is an outcome of a radicalisation 
process that can be explained by local dynamics as much as events taking place in Afghanistan, 
Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq. This history explains both the way some militants rally Shabaab and 
others dissociate themselves from it as it is explained below.  
 
The outsiders – Somalis and non Somalis - had a strong impact in the building of the organisation 
in the sense that their local fellow comrades were ready for changes and thought that the new 
methods would bring them a greater success than keeping the old ways. The military dynamics on 
the ground made those moves much easier and more natural that often believed. In a war 
situation, questioning is limited and many choices that had systemic implications were made on 
the spot. This also explains why al-Shabaab from the very beginning had to cope with different 
ideological trends and the footprints of other Somali organisations that the “more externalized” 
faction wanted to eradicate.  
 
A last point has to be made. While a number of explanations proposed here are clearly tentative, 
there could be an attempt to go back to the best anti-terrorist deus ex machina: “al-Qâ’idah 
gave specific orders to do this or not to do that”. The authors have had no access to “privileged 
information” and were focussed on the Somali arena using their personal understandings and 
contacts. Therefore, they cannot fault explanations of that kind. Yet, they would need an answer 
to why sometimes al-Shabaab looks so obedient and other times so independent…. 
 
 
This chapter sheds light on the sociological and political background of al-Shabaab. First, it 
offers a description of the conditions by which different trends merged to become al-Shabaab 
near 2004. While a cluster of people who fought in Afghanistan were at the forefront, other 
components of this movement were deeply rooted in the trajectories of the Somali Islamist 
trend throughout the civil war.  
 
A notable characteristic is that its most prominent enemies (Addis-Ababa and Washington) were 
instrumental in promoting its growth: the US intervention in Somali politics from 2001 to 2006, 
especially its support to unsavoury warlords, and the Ethiopian armed intervention of late 2006 
to January 2009 (after many limited operations in the 1990s and early 2000s) were events that 
allowed this movement to take root in Somali society, despite its initially having been rejected 
and its continuing unpopularity among the majority of the population.  
 
The second section deals more precisely on the ways al-Shabaab built itself from its creation 
onwards as an organization. While the proper military tactics are examined in chapter IV, this 
                                                 
6  Tawhid means uniqueness (of God) and is the key concept of Wahhabism. See David Commins, The 
Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London & New York, I. B. Tauris, 2006. 
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section offers more a view of how Shabaab succeeded to build itself as the main and eventually 
only armed Islamist movement against the TFG, AMISOM and the West.   
 
The point made here is that foreigners indeed play a major role in al-Shabaab internal structure 
since they contributed to build structures and manage them over times. This may be compared 
with al-Qâ’idah that was an extremely bureaucratized entity, which allowed it to work despite 
various nationalities involved. The same logic could apply for al-Shabaab: those bureaucratic 
institutions, at the differences of the armed factions the Somalis got used to in the 1990s, 
allow the movement to function efficiently by controlling the ambitions of local commanders and 
keeping clanship under control to a large extent. This does not mean (or imply) that they are 
leading the organisation through some kind of shadow Shura. Other scenarios could be 
envisioned, including the will by Somali key leaders of al-Shabaab to hand over responsibilities to 
them for the sake of proving that al-Shabaab cannot be compared to any previous armed 
organisations either secular or Islamist in Somalia. This description, if valid, means that 
dismantling al-Shabaab would be a daunting project. 
 
 
 
1. A political history 
International discourse on al-Shabaab stresses commonalities with the Taliban and al-Qâ’idah: 
its main leaders were trained in Afghanistan, and its ideology reflects the Salafi-Jihadi trend 
that is witnessed in that country. There is some truth in that description, but this trend is only 
one of three that merged to establish this movement. One should also account for trends 
expressed in the radicalisation of Somali Islamist organizations in the 1990s and especially after 
9/11: the militarist and populist factions that came out of the experiment of the Islamic Courts 
and the collusion with the Somali branch of Takfiir wa Hijra. Al-Shabaab is therefore more than 
an “Afghan/al-Qâ’idah” transplant; it is also the offshoot of a local history of political Islam.  
 
That history is reflected in the variety of behaviours and policies its field commanders enforce 
in areas they control, a spectrum so broad that rumours of splits and exclusions have been 
recurrent over the last five years, despite their not having actually happened.7 Al-Shabaab is 
said to have come into being late 2004 or early 2005, but this date can be disputed since, in 
fact, most of those who became its leaders were already settled in Somalia and actively 
promoting their views within different constituencies such as Islamic NGOs, the business sector 
or militia groups. As explained below, its establishment corresponded to a specific situation when 
Islamists were again winning influence and popular support after years in retreat. 
 
 
1.1. Learning from failures? The radicalisation of the Somali Islamist movement 
The main Somali Islamist movement, al-Itihaad al-Islaamiyya, started (as its name indicates) as a 
merging of different groupings in the early 1980s8. Its ideological references encompassed a 
broad spectrum of stances, ranging from religious figures politically radicalised against a 
dictatorship who did not want to join leftist and secularist armed groups to people who already 
had connections with the Islamist movements in the region via people close to the Muslim 
                                                 
7 For instance, one of al-Shabaab’s charismatic leaders, Mukhtaar Roobow/Abuu Mansuur is said to have 
dissented even at the time of this Islamic Courts Union; nevertheless, he is still in the leadership years 
after. See Chapter II for details.  
8 See for a history, Z. S. History of the ASWJ, London FCO, October 2010. 
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Brotherhood. Its internal consistency was weak, which became a source of tensions in the late 
1980s, especially between the Wahhabi trend and others who were not anti-Sufi.  
 
When the civil war started in 1991, some Islamists became militarily organised and intended to 
compete with clan-based militias that enjoyed huge popularity. Despite its resilience, al-Itihaad 
that counted no more than 700 fighters at that time9, was badly defeated several times in 
conditions that showed how clan appeal was still strong among would-be Islamists: clan division 
among its membership rather than unity was the norm then. After a series of lost battles, the 
group debated a strategic turnabout. While some were still campaigning for the group to be a 
military actor, the majority of al-Itihaad emphasized political and ideological work among the lay 
population: da’wa was seen as a greater priority than violent Jihad 10 . This choice was not 
consensual and produced two important diverging paths.  
 
First, a section of al-Itihaad set up another organization that was vibrantly Salafi: al-I’tisaam 
bil-Kitaab wa al-Sunnah (hereafter al-I’tisaam). This corresponded both to an internal 
clarification and to a growth of external influence on Somali Islamists11. The latter came in the 
form of aid channelled through Islamic NGOs, contracts to business people who funded the 
group and military training provided in or outside Somalia. The most doctrinaire section of this 
group eventually joined al-Shabaab in late 2004. Second, several field commanders refused to 
return to civilian life and were adamant about pursuing the military option. Many moved into the 
private sector and worked as heads of security for Islamist business people or Islamic NGOs, 
but this militaristic Islamist trend was searching for new opportunities: al-Shabaab provided 
one. 
 
These ideological and political developments took place in a context largely framed by the 
inability of the international community to shape a solution to Somalia’s problems. There was, 
however, definite success in containing the Somali crisis within its territorial borders thanks to 
regional allies, first and foremost Ethiopia. This played out in the long-term interests of the 
Islamist trend, since many Somalis perceived Ethiopia as a historical enemy and a Christian 
nation. The relative lack of interest of Western States after the failure of UNOSOM (1992-
1995) was not matched in the Muslim world: the Gulf’s Islamic charities (many of which were put 
on the US list of organisations sponsoring terrorism after 9/11)12 remained active in Somalia and 
contributed to the creation of a network of civil society activists, business people and politicians 
who could rally different quarters of Somali society on certain issues, such as the Islamic 
Courts.  
 
The events of 9/11 and their aftermath provided most militants with new opportunities, although 
at first the Somali population was shocked and sympathised with the sorrow of the US people. 
Because the bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-salaam in August 1998 had been 
possible thanks to logistical support provided by some members of al-Itihaad and al-I’tisaam, the 
US administration took drastic measures against Somali Islamists in September and November 
2001.  
                                                 
9 Interview with Hasan Daahir Aweys, 2006. 
10 This is also reflected in discussion with al-Qâ’idah in 1992 and 1993. See Harmony Project/Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point, ‘Al-Qaida’s (mis)adventures in the Horn of Africa’, 
http://ctc.usma.edu/aqII.asp pp. 40-41. 
11 This is also true elsewhere in the Horn. The spread of Salafi Islam increased dramatically after 1990. 
Yet, one should be careful about not drawing political conclusions too quickly. 
12 In particular, al-Haramein and International Islamic Relief Organisation among others.. 
 14 
 
Although a US military intervention was dismissed after a few weeks’ debates, Washington 
decided to undertake what can be described as an underground war against the alleged members 
and supporters of al-Qâ’idah in Somalia. This policy was strengthened after the November 2002 
bombing of a Mombassa hotel and the concurrent failed attempt to shoot down an Israeli plane 
in Kenya. Washington’s regional ally, Ethiopia, was tasked to help identify and eliminate specific 
targets. To be more efficient, surrogate local forces – mostly hit-squads associated with faction 
leaders and warlords - were put on the payroll of the US and Ethiopian security services.  
 
Since the international focus was not on Somalia and its internal situation was already chaotic, no 
one in the West paid much attention to the consequences of this policy in terms of radicalising 
the Islamists at large and increasing their popular support. Although several significant Jihadi 
operatives were killed or taken to Ethiopia, collateral damage was significant, and Somali public 
opinion quickly sided with Islamic militants with whom it had little in common. Moreover, the 
latter adopted the same tactics as Ethiopian security forces and initiated campaigns of targeted 
killings (which until then had not happened to any great degree). 
 
 
1.2. The experiment of the Islamic Courts13 
Somalia - even Mogadishu - did not face complete chaos except for short periods14. Nonetheless 
the restoration of law and order was a core issue at local levels, as hope for a central and able 
government recurrently collapsed. Consequently, there were numerous experiments of Islamic 
Courts that showed the resilience of the idea of justice and the need for security.  
 
These Islamic Courts shared commonalities over time. They were locally rooted (mostly in 
Mogadishu) and were set up for securing specific areas where free-lance thugs were operating. 
While Islamists were campaigning for their establishment as soon as possible, the business 
people were the key decision-makers because they were the only ones to have a decisive 
influence on clan elders, to be able to fund them and to lend military hardware. These Islamic 
Courts were clan or sub-clan based and therefore had no authority over other sectors of the 
population. This limitation may seem strange and impractical – it is to a large extent – but it 
made sense in an urban setting polarised by clan identity, as well as reflecting the local ambitions 
of these institutions. The Courts were not initially controlled by a specific Somali Islamic trend, 
especially after 9/11: clan elders and businessmen wanted to avoid a confrontation with the US 
and appointed judges to all the courts who belonged to a broad spectrum of religious opinions. 
Nevertheless, Islamists were part of the process and were overrepresented in the militias that 
enforced the decisions of the Courts.  
 
From October 2002 onward, the warlords and the international community gathered in Kenya to 
once more establish a reconciliation government, this time the so-called Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) that eventually came to existence in October 2004. Meanwhile, the situation 
in Mogadishu became increasingly affected by gangs of thugs who were kidnapping foreigners, 
aid workers, traders and visiting members of the diaspora. A new set of Islamic Courts came 
into being. To a great extent, they reproduced the patterns of the earlier Courts, but they also 
had to cope with three new phenomena: a delinquent underworld made of thugs who belonged to 
                                                 
13 For an account of the Courts, see Roland Marchal, “A tentative assessment of al-Shabaab”, Journal of 
Eastern African Studies, November 2009. 
14 In the case of the capital city, the first three weeks of January 2001, mid-November to early March 
1992 and a few weeks between February and June 2006. 
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many clans and did not comply anymore with clan rules, the effects of the ‘Global War on Terror’ 
(GWOT) and despair about the ability to set up a local administration that could manage security 
at a time when faction leaders were becoming MPs and ministers but had lost most of their 
ability to secure the areas they claimed to control.  
 
A major weakness of the Courts (there were nearly ten in Mogadishu in 2004) was that clan 
rules prohibited full cooperation. As a result, many officials of the Islamic Courts, whether 
Islamists or not, felt the need for militias who would simply enforce law and order without 
caring for clan rules.  
 
Islamists were also keen for the same goal for political reasons: between 1998 and 2000 they 
(and others) had built a set of capable Islamic Courts, but most of the Courts’ leaders were co-
opted into the then Transitional National Government set up in Djibouti in August 2000 as 
representatives of their respective clans. Within a matter of weeks, the Islamic Courts were 
practically dismantled by their integration into a notional TNG apparatus; the Islamists who had 
played a strategic role in developing the Courts lost everything. Moreover, up to 2000, the 
technicals were lent by the business people and Islamists were keen to build a proper 
autonomous force for the Courts, especially if they were to be in charge of the militias. History 
should not repeat itself.  
 
 
1.3. The emergence of Shabaab 
As a result, in 2005 Islamists and others interested in the success of the Courts aimed to avoid 
a repetition of the events of August 2000 and obtained a political endorsement from the Islamic 
Courts’ leadership to set up a facility to train the new militias. This was an opportunity that 
several operatives did not want to miss. 
 
Hasan Daahir Aweys15 was of course in the forefront of this initiative. At that time, a number of 
Islamic courts (Saleebaan, Duduble, ‘Ayr and Harti Abgaal) were already allied and Aadan Haashi 
‘Ayrow16, the military commander of the most powerful Court in charge of coordinating the 
militias. They had also, unsurprisingly, the backing of the remnants of al-Itihaad and al-I’tisaam.  
 
This training camp, first called Mu’askar Mahkamad (Troops of the Islamic Courts) then later 
Jamaa’a al-Shabaab, was going to become the core location of al-Shabaab organization. This was 
also possible because of the destruction of the Italian cemetery and a huge financial reward 
provided to Aadan ‘Ayrow and his colleagues (including Khaliif ‘Adale) by the Italian government 
to get the bones of the corpses that had been dig out the cemetery. The training camp was part 
of a madrassa called Ayuub built on a section of this cemetery and controlled then by al-
I’tisaam. At that time, the key figures were Aadan ‘Ayrow, Mukhtaar Roobow and Abdullaahi 
Ma'allin Nahar known as Abu Qutayba17. This at least was the first and apparent structure of 
the group.  
 
                                                 
15  Haber Gidir/’Ayr/Ayanle, he is former military leader of al-Itihaad and al-I’tisaam and may be 
considered as one of the last figures of Somali Islamism of the 1980s.  
16  Haber Gidir/’Ayr/Absiye/ Kulmiye/Reer Hirole. He was killed on 1st May 2008 by a US missile in 
Dhuusamareeb.  
17  A trader in Bakaraaha, he was a member of al-I’tisaam before joining al-Shabaab. He was 
Murosade/Sabti/Israafiil. Responsible for Mogadishu security throughout the ICU period, he was killed in 
January 2007 during the Ethiopian intervention.  
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The camp was managed by a committee of 15 persons and though many were members of al-
Shabaab18, a good number was not and eventually shifted to more moderated factions (including 
Sheekh Shariif’s)19. While it was likely that the key figures of al-Shabaab had a plan, at that 
time their agenda was minimalist and that they were still weak enough to have to work with 
others.  
 
But as happened often in following years, al-Shabaab got support from its most radical enemies. 
The US made two significant miscalculations that contributed to the growth of al-Shabaab. The 
first was a misreading of specific incidents in Mogadishu that pushed the CIA to overtly endorse 
a loose alliance of warlords against the Islamic Courts at a time in 2006 when the former were 
hugely unpopular. The outcome was a popular upheaval in the capital city against these unsavoury 
American allies and significant gains for al-Shabaab, which was able to get a share of the 
warlords’ huge arsenals. The second strategic miscalculation was congruent with the first, as 
Washington prompted (or endorsed) a large-scale Ethiopian armed intervention in Somalia.  
 
Early February 2006, al-Shabaab became known to everyone, especially because they entered 
the fray with an arrogant stance and blunt requests that they made recurrently in all episodes 
of fighting. First, they claimed to be autonomous and showed no will to coordinate with other 
groups of the Islamic Courts. As said before, the Islamic Courts were decentralized and 
welcomed different ideological trends including within their militias. By doing so, al-Shabaab 
knew that it would need to get its own supplies (but money was not then a problem) and that it 
could claim its part of the booty (qanima being the Quranic concept for it).  
 
From that time on, bitter comments on the poor quality of the Islamic Courts leadership became 
recurrent and central figures such as Abuukar ‘Umar ‘Adaan, Ahmed Nuur Ali Jim’ale and even 
Hasan Daahir Aweys were criticized. The presence of foreign fighters in their camp was never 
concealed20. Just after the defeat of the warlords in June 2006, a meeting gathering all fighting 
forces took place at the Ramadan hotel in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab did not show up but sent its 
requests to get included: Shari’a should be enforced without any qualifications; it should get its 
good share of the booty (notably of the arsenals owned by some warlords, especially ‘Abdirashiid 
Ilqeyte, Muuse Suudi and Mahamed Qanyere); it also claimed one third of all positions in the 
Islamic Courts Union; and last but not the least for Western countries, it wanted the ICU to 
welcome foreign fighters without any conditions.  
 
The meeting went bad to the extent that the attendance had to call Hasan Daahir, who at that 
time was in Gure’eel. This latter eventually bargained a deal but basically al-Shabaab conditions 
were accepted. From that time on, al-Shabaab flag became the black flag that impresses Somalis 
as much as foreign diplomats. Eventually, of the 18 members of the ICU Executive Council, at 
least 6 had been members of al-Itihaad and five were active members of al-Shabaab. Ahmed Aw 
‘Abdi Mahamuud Godane21 was appointed Secretary General; Fu'aad Mahamed Khalaf Shongole 
                                                 
18 Among them, Ahmed Godane, Ibraahim al Afghani, Fu’aad Shongole, Khaalif ‘Adale, Mukhtaar Abuu Seyla’, 
Mukhtaar Roobow, a son of the owner of the Hargeysa Mansuur hotel,  
19  Mahamuud ‘Abdi Amey who was deputy finance officer throughout the ICU and went with Sheekh 
Shariif; Faarah Yaare who worked previously at Global, a money transfer company or even Qatato who went 
with Hisbul Islaam and was executed by Shabaab.  
20 They were welcomed at the Kenyan border and at the Mogadishu airport and brought to al-Shabaab 
facilities. 
21 Also known as Sheekh Mukhtaar Abu Zubayr. Godane is the nickname of his father who was a member of 
a Sufi order. His own nickname is Afgaduud. 
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(Awartable/Daarood) 22  put in charge of education; Moheddin Mahamed ‘Umar 
(Sheekhaal/Hawiye) in charge of health23; Abdullaahi Ma'allin Nahar known as Abu Qutayba head 
of Mogadishu Security; Mukhtaar Roobow/Abuu Mansuur the deputy of the head of defence, 
Yuusuf Indha’adde; Khaliif ‘Adale the deputy of Ibraahim ‘Addow, in charge if ICU Foreign 
Affairs. 
 
From June 2006, the Islamic Courts had been able to rule Mogadishu and, a few weeks later, a 
large part of Southern Somalia; Al-Shabaab benefited from the internal disorganisation of the 
Courts and grew more influential in the security sector. Yet it had to face growing opposition 
from different quarters, including Sufis and Wahhabis who were part of the Islamic Courts’ 
leadership. Meanwhile, in August Ethiopia positioned troops in Baydhabo, the then-de facto 
capital of the Transitional Federal Government. Although this was not a unfounded move -- the 
TFG was already crumbling, and ministers and the President had just escaped an attempted 
killing -- the subsequent massive Ethiopian military intervention in late December 2006 was a 
blessing for al-Shabaab.  
 
Although routed at first in early 2007, al-Shabaab again rebuilt itself by projecting itself as the 
staunchest nationalist and Islamic group within the resistance (muqawama) to a foreign 
“Christian”24 occupation. Its resilience was not based only on an internal mobilisation. The flows 
of foreign fighters (being Somalis or not) did contribute to its growth. Not only had the West 
been unable to let contradictions within the Islamic Courts Union bringing about clarification but 
the Ethiopian army provided a further argument for global Jihadists to join the fray.  
 
Another component of its resilience was the ability of al-Shabaab to develop a full range of 
terrorist tactics while others in the muqawama were still practicing a guerrilla war. These 
targeted killings reached such a level that the Hawiye clan elders asked Shabaab to stop doing 
so and even leave Mogadishu late 2008. Once again, the latter paid lip service to that request, 
denied being responsible and got eventually the support of Hasan Daahir Aweys to be back in the 
capital city.  
 
Their strength was not only military but also political. While other sectors of the armed 
opposition to the TFG and its Ethiopian ally split and mobilised clan rhetoric throughout most of 
2008, al-Shabaab maintained its radical stance, which eventually appeared the only correct one 
to many people. This self confidence expressed itself in the aggression against Sufi practices 
late 2008 and the explicit claim at that time to build in Somalia an Islamic Emirate. At the 
difference of the Taliban who grew more flexible towards certain religious practices when they 
restarted the insurgency, al-Shabaab leaders showed a more brutal opposition to those practices 
compared to 2006. At that time, for instance, when they took over Kismaayo, they did not 
formally prohibit Sufi ceremonies. In December 2008, they destroyed tombs of Saints which 
became the symbol of a new war between them and Ahlu Sunnah wal Jaama’ah (ASWJ) backed 
by Ethiopia more than the TFG, to say the least.  
 
The claim for an Islamic State, stated many times in 2008 (but much less after) may underline 
an aspect that should be borne in mind: throughout the Ethiopian presence, al-Shabaab was 
supported by many Somalis independently of its own agenda and got its most impressive success 
                                                 
22 Shongole was the nickname of his father, a celebrated sports man in Somalia. 
23 He was killed alongside ‘Ayrow on 1 May 2008 in Dhuusa Mareeb. He was also a former al-Barakat 
employee. 
24 Most of the Ethiopian soldiers were actually Muslims, and a majority was ethnically Somali. 
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ever. In a matter of months, al-Shabaab was able to take over Kismaayo, Merka, Baydhabo, 
Jowhar and appeared by far and large as the most powerful organisation in Somalia. It actually 
was not but it was proactive in its major military moves and knew how to promote its victories, 
while the other contenders often were reacting or simply acted locally. Yet al-Shabaab was not 
numerous at that time (no more than very few thousands) and had much less fighters and 
technicals than the remnants of the Islamic Courts Union.  
 
Observers thought that the movement would not recover after the departure of the Ethiopian 
forces early January 2009 and the election of a then popular cleric, Sheekh Shariif Sheekh 
Ahmed, in late January as the new TFG president. At first, events seemed bear this 
interpretation out, but al-Shabaab was once more able to benefit from changed dynamics. The 
group undertook a vigorous recruitment campaign after it had extended its control of cities 
south of Mogadishu and also benefited indirectly from the TFG’s complex internal situation, 
including a power-sharing agreement among groups that bitterly distrusted each other and the 
continued presence of a foreign force, AMISOM.25  
 
 
 
2. Getting organized 
Information about the internal set up of al-Shabaab is sketchy and what follows is particularly 
tentative. Secrecy in an Islamist organisation is not rare but, in case of Somalia, its level is 
surprising since the leadership of other Somali Islamist organisations were never shy to express 
their views, sometimes contradicting each other. This could be further evidence that the foreign 
transplant plays a great role in al-Shabaab. The following data reflect an organisational chart 
but hardly says anything about the genuine allocation of power among them and between Shura‘s 
members and Maktabs (or ministries).  
 
Yet, one point has to be emphasized. Al-Shabaab – like al-Qâ’idah - is a quite bureaucratic 
organisation if considered in a Somali context or compared to the TFG. People who join should 
provide CVs, IDs, and telephone numbers of their relatives. There are plenty of internal 
regulations that touch all aspects of life, salary scale, marriage and leaves. As heard in one 
discussion, the very proof that foreigners are important in al-Shabaab management is that those 
data are collected, stored and used when necessary, that salaries are paid every 28th of the 
month and that no money can be diverted for long from the organisation without lethal 
punishment. This may sound too mundane but a quick glance at the TFG achievements or the 
inability of the warlords in 2005 to reach half of that standard while they were entrenched for 
years in Mogadishu shows that we are dealing with something different.  
 
Whatever al-Shabaab rhetoric is, the routinisation of those practices and the expansion of 
those would-be institutions rebuild an authority that is heterogeneous compared to, and 
profoundly distinctive of the population (a process that never took place with the armed factions) 
and a new definition of the public sphere. Recreating different social statuses and defining new 
processes of subjection are definitively parts of State-building. There is no discussion that 
those processes take place through coercion and fear, and aim at restoring a military supremacy 
of this movement in Somalia. The period, al-Shabaab has been ruling populations, is very short in 
                                                 
25 Roland Marchal, “Changing paradigm in Somalia”, Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria), December 
2009. 
(http://www.issafrica.org/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/SITREPSOMALIA14122009.PD
F?link_id=3&slink_id=9313&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3) 
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terms of institution building; its legacy at this stage seems more ideological. Yet one should 
carefully assess whether those new practices are taking roots. Six years ago, few people – and 
certainly not the authors -would have believed in the success of an organisation like al-Shabaab. 
It simply happened.  
 
 
2.1. The Supreme Council (Shura)  
The top leadership structure is the Shura. This institution functions by consensus since it 
endorses a Quranic prescription (see Sura 3, Verse 159). Its mandate is to discuss all important 
issues concerning the organisation, ideological, political, or military. Its membership is not known 
for sure. Al-Shabaab websites keep quoting its decisions and views but never ever provided its 
number and membership. Educated guesses go often to 31 members but some observers add that 
after the merging with Hisbul Islaam it grew up to 53. Rumours say that foreigners are included 
in the Shura but one may wonder in which language the discussions take then place. The Shura 
might not be the most relevant in terms of decision making, whatever al-Shabaab websites claim. 
One of its main roles is to dilute the recurrent question on clanship.  
 
In Somalia, political science can be turned upside down: over time an organisation gets identified 
with its leader and not the opposite. Therefore, an unidentified Shura is the best solution to 
dismiss any sensitivity to clan: no one can start counting members of a specific clan family or 
underline the exclusion of some important sub-clans, and so on. Yet, rumours in Mogadishu often 
said that al-Shabaab leadership is controlled by Isaaq militants and that would explain why they 
are so careless about the life of their fighters and the civilians in southern Somalia. One point 
often heard throughout this work is that Ahmed Godane is only accountable to his foreign 
friends and therefore careless while others, like Mukhtaar Roobow or Sheekh ‘Ali Dheere are 
managing a war in the territory of their population and have to care about this latter. Whether 
true or not, this explanation makes a point: the difference between them is not the ideological 
stance but the means for political survival.  
 
The view of the authors which is not based on hard evidence is that there is a dual structure 
with a few members of the Shura being associated to the debates with some foreign fighters 
(including of course those who belong to al-Qâ’idah). Among those Somalis, two are very 
important: Ahmed Godane and Ibraahim al-Afghani.  
 
Ahmed Godane is important because he is al-Shabaab’s Amiir. As per theology, he should keep 
this position until he dies; therefore a transfer of leadership without violence seems near to 
impossible at this stage. Ahmed Godane was very close to Aadan Haashi ‘Ayrow. One can doubt 
that he was selected for any other reason. He has been in Afghanistan several years and spent 
years in southern Somalia (he was in Mogadishu as an employee of Dahabshiil) but does not know 
personally many al-Itihaad cadres who defected after that movement was defeated by Ethiopia. 
As ‘Ayrow (but without his charisma) he is younger than many cadres of his movement. Amazingly 
enough, his speeches echo different styles: one being Quranic recitation, another being Somali 
poetry. This latter is a clear allusion to Sayid Mahamed ‘Abdulle Hasan who led the upheaval 
against the British at the beginning of the 20th century.  
 
Ibraahim Haaji Mee’aad Afghani is, in the view of the authors, a much more powerful figure 
though hardly in the forefront. First, he is better educated than Godane and got his higher 
degree (MA in IT) in Pakistan. He has been a cadre of al-Itihaad and therefore knows well the 
internal history of the Islamist movement in Somalia. His age also provides him with greater 
respect in the Somali society. Over the years, he is the one who developed and entertained the 
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relations with the most important foreign fighters and al-Qâ’idah cadres. He played an important 
role in setting up the administration in Kismaayo against a certain tradition that had failed. His 
role makes him a genuine mentor of al-Shabaab.  
 
 
2.2 The ministries/offices or Maktabs 
There are a number of ministries or offices that are supposed to enforce decisions made by the 
Shura. One can quote the following ones. 
 
Maktabatu Difaa’ is the equivalent of a ministry of Defence. It may be chaired by Ahmed Godane 
since Aadan ‘Ayrow was in charge until his death. It is fairly possible that a deputy handles the 
day-to-day business. All militias are listed when they join and should provide the organisation 
with data about their personal history and their relatives. While data collection is centralised, 
recruitment takes place at a local level and recruits are sent to training camps. According to 
testimonies made by defectors and published in the newspapers, the activities focussed on 
physical exercises (a way to get around sport’s prohibition?) and minimal proper military training. 
Only few get training on IEDs. This Maktab also makes decision on promotion and transfer of 
the military staff.  
 
Maktabatu Amniat is the equivalent of the ministry of Intelligence and Internal Security. His 
chair is a long time member of al-Shabaab, Sheekh Mukhtaar Abuu Seyla’i, who belongs to the 
Isaaq clan. This organisation is tasked with the targeted killings of whoever is believed to be 
associated with the TFG, AMISOM or simply socially influential and ideologically too far from al-
Shabaab. In order to do so, hit squads can be al-Shabaab full members but also sympathizers 
recruited in the schools. This Maktab monitors the calls made by people they believe are spying 
al-Shabaab: often, young students just recruited, are tasked to check the numbers and provide 
the evidence that the suspect is a spy. In May 2010, a mosque in Bakaraaha market was bombed: 
the place was also the HQs of the al-Shabaab Intelligence in Mogadishu (led by ‘Umar Mataan) 
although the primary target might have been Fu’aad Shongole who was lecturing in the madrassa 
adjacent to the mosque,. 
 
Maktabatu Da’wa is the equivalent of the ministry of Religious Affairs and Orientation. This is a 
crucial place for disseminating al-Shabaab ideology and viewpoints concerning Islam, Shari’a, and 
Jihad. Da’wa is an essential task for al-Shabaab whenever it has to interact with the population. 
Its members underline their radical teachings in Quranic schools and other educational facilities. 
Furthermore, one should be aware that da’wa is also performed for the business people, the 
women and so on. Behind this priority, there is a basic principle taken from the Wahhabi 
doctrine: the Somali culture has misinterpreted Islam teachings and al-Shabaab‘s role is to guide 
people in the right path.  
 
This Maktab has become even more important after January 2009 when al-Shabaab had to face 
former ICU leaders who had joined the TFG and got the support of influential clerics in the 
Arab world such as the Qatari based ‘alim, Yuusuf Qaradawi. Actually, this raises the question of 
how al-Shabaab fatwa are conceived and by whom. It became a crucial issue because of the 
importance of religious fatwa in this context and the difficulty of al-Shabaab to find religious 
authorities able to contest speeches made opponent clerics. A paradox is that important fatwa 
are pronounced from outside Somalia by clerics who stay in the diaspora, either in Kenya, the 
USA or the UK.  
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The chairperson of this Maktab is Fu’aad Shongole (a Somali/Swedish citizen). Over the last 
months, he seemed to have had a series of bitter arguments with al-Shabaab leadership but 
there is little doubt for the authors that he is still in charge though his personal ascendancy 
over lay members has clearly diminished (see chapter II).   
 
Maktabatu Siyaasada iyo Gobolada is the equivalent of a ministry of Interior focussing on local 
administration and politics. It also deals with social affairs. Just before the 
Ethiopian/TFG/ASWJ/AMISOM offensive of late February and early March 2011, this Maktab 
was in charge of Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba, Gedo, Lower Shabeelle, Middle Shabeelle, Hiiraan, 
Bay, and Bakool. Moreover, it controlled at least three districts in Galgaduud (‘Eel Buur, ‘Eel 
Dheer, Gal Hareere), in Mogadishu (Karaan Huriwaa, Dayniile, Yaqshiid, and ‘Abdi Asiis). Its 
leader is Huseen ‘Ali Fiddow (Murosade/Foor’ulus/Haber Mohamed/Hilibi). One can quote the 
names of other al-Shabaab leaders.  
 
The Amiir walaaya of Galgaduud is Sheekh Yuusuf Kaba Kutukade (Abgaal/Wa’aysle/Reer Fiqi); 
Reer Fiqi is a minority in Abgaal politics (see chapter 2). The Amiir walaaya of Hiiraan is Sheekh 
Yuusuf Ali Ugaas (Hawaadle/Reer Ugaas). The Amiir walaaya of Middle Shabeelle is Abshir ‘Ali 
Bukhari (Mareehaan). The Amiir walaaya of Banaadir was Sheekh ‘Ali Mahamuud Huseen 
(Abgaal/Wa’buudhan/Reer Mataan) but was replaced in February 2011 by Sheekh ‘Abdullaahi 
Hasan ‘Umar ‘Anshuur (Hawiye/Haber Gidir/’Ayr). The Amiir walaaya for Lower Shabeelle is 
Sheekh Mahamed Hareed (Hawaadle/’Abdi Yuusuf); his sub-clan is a minority in Hawaadle 
politics. The Amiir walaaya of Lower and Middle Jubba is Sheekh Hasan Ya’quub ‘Ali 
(Rahanweyn/Leysan): he is from a minority clan. The Amiir walaaya of Bay is Mahamed ‘Umar 
‘Abdikariim (Dir). The Amiir walaaya of Bakool is Sheekh Adaan ‘Ali Sheekh Adaan Yare, 
(Rahanweyn/Hadamo). For Gedo, the Amiir walaaya is Sheekh ‘Baas ‘Abdullaahi who was appointed 
late February in replacement of Mahamed Salaad (Galje’el). 
 
Maktabatu I’laam is the ministry of Information. As discussed in details in the next chapter, al-
Shabaab heavily invested in the multimedia sector like other Jihadi movements (such as the 
Taliban who at one point in the 1990s had been reluctant towards cell phones and laptops). Two 
main goals motivate them. First, a wish to propagate their ideology in Somalia and in the diaspora 
while making their (dubious) achievements known to the global Jihadi movement. Second and 
increasingly important, the need to counter the media developed by the TFG and AMISOM.  
 
In the Banaadir Region, al-Shabaab has three FM radio and one TV Channel. The first one is 
Quran Karim Radio FM. It was a private radio which supported ICU and the Islamic insurgents 
against Ethiopia. Al-Shabaab took it over when its owner (Daahir Geele) joined the TFG and 
became minister of Information. The second is Somali Wayen Radio FM. It was a private entity 
but its staff refused to follow al-Shabaab directives which gave an argument to take it over. 
The third radio is HornAfrik Radio and TV. It was also a private entity, that al-Shabaab 
confiscated after a litigation among the shareholders. A last one can be mentioned for 
Mogadishu: GBC Radio and TV channel that followed the same history. The TV channel used by 
al-Shabaab in Mogadishu is GBC that it took over after Radio Barkulan (the AMISOM’s radio) 
used one of its frequencies. At first, Hisbul Islaam requested the owner to close the facility but 
soon after al-Shabaab took over the place.  
 
Al-Shabaab has also taken over a number of private FM radios in the regions it controls al-
Andalus Radio for Kismaayo and lower Jubba, in Buulo Haawa (until early March 2011), in ‘Eel Buur 
for Galgaduud, in Baydhabo for Bay.  
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The websites that currently support al-Shabaab are: http://Somalimemo.net, 
http://AmiirNuur.com; http://Somalimidnimo.com. Over the last years, al-Shabaab had 
developed other websites that were blocked such as http://Al-mujaahid.org; 
http://alqimmah.net (it was blocked but still is operating although the last report dates October 
2010); http://aminarts.wetpaint.com,  
 
Maktabatu Hasba is the Religious Police. It is based on a hadith (al-amru bilma'aruuf wanahyi 
'anil munkar26) to enact justice on the spot: a number of children (not to mention adults) were 
beaten, some even killed because they had the audacity to watch the World Football Cup in June 
2006, others because they wanted to go to a movie or play games in public places. As always, a 
simplistic, rigid and ritualistic understanding of religion created havoc among people who 
nonetheless were strong believers.  
 
Maktabatu Maaliya is the ministry of Finance with a local and global outreach. This Maktab is 
less involved in raising local taxes than developing strategies to get access to major sources of 
funding. Internally as described in Chapter V, it is based on two main deeds: the collect of 
zakaah and sadaqa fii sabiililaahi (“for the sake of God”) and the relations with proper business 
activities (one can guess, port services, charcoal export, etc.); for the outside world, it is again 
the mobilisation of wealthy donors and the fund-raising among the diaspora. This Maktab is 
chaired by Ibraahim Haaji Jaama’ Mee’aad al-Afghani also called Abuu Zalma.   
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The most striking characteristic of al-Shabaab is its ability to evolve and adapt to new 
situations, despite being constantly under threat. This should be understood as a proof that this 
movement has emerged from a very specific history and that while it clearly benefits from 
external input, it also gains from a deep understanding of the Somali dynamics. 
 
The coercive technologies this movement has mobilized to eliminate its opposition and curb any 
protests from the lay population can be analysed as a transplant of techniques used elsewhere 
(and maybe Iraq as much as Afghanistan), notably by Islamist movements, and a legacy of the 
brutalisation of the Somali society for more than 20 years.  
 
Al-Shabaab built itself as the aspiring most powerful Islamist military group. To a large extent, 
its growth was framed in a dynamic of permanent confrontations. However, it was able to prove 
that it was eventually the most credible group, the one that people should fear because it was 
doing what it was claiming.  
 
While it has been able to make this point repeatedly due to many miscalculations made by the 
international community, it has not been able to articulate a project of social and political 
transformation of the Somali society. This focus on the sole military dimension is a striking point 
that cannot be only explained by the continuing presence of foreign troops in the country. But 
politics is not only produced by discourses and explicit visions: it is also an outcome of 
necessities. 
 
                                                 
26 This hadith is crucial in the Wahhabi doctrine: "commanding the good and chasing evil". According to one 
interpretation, it provides the right (and the duty) to stop incorrect behaviour.  
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The bureaucratic structure of al-Shabaab has to be taken more seriously than the TFG State 
apparatus. It reflects a will to duplicate the organisation of other Jihadi movements (including 
al-Qâ’idah), the strong influence of foreigners who want to mitigate problems that always 
hindered the development of a Somali Jihadi group (clanism, warlordism and physical elimination 
by outsiders) and the de facto governing role of al-Shabaab.  
 
While resources are put first and foremost in the military and security sectors, the need to 
(re)educate the population and to govern it without become prisoners of its internal tensions (or 
becoming again a full social actor and interacting with it) has convinced al-Shabaab leaders to 
build new institutions and procedures.  
 
Whatever evaluations made on the ideological debates within al-Shabaab, the key question still is 
whether at one point ruling a population would create a political dynamic that would circumvent a 
mere militaristic Jihadi agenda.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE CONFRONTATION WITH OTHER ISLAMIC TRENDS 
 
 
 
 
Among the many misunderstandings that flourish on Somalia, one is that the Islamist or even 
Salafi trend is born in the civil war. This is untrue and just based on a vision of the pre-civil-war 
Somali society as secular as Siyaad Barre regime that was ruling it. While a full description of 
the development of those trends is beyond the scope of this study27, one may keep in mind a 
number of patterns that helped the more militant section to survive the State coercion and build 
a constituency at least in margins of the Somali society from the 1980s. In particular, it 
inherited a culture of violence and secrecy that translated also in the way al-Itihaad and al-
I’tisaam behaved.  
 
Throughout the first decade of the civil war, other dynamics also played an important role. The 
UNOSOM and the failure of al-Itihaad to make a breakthrough provoked a massive 
demobilisation of fighters. While a tiny minority was supportive of an Islamist agenda, most by 
adopting a strong Salafi stance found a way to rehabilitate themselves within the society: since 
they had become genuinely religious, they were not accountable for the crimes they had 
committed as militias. This adoption of new social codes was also conducive for business 
connections that were helpful in their economic success: Salafi business people first tried to 
help each others before looking for other partners. This behaviour helps understanding why in a 
matter of years they became so numerous in the business realm. While others played the 
individualistic cards, they reacted often as a committed safety net and built on their own 
success (thanks also to Gulf’s funds). Those people in majority were not the most influential in 
the business realm: they often were shopkeepers and wholesalers with few dominant figures 
such as Ahmed Nuur ‘Ali Jimaale, the CEO of al-Barakat holding. However, because of their 
number and their networking, they were instrumental to push well-known economic operators to 
promote the Islamic Courts and play publicly the religious card, though those latter were not 
always genuinely interested in developing political Islam.  
 
This ideological proximity based on genuine beliefs or on opportunism was mobilised at different 
moments but al-Shabaab was not the last one to cultivate this economic strata and get human 
and financial support thanks to it. Their ability to do so was based on different strategies 
explored elsewhere (see Chapter III in particular) in this report but also on coercion and 
eliminating (even physically) potential competitors.  
 
Clan politics was also a reason for some to stick on this religious stance: it was a legitimate, yet 
stark criticism of the factions and was not detrimental to securing properties and business 
deals. The business class that developed in the 1990s was an offspring of the informal economy 
of the 1980s, an expression of the protection economy reframed by the military factions and an 
agency of networks with outside supplying markets. In major markets, business people were 
requested to fund factions without having any leverage on what they were doing. Political Islam 
was an alternative to that situation.  
 
                                                 
27 Roland Marchal, ‘‘Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War.’’ in: Islamism and its Enemies in the 
Horn of Africa, ed. A. de Waal. London: Hurst, 2004 and the more precise study of Z. M. a History of the 
Somali Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaa’ah, FCO, 2010. 
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Salafi militants were also active and the events following 9/11 provided more ground to their 
agenda than anytime before. In all those developments, secular political activists also played 
often a dubious role. While the Mogadishu based HornAfrik FM Radio appeared a very secular 
institution eventually sympathetic to Ethiopia to many in the mid 2000s, its managers played the 
Islamic card at different moments hoping to keep the upper hand on the Islamists while 
strengthening their influence and becoming the main political players.  
 
A last (and minor) point can be made. Fashion is not foreign to the Somali culture. While most 
Somalis are believers, there are many ritual variations that could develop in specific social 
behaviours. When the Islamic Courts got the upper hand in Mogadishu, many Somalis bet on 
different religious factions and overnight became members of Salafi or Jihadi organisations like 
al-I’tisaam or al-Shabaab. Emotions prevailed on any other considerations and brought people 
into situations they had not foreseen.  
 
While this argument is valid, the religious appeal is very powerful in a Muslim society like Somalia 
after 2001. At the difference of other Islamist trends that only had a conventional 
communication strategy to promote their views, al-Shabaab from the very beginning invested in 
da’wa and used the most modern technologies. One may believe that the expansion of internet in 
Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia that took off significantly in 2004 played its role.  
 
Let us now describe the relations with the various Islamist trends: al-Islaah, Majma’ al-‘ulemaa 
(or Ahlu Sheekh), Tabligh, al-I’tisaam and Takfiir wa Hijra. While the relations with the two last 
ones have been marked by ambiguity before open conflict, the general trend has been a very 
confrontational attitude up to elimination. Max Weber would have described this as a staunch 
attempt to get at all costs the monopoly of the salvation goods.  
 
For the record, this behaviour is not exactly the stance supported by al-Qâ’idah that promotes a 
more conciliatory and pedagogical approach. This radicalism seems mostly motivated by the 
relative previous junior status of most of al-Shabaab leaders within the Somali Islamic 
movement and their weak religious background: it is amazing that the key figures have only a 
military background and none of them has ever published a pamphlet dealing with Jihadi issues. 
One can not dismiss the role played by foreigners but the “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi” model28 was 
criticized even by Ayman al-Zawahiri (who happens to be more rigid than Ussama ben Laden)29 
and al-Qâ’idah in the Arabian Peninsula never endorsed it.  
 
 
 
1. The Salafi divide 
The main Islamist organisation in the 1990 in terms of social influence was al-Islaah 30 . 
Established in the 1980s, al-Islaah was ideologically close to the Egyptian Muslim Brothers. At 
the difference of other groups, it kept being a non armed movement but adapted its recruitment 
                                                 
28 In 2007, al-Shabaab thought about changing its name into Jamaa’a al-Tawhid wal Jihad, the same name 
of Zarqawi’s organisation in 2004 (this later became al-Qâ’idah Jihad Organisation in the Land of the two 
Rivers) more than a year after.  
29 Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, London, Hurst and Co. Peter Bergen, op. 
cit. 2011. Yet, the Iraqi insurgency is very different compared to the Somali one. Afghanistan provides a 
better point of comparison, though the regional context is radically different.  
30 Roland Marchal, "Islamic Political dynamics in the Somali Civil War" in Alex de Waal (ed.), Islamism and 
its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, London, Hurst, 2004, pp. 114-145. , ‘Umar Imaan Abuubaker, The Islamic 
Movement in Somalia [in Arabic], 2008, Cairo, Maktab Dar Fikr Arab [House of Arab Thought]. 
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strategy to the war settings. While organisations such as al-Itihaad promoted a top-down 
strategy (control of the power to Islamize the society), al-Islaah bet on a civilian strategy that 
aimed at Islamizing the society to get an Islamic State. This was a good example of bottom up 
strategy so much liked by the NGO world in Somalia. 
 
Logically, the conditions of recruitment were more flexible since the core aim was to involve 
socially influential people, which would motivate others to also join the movement. As there was 
no explicit determined ideology, different schools of thought could co-exist in the same 
movement. People from al-Itihaad were members as well as important economic operators who 
gained some social prestige by doing so. The political path of an Islamist like Dr ‘Umar Imam 
Abuubaker (Hawiye/Badiadde) illustrates well this point. He was a member of al-Islaah, then al-
Itihaad, then again al-Islaah, then al-I’tisaam; in 2006, he became a deputy of the ICU Shura 
chaired by Hasan Daahir and the first chairman of Hisbul Islaam in February 2009. Al-Islaah 
could be seen at that time as a rallying point for all Islamist schools of thought, a network of 
networks or even a bridge between them. As a consequence, al-Islaah became very influential in 
the school system (FPEN) and health facilities (thanks to funding provided by Gulf charities) and 
also among the Somali intellectuals, especially those employed by the UN and INGOs.  
 
The ‘Arta conference in 2000 was their pick of influence and as well the beginning of their 
predicament. The ambiguity of their membership was emphasized by different sectors of the 
Somali society and Ethiopia provided a pamphlet full of mistakes and confusions that made only 
one point: Islamists were all the same and a national threat to Ethiopia31. After 9/11, they had to 
make their views known and refused to endorse al-Qâ’idah views. But the true clarification came 
in 2006 while the factions were fighting the Islamic Courts. A mirror of the debate in June 
1993 when Islamists had debated their conditional support to General Mahamed Faarah ‘Aydiid, 
al-Islaah split on the issue of armed struggle and the support to the Islamists Courts. A section 
called Damul Jedid (New Blood) came out and endorsed the Islamic Courts, while al-Islaah kept 
neutral and increasingly vocal against the ICU “totalitarian” behaviour.  
 
While ideologically both trends are far from al-Shabaab, one cannot dismiss the fact that at 
different moments, cooperation or acceptance was on the agenda mostly due to the war situation 
because of the Ethiopian occupation. But this apparent lull was not for long since al-Shabaab has 
a definite policy to get rid of socially influential people who differ religiously. The most 
important challenge for al-Islaah today is to be seen aloof of the political arena since the 
organisation has reservations on a number of key figures of the TFG and cannot face al-Shabaab.  
 
Majma’ al-‘ulemaa and Ahlu Sheekh are two different names for the same cluster of people. The 
very simple fact that they endorsed Yuusuf Qaradawi stance on 9/11 made them from the very 
beginning potential enemies of al-Shabaab since they strongly disagreed with the concept of 
Jihad supported by al-Shabaab leaders. Yet, one should not be naïve. Someone like Adbulqaadir 
Jamaa’ - a close adviser to TFG President from 2009 onward and currently a TFG minister - was 
at one point a member of al-Itihaad and personal ties are more powerful than any others. Al-
Shabaab until December 2006 had a tense relation with that trend. The end of this difficult 
cohabitation occurred when Sheekh Shariif was arrested in Northern Kenya early January 2007 
but treated well by Kenyan authorities thanks to an US request.  
 
                                                 
31 Medhane Tadesse, Al-Ittihad: Political Islam and the Black Economy in Somalia", Addis-Ababa, Megan 
press, 2002.  
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Those organisations cannot be considered Salafi, though many of its members are. To a large 
extent, they have adopted the mainstream Islamic requirements for Jihad, which is not 
acceptable by organisations like al-Shabaab or al-Qâ’idah. Only then tactics put off the violent 
confrontation.  
 
 
 
2. al-I’tisaam, Muqawama and the Salafi trend 
As always in Somalia (and elsewhere) it is difficult to give ideology a major role in defining 
factions and making sense of their behaviour. For instance, al-Tabligh and al-Shabaab may 
actually have many religious commonalities since the Salafism of the latter is very close to the 
Deobandi doctrine of the former. Yet, they act in different ways. Al-Tabligh in Somalia 
promotes a ritualistic Islam but does not impose it on the people; most of its lectures deal with 
strictly religious issues; Jihad is rarely mentioned and, if the case, it is in its two meanings (holy 
war versus spiritual effort).  
 
As explained in Chapter I, al-Itihaad and al-I’tisaam are two different organisations. Yet, while 
ideologically al-I’tisaam is strongly endorsing Wahhabism and Jihad, the personal connections 
between people have often survived the different agendas, a difference that became often 
notional in front of the common threats they were facing. This is a very important aspect that 
sheds light on the influence of Hasan Daahir Aweys. 
 
A second ambiguity deserves clarification. Al-I’tisaam claimed to be a Jihadi organisation but 
their ambitions were mainly national or at one point regional because of the Ethiopian region of 
Ogaden. This was the motto of Hasan ‘Abdallah Hirsi Turki (Ogaadeen/Mahamed Zubeyr/Reer 
Isaaq) who claimed to have a Jihadi regional agenda while his recruits belong only to his clan. For 
many others, this Jihadi agenda meant only sympathy towards others Islamists involved in wars 
against the “West” and military ambitions concerning Somalia.  
 
Over one decade, they indeed showed little stamina to promote an Islamic State in Alaska (as 
the regional governor of Lower and Middle Jubba Sheekh Hasan Ya’qub ‘Ali said in an interview 
with Al-Jazera) and the cooperation for the terrorist attacks in Kenya in August 1998 and 
November 2002 seemed to not have involved significant sections of this group. The bravado of a 
Hasan Daahir Aweys claiming that he would free Guantanamo prisoners could hardly be taken 
seriously.  
 
As said earlier, when Mu’askar Mahkamad was set up, many cadres of al-I’tisaam joined what 
became soon known as al-Shabaab. At that time, those were a minority within the Somali society 
and knew that they were targeted (and targeting...). Global events were not inciting to 
moderation: the discourse on the GWOT and Western policy in the Middle East could hardy get 
support from lay Muslims. Rallying into al-Shabaab was a military success but then came the ICU 
era and new arguments started to develop.  
 
In October 2006, Sheekh Dr. Bashiir Ahmed Salaad (then chairperson of al-I’tisaam) was tasked 
to organise a meeting of all Islamist trends within the ICU to build a new umbrella organisation, 
al-Wifaq. This latter would be the place where all participating groups could settle differences 
before they become problems that stall the ICU. After a few months of existence, it was indeed 
clear that the ICU was not working properly and that differences got bitter even among 
Islamists, while the situation required a strong cohesion since Ethiopia was already in Baydhabo 
and popular support for the ICU dissipating. Mukhtaar Roobow and Ahmed Godane who attended 
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the gathering left in fury and, as usual, the meeting was denounced by ‘Aadan ‘Ayrow who called 
its participants murtadin (apostates, not least!). Al-Wifaq was a born dead organisation but his 
chairman did not appreciate al-Shabaab behaviour.  
 
The war against Ethiopia was another motive of division. After a five-day fighting in Mogadishu 
in spring 2007, it became clear that the confrontation against Ethiopia and the TFG would take 
longer and that a political expression of the Resistance was needed. Asmara did play a strategic 
role in setting up the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) in which the former ICU 
(and Islamist) cadres had the biggest influence. Al-Shabaab reacted negatively even before the 
foundation meeting took place in Asmara and kept criticizing the new organisation after, 
although a number of known al-Shabaab operatives (including Mukhtaar Roobow and Khaliif 
‘Adale) were present in Asmara. Talks to narrow differences took place early 2008 in Galgaduud 
but brought no solution, especially because the ARS leadership (including Hasan Daahir Aweys) 
were already discussing a possible dialogue with the TFG and the international community.  
 
The ARS divisions were expected and just reinforced al-Shabaab. While the Djibouti process 
took place, al-Shabaab grew thanks to ICU defectors who believed that the ARS was bought by 
either Eritrea or Western powers. The conclusion of the Djibouti process was the departure of 
a group of former ICU cadres to the TFG and the subsequent creation of Hisbul Islaam. Ethiopia 
left the country early January 2009 and the Islamists needed a fresh assessment of the new 
political situation.  
 
Contradictions developed on two fronts. Politically again there was a new attempt to mend the 
rifts between the former ICU leadership. Dr. Bashiir Ahmed chaired a new committee to 
organize a mediation process and his work was again bitterly criticised and labelled by al-
Shabaab. This was another blow to the face of a well-known Islamist who had more religious 
credentials than his critics.  
 
Militarily the cooperation between al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islaam commanders went cold and then 
degenerated quickly. The main argument became the control of Kismaayo administration, the 
port city that had been taken over by a loose alliance of al-Shabaab and Raas Kambooni fighters 
in August 2008. The deal was that each faction had a 6 month mandate on the city but, 
unsurprisingly, al-Shabaab refused to honour the agreement when its period was over. 
Meanwhile, a number of Raas Kambooni commanders rallied al-Shabaab (money might have been 
involved) and at one point the deputy and son-in-law of Hasan Turki, Ahmed Madoobe, called for 
a military confrontation between Hisbul Islaam and al-Shabaab since the negotiations were at a 
standstill. Once more, Hasan Daahir tried to buy time and deflect the fighting. The end result 
was the collapse of Raas Kambooni to the extent that its leader (in poor health), Hasan Turki, 
had to join al-Shabaab early February 2010 at a time he had become politically irrelevant32 while 
his son-in-law  became a surrogate military actor of Kenya in the border area.  
 
A next step in framing an opposition to al-Shabaab was the Garoowe Conference early March 
2010. Local religious authorities, Sheekh ‘Ali Warsame who had been the first leader of al-
Itihaad, members of al-I’tisaam and again Dr. Bashiir Ahmed gathered in the Puntland capital 
                                                 
32 The agreement between the two organisations is actually interesting since it states that an Islamic 
State should be set up in the Horn (including Ethiopia) – which was the goal of Hasan Turki- but that the 
jihad has no borders as al-Qâ’idah. Hasan Turki joined because he had no other opportunity: join the TFG 
was unacceptable and he could not leave the country since he is searched by the US and others. The lack of 
political space benefited once more al-Shabaab?  
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and after lengthy discussions declared that Jihad in Puntland had no sense and should not be 
carried out. Al-Shabaab should not destabilise the rest of Somalia, neither Puntland nor 
Somaliland. This infuriated al-Shabaab that has always had problems to religiously justify its 
political choices.  
 
But this event was followed by another one that brought an open antagonism between al-Shabaab 
and respected Sheekhs who until then had, openly or less openly, endorsed its Jihad against 
AMISOM and the TFG. In the jargon, many ‘ulemaa who were supportive of Salafi Jihadism 
seemed to shift toward what is called a Salafi Jedid stance defined by a more civilian approach 
and the refusal of calling for Jihad33.  
 
As a consequence of the elimination of Raas Kambooni, a faction of ONLF (the heirs of the 
former Western Somali Liberation Front led by Sheekh ‘Ismaan Dheere who was also a Raas 
Kambooni commander) engaged in talks with Addis-Ababa and made a deal since the cohabitation 
with al-Shabaab was becoming impossible under the new conditions34. The most respected Salafi 
religious figures in Kenya who used to be closed to al-Shabaab, Sheekh Mahamed ‘Abdi Umul and 
Sheekh Mahamuud Sheekh Mahamed Shibili, supported the agreement while, once more, al-
Shabaab condemned it fiercely and organised a campaign against them in its medias and even 
through a association Baraaruga Islaamka (Islamic Awakening)  linked to al-Shabaab in the USA.  
 
Just before the beginning of Ramadan in August 2010, both Sheekh made speeches about the 
Khawarij in Nairobi mosques. Without mentioning al-Shabaab, they pointed out commonalities and 
reminded the huge audience that the Khawarij should not be considered Muslims (at the 
difference of the Shi’a)35. The term “Khawarij” means in Arabic those who “withdraw” from the 
community”36. Their faith was characterized by Puritanism and fanaticism, strictness in matter 
of belief and the observance of customs. Their view was that any non-Khariji Muslim was a 
heretic, and they included the holy war (Jihad) as one of the main pillars of Islam. They also 
allowed the killing of Muslims and their wives and children whom they considered heretics. For 
the mainstream Sunni, therefore, this term has a negative connotation because the image of the 
Khawarij continues to be that of divisive groups outside the consensus made up of anarchists or 
zealots who are impatient and intolerant. This was a very serious blow to al-Shabaab because it 
had lost in a matter of months the support of influential ‘ulemaa and other religious figures who 
had been very close or members of al-I’tisaam.  
 
One should wonder why those events took place so quickly after years of ideological lull. 
Although this has to be cross-checked, the authors intend to believe that 40 influential Salafi 
‘ulemaa were invited by Saudi Arabia to attend the Haaj pilgrimage in December 2009 and came 
                                                 
33 The website http://somaliswisstv.com/ provides the texts of the fatwa. 
34 http://hornofafrica-abdikarim.blogspot.com/2011/01/ethiopia-agreement-between-onlf-and.html 
35 to add to the polemics, they actually called the Khawarij “dogs of hell”, a message difficult to convey to 
al-Sabaab… 
36 It refers to a group of early Muslims who were originally allied with the followers of Ali Ibn Abi Talib 
when the latter ruled as the fourth Caliph after Prophet Mohamed and led a military campaign in Siffin in 
the year 657 against Muawiya Ibn Abi Sufyan, who would later establish the Umayyad Caliphate. When Ali 
received Muawiya’s proposal to arbitrate the dispute, a group made up of Bedouin combatants broke away 
from Ali’s camp, demanding that the fighting continue until Allah resolves the issue between the two 
enemies. ‘Ali was subsequently forced to fight these Khawarij, but he did not manage to overcome them. 
They continued to operate in various locations in the Muslim world, trying to impose their principles on 
those around them. 
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back in a different mood concerning the nature of the fighting in Somalia. This, if true, might be 
only a partial answer.  
 
A pick of those strains could be illustrated by the death of Ahmed ‘Ali Huseen Keyse executed 
mid February by al-Shabaab. One explanation heard often in Nairobi in that period was that it 
was the revenge by the group led by Mukhtaar Roobow. This latter reacted against the killing of 
one of his close friends and kinsmen (the victim was indeed Leysan) in August 2010 in Baydhabo 
by a Shabaab Isaaq Commander under the allegation that the former was cooperating with the 
TFG and AMISOM. Ahmed Keyse was allegedly targeted by them because he was a close 
associate of Ahmed Godane. This version does not make much sense.  
 
Ahmed Keyse was a leading member of al-I’tisaam and joined Shabaab in 2006 as many others. 
Although he is Isaaq/Eidegalle and therefore seen in south Somalia close to Ahmed Godane for 
that mere reason, one cannot expect of someone near to the Shabaab’s leader to travel freely to 
Djibouti (2009) and Hargeysa (2010) and walk alone in Bakaraaha market (at the time he was 
arrested in January 2011). Moreover, Ahmed Keyse was kept in jail for more than a week before 
getting sentenced: Godane had plenty of time to save him at the difference of what happened in 
Baydhabo in August 2010 when Roobow’s friend was killed on the spot.  
 
A more serious explanation can be based on our previous argument: the relations between al-
I’tisaam and al-Shabaab have gone from bad to worse over the last months and there won’t be 
any reconciliation. One can add the need for the Shabaab leadership to contain the expressions 
of sympathy toward Hasan Daahir Aweys that followed the “merging” of Hisbul Islaam and 
Shabaab late December 2010 (read below). Last but not least, one should also not completely 
dismiss the possibility that Ahmed Keyse was entertaining relations with the TFG and others. 
 
 
 
3. The merging with Hisbul Islaam (December 2010) 
As witnessed different times over the years, the relations between Hasan Daahir Aweys and the 
founding members of al-Shabaab have been marked by indecision, anger and sympathy. Aadan 
Haashi ‘Ayrow became head of the ‘Ayr Islamic Court militias (Hifka Halane) thanks to the old 
Islamist leader who did not antagonize his actions for months. Later on, at different moments, 
Hasan Daahir tried to find common ground while he was losing people or had to pay for the 
consequences of al-Shabaab unilateral actions. On 21st December 2006, while meeting with Louis 
Michel, the European Commissioner for Development, he was trying to get a sense of the fighting 
that had started the same morning.  
 
It will be easy, as journalists do, to remind readers that he had been on the US (then UN, then 
EU) terror list from September 2001 and had had relations with al-Qâ’idah people from the 
early 1990s. Therefore, despite some disagreements, there is no surprise of a long comradeship 
between him and this organisation he contributed to create37. In that view, he would appear as 
either an unconscious leader or a victim of his own creation.  
 
Without entering into too many details, one can say that his main principle was to keep the unity 
of a movement at a time he thought his Islamist project was threatened by different foreign 
                                                 
37 This is typically an outcome of the “religion of the list”: no facts are needed and no analysis required. As 
we know, the US and the international community never make mistake nor play politics with the management 
of terrorism…  
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interventions. Although he has been a dedicated Salafi, he still proves some flexibility coping 
with situations when al-Shabaab leadership would overreact. He shows respect to elders even 
when he disagrees with them and, from time to time, expresses even open minded views (and also 
al-Shabaab compatible statements). In September 2006, when an Italian nun was killed in 
Mogadishu, he went on air to say that foreigners working for the Somali population such as the 
late nun should be welcomed and protected. Not an easy speech in front of al-Shabaab.  
 
Al-Shabaab also had a long term plan to recruit all Islamists under its flag without compromising 
at all on its own ideology and structure of leadership. The concept was more monopolising the 
religious legitimacy than building a large front to defeat the TFG and its foreign allies.  
 
Arguments with ‘Aadan ‘Ayrow and later with Ahmed Godane were numerous on petty and 
strategic issues throughout 2006-2010. When the ARS was to be established, al-Shabaab 
leadership became highly sarcastic and criticized the “old man” for his allegiance to clan and his 
tolerance towards secular people. Yet, Hasan Daahir had a name and was respected by many al-
Shabaab commanders who had been members of al-Itihaad or al-I’tisaam.  
 
The turning point was the defeat of Raas Kambooni. From that period on, the time life of Hisbul 
Islaam was counted. As for other factions, what al-Shabaab did was to dismantle piece by piece 
Hisbul Islaam structure, by buying local commanders, killing others and taking over important 
places from its rival movement. The last step was the taking over of Buur Hakaba, followed the 
following weeks by Luuq and Afgooye in December 2010. This was the military end of the 
movement.  
 
Yet, timing was important. After the failure of the Ramadan 2010 offensive, al-Shabaab 
leadership entered into a bitter argument (see below). Ahmed Godane and his supporters were 
willing to downplay the role of Mukhtaar Roobow and Sheekh ‘Ali Dheere by introducing another 
key figure that would compete with them: Hasan Daahir. It was also the hope to bring 
experienced fighters to al-Shabaab after the Ramadan defeat.  
 
When discussions started early October 2010, Hisbul Islaam was not weak enough and Hasan 
Daahir still in a position to disagree. The Hisbul Islaam negotiating team put only two conditions: 
the name of the new organisation should be changed and a new leader appointed. It kindly 
proposed that al-Shabaab provided a list of 5 or 3 names and selection would be made by Hisbul 
Islaam. This was not acceptable and the discussions were cut for a while, until Hisbul Islaam lost 
its last important base in Buur Hakaba.  
 
What Ahmed Godane had not envisioned because of his contempt for the old leader, was that 
Hasan Daahir was old indeed but also a living memory of the Somali Islamic movement. Suddenly, 
al-I’tisaam commanders who had joined al-Shabaab came to congratulate him while Mukhtaar 
Roobow, Sheekh ‘Ali Dheere and even Fu’aad Shongole who had personal scores to settle with 
Godane sided with him and endorsed his request to get international assistance to cope with the 
drought. This request was echoing a fatwa by Dr. Bashiir Ahmed and other al-I’tisaam ‘ulemaa 
who said that international humanitarian aid was allowed and those forbidding it bad Muslims. 
This was too much public divergence with the official al-Shabaab stance and provoked an internal 
shake up (see next section).  
 
However, Hasan Daahir was also useful for al-Shabaab beyond this tug-of-war. The new TFG 
cabinet mistreated the ‘Ayr clan (at least that was the common perception among that clan) and 
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Hasan Daahir could hopefully create a new momentum in favour of al-Shabaab. That is why in 
February 2011 new positions were given to al-Shabaab commanders who belong to that clan.  
 
Beyond these competitions among the leadership the merging of the two groups is not going to 
benefit much to al-Shabaab while it constitutes one more blow to the TFG. The international 
community (at least at the time of the Djibouti process) considered those behind Hasan Daahir 
(either as Muqawama or as Hisbul Islaam), very close to al-Shabaab. But, the truth of the 
matter is that Hisbul Islaam has always been very close to the (new) TFG. A good illustration of 
that point is that most defectors went from one group to the other, rarely to al-Shabaab. A 
more open attitude to Hasan Daahir and his supporters in Asmara and Somalia may have brought 
a quite different result. But Sheekh Shariif was so nicely moderate… 
 
Hisbul Islaam militias were not very different from the clan militias – in particular they are more 
experienced than the average al-Shabaab fighters, to the extent that few felt the mood to help 
al-Shabaab fight against ASWJ in Galgaduud (as far as Sufism is concerned). Although some are 
genuine Salafi and even close to al-Shabaab, most chew qaat, smoke cigarettes and play strong 
clan allegiance. When the two organisations merged, many preferred to shift to the TFG than to 
go back to a training camp and cope with lectures by Sheekhs appointed by al-Shabaab.  
 
This characteristics help understand also why many people moved from the Afgooye corridor 
back to TFG area in Mogadishu. While they knew how to deal with Hisbul Islaam militias without 
changing their social habits, the take-over by al-Shabaab was not a promise of compromise.  
 
 
 
4.  The collusion with Takfiir wa Hijra  
In Somalia, as in many other Muslim countries, an organisation claiming to be a clone of the 
Egyptian Takfiir wa Hijra developed before the civil war. That movement did not manage to grow 
in the country. Because the Somali social fabric had not degenerated so far as to deprive family 
and clan relations of any value, enforcing the project of a counter-society was as a result nearly 
impossible, and only a small cluster of militants could accept such a new way of life. In 2004, 
Takfiir wa Hijra only controlled one mosque in Mogadishu, and this was due more to its military 
strength than to popular acceptance.  
 
Although the connection between al-Shabaab and this group dates from Aadan Haashi ‘Ayrow 
(cf. Italian cemetery in January 2005) and Somalis until now debate whether ‘Aadan ‘Ayrow and 
Ahmed Godane belong to that movement 38. Yet, one should not forget the strong dogmatic 
difference between the two movements39. Al-Shabaab calls people murtadin (apostates) based on 
their political stance while Takfiir wa Hijra has a deeply rooted theological definition of the 
right way. This implies that at the personal level, relations may not be so warm between al-
Shabaab commanders and their Takfiir colleagues despite a common will to fight the TFG and 
AMISOM.  
 
The Takfiir group may actually consider some of its associates just as bad Muslims as the TFG 
supporters. There is however a theological justification to such an alliance. The Prophet always 
benefited from the support of his grand father, Abu Talib, who was not a Muslim. Ibn Taymiyyah 
                                                 
38 The authors are divided on the answer.  
39 there is a distinction between Takfiir bil Hukum and Takfiir bil ‘Aqiida according to the emphasis put on 
the individual versus the State and society. 
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indicates that in time of war one should choose a strong military leader even if his faith has 
weaknesses more than a great ‘alim whose leadership’s capacity would be weak40. Even radicalism 
has its flexibility. 
 
The first public clash between the two groups occurred just after the Shamo Hotel bombing on 
December 3rd, 2009. For what the authors have been told repeatedly, the bombing was decided 
by al-Shabaab leadership who then was struck by the popular outrage because of the death of 
innocent medical students and, among others, of a respected educationist, Ibraahim Hasan 
‘Addoow41. Therefore, it decided to distance itself from the bombing.  
 
Takfiir considered this move as a genuine betrayal: the one who committed suicide was shahiid 
and should have been praised accordingly. This stance was logical due to their theological 
understanding: the students were as infidels as the TFG ministers killed. Political opportunism 
was not allowed. The argument went bitter until other serious problems in the conduct of the 
war got on the top of their agenda but no common agreement was ever found on this case. 
 
At the opposite of what AMISOM and others said, the authors intend to believe that the 
attempt to create an organisation called Millet Ibraahim in the following months was either a 
pure scam by TFG and/or some of its international friends or materialized the will of Takfiir to 
create its own trend within Shabaab. In any case, it failed.  
 
Some other military clashes happened and attested unsolved tensions. In May 2010, a grenade 
was launched in a Takfiir mosque in Kismaayo, a couple of days after Fu’aad Shongole was 
wounded in the bombing of his mosque in Bakaraaha market. The possibility of a manipulation 
cannot be completely dismissed.  
 
In the same period a high ranking Shabaab/Takfiir official, Dhoobley police chief Da’uud ‘Ali 
Hasan, was arrested and executed in Kismaayo on March 20th, 2010. There are two 
interpretations of that event: one based on clan; the other on conflicting ideologies. At the end 
of a clash against Ahmed Madoobe’s forces at Diif base near Dhoobley, three prisoners were 
made by this officer and executed despite an explicit order from the Dhoobley Governor 
Sheekh Mahamed Arab to keep them alive. The clan reading is that this latter as the three 
prisoners belong to the same Ogaadeen sub-clan as Ahmed Madoobe, Mahamed Zubeyr, while the 
commander on the ground belongs to another Ogaadeen sub-clan, ‘Owlyahan. This is why the 
Dhoobley police chief can be accused to have settled clan scores and diyya (blood money, mag in 
Somali) was not accepted though proposed. The ideological reading is that a Takfiir member is 
not supposed to show mercy in front of people allied with the West. Takfiir leaders said that 
their fellow member was killed because he was Takfiir though one can also claim that he 
disobeyed an explicit order and did not respect the chain of command.  
 
In Qansardheere, Takfiir built a mosque that quickly after was taken over by al-Shabaab forces 
in fall 2009 and transformed into a police station since another mosque was already available for 
the inhabitants. This was perceived as a further humiliation by the Takfiir leadership who 
claimed that that was the fifth incident of this kind.  
                                                 
40 Ahmed Ibn Taymiyyah, Alsiyasa alsharciya fii islaax alraacee w alraaciyat (in Arabic), Beirut, Maktab 
‘Asriya, 2008 [1328].  
41 He was the main figure of Haber Gidir/Sa’ad Islamists (he actually belonged to Reer Nimaale). He was in 
charge of the ICU foreign relations. Initially among the hardliners, he ended that period with more flexible 
and realistic views.  
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When Shabaab took over Buulo Haawa in October 2009, Takfiir fighters were numerous in its 
ranks and files. An important decision for the lay people was that all animals should be 
slaughtered in a specific place under the instruction of a Shabaab Sheekh who happened to be 
Takfiiri. It did not take long for tensions to rise because of the contempt he treated the lay 
people with. After several complains, al-Shabaab higher Commander visited Buulo Haawa and 
dismissed the Sheekh but also allowed local people to slaughter their animals at home if this was 
only for private consumption. Again, one may argue that there were two different problems: one 
being the obligation to slaughter animals in a defined place; the other to do so under a Takfiiri 
Sheekh.   
 
In February 2011, more than 100 relatives of Takfiir fighters and Sheekhs were arrested in 
Merka and Wanlaweyn (Lower Shabeelle). It should be noted that no official charges against 
them was made and only a Wanlaweyn Sheekh made a controversial statement on their “un-
Islamic” practices. Before the merging, this area was under Hisbul Islaam control: this could 
explain why a looting took place after the Takfiir people were arrested. 
 
There are basically two different explanations of this situation. Both are worth considering 
though the authors believe that the first one – very much promoted by the TFG and some in the 
international community – does not encompass all elements and overemphasizes a leadership 
crisis that, at this stage, cannot materialize for reasons explained below. Debates, 
contradictions, ego confrontations and arguments should be seen as the daily plate in any armed 
or political movements, including the Salafi Jihadi groups: one needs more to get a split. 
 
The first one emphasizes a strong leadership crisis among al-Shabaab organization and the 
ongoing attempt by Takfiir to reorganise itself within the movement to have better leverage and 
more influence. Of course, such a move cannot be allowed by al-Shabaab current leaders since 
other trends would take the same path. Therefore, the current repression and humiliation.  
 
The authors’ preferred explanation (at this stage) is that the moving element is the absolute 
need of al-Shabaab to recover popular support. This decision to put under arrest many Takfiiri is 
therefore connected to other elements of Shabaab politics: for instance the astonishing speech 
made by Mukhtaar Abu Zubeyr late January 2011, just after Fu’aad Shangole’s even more 
surprising (see below). To a large extent, al-Shabaab has to cope with an ideological war and 
seems to have lost several battles in 2010 when Salafi Jihadi Sheekhs shifted their support and 
suggested many similarities between Shabaab as the Khawarij, as described in the previous 
section.  
 
Over the last two months, al-Shabaab has tried to reassert itself as a fully Sunni organisation 
(therefore the arrest of Takfiiri people seen by most Somalis as the Khawariij’s heirs) yet 
hostile to any compromise with other political Islamic trends (therefore the killing of several 
members of al-Wifaq and al-I’tisaam such as Sheekh ‘Eel Buur, Sheekh Kashka, and Sheekh 
Mohamed Tahliil who was also very close to Hasan Daahir Aweys) that had successfully cornered 
Godane’s group in 2010. The bad management of the drought increased the unpopularity of 
Shabaab and therefore reinforced the need to react forcefully to counter this stage of the 
public opinion (as often heard in Nairobi, “Somalis are leaving Islam because of al-Shabaab”, not 
the best way for the latter to reach paradise). 
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5. An apolitical jihad? 
Al-Shabaab is born as a military populist Jihadi organisation, whose aim was not so easy to 
decipher. At first, until the Ethiopian intervention, its behaviour was characterized by Salafi 
zeal and a policy of intimidation that was unfamiliar in Somalia. Throughout that period, people 
got to know about those who had been killed by al-Shabaab (or its members) long before the 
organisation emerged in 2005.  
 
Yet, they were cooperating with other groups and their Jihadi statements were not taken so 
seriously since the situation on the ground was difficult and few people envisioned a political or 
even military agenda that could encompass more than Somalia and its immediate peripheries. In 
that sense, they were not different from other groups such as Hasan Turki’s Raas Kambooni that 
also had a Jihadi agenda but restrained to the Ethiopian Ogaden Region (and Somalia).  
 
The period of the Islamic Courts showed also that al-Shabaab leadership was not politically 
united even if they shared the same vision of Islamic requirements. On a number of important 
issues, serious differences emerged among them. The prohibition of qaat or the creation of al-
Wifaq split them in tumultuous manner: Mukhtaar Roobow requested Hasan Daahir to convince 
‘Ayrow and Abuu Qutaybah that the killers of the Italian nurse should be arrested in September 
2006 or even asked the same to arrest ‘Ayrow when the qaat prohibition was enforced. Later, 
again the debates were hot and bitter when the ARS was created as some were for a more 
compromising attitude than Ahmed Godane. When two French (not so) secret agents were 
hijacked in July 2009 in Mogadishu and, at one point, held by Hisbul Islaam militias, Mukhtaar 
Roobow made clear that he would not fight to get the two hostages as ordered by Ahmed 
Godane: as he said, “ we won’t kill Muslims or die for kaafir”. In the following weeks, one of his 
supporters lost Baydhabo governorship at the benefit of a commander close to Ahmed Godane.  
 
As the TFG and other Somalis are eager to describe al-Shabaab at the edge of collapsing, the 
evidence provided is often sketchy. The authors fundamentally disagree with such a version 
today though their own data are not deprived of flaws for sure.  
 
A number of issues have been discussed again and again over time and seem to have played a role 
in a new outburst of divisions over the last months. There are quoted here but one should read 
them carefully. Many organisations faced a pugnacious internal debate and confrontation of egos 
motivated by personal ambitions is the norm not the exception. As often, we should not assess 
the factions by labelling them moderates or extremists but by assessing the concrete impacts 
their stances could have on the ground within or outside the organisation. Among key divisive 
issues, one can quote the following bearing in minds the caveats just mentioned.  
 
The first one is the nature of the Islamic State. This question is actually not so simple. On the 
one hand, Ayman Zawahiri acknowledged in his autobiography that the most important strategic 
goal of al-Qâ’idah was to regain control of a State or part of a State somewhere in the Muslim 
world since without that the jihadi agenda is very fragile42. Yet, ruling a population requires a 
number of political conditions that may contradict or amend a Jihadi project. Which area should 
be considered to do it? Which organisation of the State, which definition of the citizenry? Over 
the last five years what we have witnessed is a balancing discourse of al-Shabaab; at some point 
in the euphoria of popular support and military victories the announcement that this step would 
follow and in other moments a clear focus on the sole military activity.  
                                                 
42 See Peter Bergen, The Longest War. The Enduring Conflict between America and al-Qaeda, New York, 
Free Press, 2011. 
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Interestingly, there are differences between what is claimed in terms of discourse and what is 
achieved on the ground. Looking at what is happening in the Somali regions they control, one may 
have the feeling that they actually build a State of some kind by doing things that were not done 
before. To give a few examples, not only are they securing the territory and collecting taxes but 
they stress social differentiation, the different nature of the authority, the power of the public 
realm compared to private arrangements (see chapter IV for details and comments). The 
compromise with the sole military approach is that most of what they are doing is eventually 
focused on the security dimension. For instance, the enforcement of certain regulations at work 
places and the rehabilitation of some infrastructures have side effects that are important (and 
sometimes positive) for the population but the reason al-Shabaab undertook those works has 
been primarily military.  
 
Another aspect is the national/regional/global agenda. Clearly, most of the leaders seem 
interested in Somalia, though they pay lip service to the global Jihad. This has several 
implications. First, this lack of interest does not mean that territory controlled by al-Shabaab is 
not used by global Jihadists. As explained before, they are embedded in various bureaucratic 
entities that manage the movement organs and are not only involved in the military sector, either 
as fighters or trainers. They therefore can act decisively. But the next question is what can 
they do without a tacit support from their Somali friends? On the Somali side, the call is not yet 
to go and wage Jihad in Tanzania or South Africa, it is actually to fight global Jihad inside 
Somalia. To a large extent for the authors, the presence of Ethiopia and AMISOM on the Somali 
soil has allowed the various views on local/regional/global Jihads to merge into a decision to 
promote Jihad at the regional level because, indeed, the Somali crisis has become a regional 
crisis and the Western interests are well entrenched in the policies of neighbouring States.  
 
A third aspect that provoked turmoil in the organisation in September 2010 is the actual military 
strategy and its human costs. Al-Shabaab may need the war to keep its propaganda machine 
active and justify its harsh tactics in controlling civilians. Yet, especially in Mogadishu, many 
incidents look senseless and do not impact on the military balances of forces despite huge loses. 
One may talk about a combat Darwinism.  
 
If those killed go to paradise and meet their hural’ayn43, what about those wounded, even if they 
got some money as a symbolic compensation? This is a difficult issue for any army in the world 
and al-Shabaab is no exception to that since it has not the means to care about those injured 
and no discourse to counter the negative impact of this sad reality on the youth and the civilian 
population at large.  
 
The last debate worth mentioning here is the actual policy toward the population. Al-Shabaab 
has not a limitless manpower and the politics of fear it uses to rule the population corresponds 
to both its ideological project of correcting popular Islam and the need to save resources while 
enforcing its authority. This assertion may be true but does not say much about the way clan 
elders should be treated and local non political grievances answered.   
 
Over the last six months, these questions were again raised all together because of the military 
defeat in Mogadishu, the slowing of the Jihadi discourse, the growth of incidents with the 
population in areas they control and the inability to answer properly to the drought while at the 
same time forbidding humanitarian access. These questions are not new but seemed suddenly 
                                                 
43 The females found in Paradise: “[In beauty] these women are like rubies and small pearls” (Quran, 55:58). 
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more important because of the merging with Hisbul Islaam and the personality of Hasan Daahir 
Aweys.  
 
The drought came at a difficult time for al-Shabaab. Suddenly, it was facing its own limitations 
because of its dogmatic stances. Not only was humanitarian access not allowed but al-Shabaab 
turned very suspicious against even the diaspora’s will to support their relatives. This (initial) 
bad management of the drought increased the unpopularity of Shabaab and therefore 
reinforced the need to react forcefully to counter this stage of the public opinion.  
 
Al-Shabaab stance could be explained not only by its dogmatism and the little care it has of its 
own population. Al-I’tisaam leadership and other religious clerics made a fatwa to declare 
legitimate any aid to those starving to death. At the same time, the West was overreacting at 
the finding of a UN Monitoring Group report despite its omissions and flaws. Al-Shabaab had to 
react to allegations that it was diverting up to 50% of the food aid. The best answer was to 
forbid it.  
 
The political cost was tremendous for al-Shabaab. People demonstrated in several towns that 
were for months under its control. Elders were beaten or arrested, some youth even killed. The 
combat Darwinism was evolving into a mere Darwinism. The organisation needed time for reacting 
concretely (it did so, see chapter IV) but the first priority was to cool down the situation.  
 
It is in that context that the last episode of public arguments took place in January 2011. First 
the opposition to the official line was expressed as key figures like Fu’aad Shongole. Hasan 
Daahir made vibrant speeches that clearly contradicted al-Shabaab decisions on drought and 
repression. While Ethiopia official websites announced mid-January that Ahmed Godane had 
been overthrown and replaced by Ibraahim al-Afghani, a much more interesting dynamic was 
taking shape. Ahmed Godane made an impressive speech to reassert his leadership late January 
and in a matter of two weeks after both Fu’aad Shongole and Hasan Daahir retracted their 
previous statements… Let us review the events in more details. 
 
Fu’aad Shongole, on 25th January, made a speech that was highly surprising for a Salafi Jihadist. 
He basically stated that militias should not punish on the spot people they believe do not behave 
according to Islaam. Only the Courts and the Sheekhs, not the commanders, could make a 
decision. He also advises militias not to identify every wrongdoer with murtad (apostate). He also 
added that whoever fights Jihad should show his face, a staunch personal criticism of Ahmed 
Godane’s behaviour.  
 
The response of Ahmed Godane came only a few days after and was on two levels. First, because 
he still controls the bureaucratic apparatus, the military, the security, the funding and the 
nominations in the regions, he allowed a number of people who could be seen as the rivals of 
those “dissidents” to have a greater public role to show that alternatives existed. Second and 
the most impressively, he delivered a speech that contained four important points: the militias 
should not overreact44, education is better than punishment; the regional governors, the Amiir 
wilaaya, are responsible if things go wrong; public good and properties should be respected by 
everyone. In the following days, a number of regional figures were transferred to other duties.  
 
                                                 
44 In his point 5, he mentions dulqat and dimirin which can be translated by tolerance or «open mind-ness ». 
The point 7 of the discourse also would deserve detailed comments. 
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These moves should be interpreted within a broader context. For the first time, al-Shabaab 
seems to grasp that it has lost the popular support it enjoyed at a point in time and that this 
creates a situation that may dramatically weaken the organisation because of the new offensive.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
It would be paradoxical that in a context when all Islamist groups have had to reassess their 
political agenda, al-Shabaab keeps being the same organisation as it has been over the last two 
years. While the focus on the military dimension is again the highest priority, one should not 
exclude the possibility of some amendments – not only at the rhetorical level - in the next weeks 
and months.  
 
Al-Shabaab seems more aware of its ideological defeat since a number of influential figures of 
the Salafi-Jihadi doctrine have shifted to a more civilian approach. By far and large, except if 
the internationalisation of the conflict grows and pushed those ‘ulemaa to review their stances, 
it is a strategic defeat for al-Shabaab leaders. Today they are on the defensive and have to 
respond on two levels.  
 
They have to prove that they belong to Sunni Islam and that the population needs them as much 
as they need the population. One may expect that the system put in place to assist the victims 
of the drought is kept functioning, this time to set up more social services than today. This, by 
itself, does not mean that al-Shabaab will change its core practices of coercion. It may only 
assess in a more efficient manner their social cost and without any doubt, use its most terrorist 
techniques to undo through fear the fragile military successes obtained by 
AMISOM/Ethiopia/TFG/ASWJ…. 
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CHAPTER III 
CITIZENS OF JIHAD. AL-SHABAAB’S RECRUITMENT 
 
 
 
 
Al-Shabaab started as a populist militaristic organization devoted to Jihad. The very notion that 
al-Shabaab might rule a territory on a permanent basis at first was an abstraction since from 
the beginning its leadership had faced imminent physical threats. From June 2006 until now, it 
has made strides, learning from interactions with others. The first lesson it drew was that in 
order to survive, al-Shabaab had to become socially embedded, with the implications explained 
below. Another was that the very notion of Jihad must be prioritized in a way that is sustainable 
in the medium term, not just in the heat of battle. The third lesson is that to wage Jihad, al-
Shabaab needed to rule a land and a population. Although the points may seem clear, their 
implementation creates different dynamics and occasionally contradictions, according to local 
conditions and leadership qualities. These may translate in accepting substantial local 
differences or in condemning commanders who would appear as crossing the red line because of 
their sudden greater acceptance of Somali customs45. 
 
The description hereafter gives a view of how three main tools used by al-Shabaab function in 
its recruitment process. The first one is da’wa and muhadara (orientation) that have a strong 
impact on the youth because of their age and their lack of religious knowledge. This emotional 
dimension could be reinforced by the use of videos that stress even more the rewards for 
waging Jihad. A second important point is the economic motivation. Unfortunately, Somalis got 
used to a violent environment and the gaps or the social prohibitions linked to the use of 
extreme violence are weakened. Economic reward for killing people (who happened to be 
described as apostates) is therefore not conceived as faulting major prohibitions and belonging 
to al-Shabaab is a way to secure revenues for his/her nuclear family. A third tactic used by al-
Shabaab is a smart process of de-socialisation/re-socialisation of the young recruits. As 
explained below this has a number of consequences that could be positive (unifying the militias) 
or negative (provoking more resentment from the lay population) for the organisation. A last 
aspect should be underlined: although al-Shabaab fights for the control of Somali locations 
hardly known to the outside world (with all due respect to Shangani or Diif), its narrative of the 
war connects its members with global events and issues. To put it this way, the GWOT closed 
the doors of many countries to Somalis but Jihad is opening others. 
 
This chapter is organized the following way. A first part looks at what al-Shabaab could offer to 
individuals. While many narratives emphasized forced recruitment of youth and coerced adults, 
the authors believe that this would be a too easy explanation for skills that clearly mobilize 
different technologies and discourses in the context of the Somali civil war. A second section 
looks at how the media policy they had developed is congruent with their recruitment. A third 
section may bring fresher data in the sense that it explores the relations between clans and al-
Shabaab and tries to make sense of the claim often heard that al-Shabaab recruits in the 
“minorities” (whatever this term means in a Somali context). The conclusion is that the legacy of 
al-Shabaab – if this organisation disappear (an unlikely scenario today for the authors) – could be 
                                                 
45 This is fostered by the constraints on communications between the leadership and local commanders. 
Communications between key leaders have to be kept minimal, especially the use of telecommunications, as 
al-Shabaab leadership is rightly convinced that the Western Security Services are monitoring calls. This 
also explains differences: consultation requires time which is not always available. 
 40 
either positive or as concerning as its existence depending the way al-Shabaab would be 
defeated.  
 
 
1. Joining al-Shabaab 
It is difficult to draw a complete and fair outline of the reasons why people are part of such a 
Salafi Jihadi organisation. Two basic misreadings should be avoided.  
 
The first one is to believe that compulsory recruitment is the norm not the exception. This view 
is congruent with Western values but does hardly reflect the truth. People should also compare 
al-Shabaab with other ultra-violent armed groups such as the Mozambique’s RENAMO or the 
Sierra Leone’s RUF to understand the complexity of any genuine answer. This does not mean that 
people queue to get incorporated into the movement but that the balance between free choice 
and coercion is often very complicated and based on structural motivations (that can be 
analysed) and personal drivers that are highly dependent of the individuals and the very context 
in which they live at the time of decision.  
 
While the authors believe that, in average, conscription has not been performed with guns (but 
with Sheekhs), there are periods when it took place through pure coercion. Last February and 
early March 2011, al-Shabaab got surprised by the magnitude of the offensives in Mogadishu, 
Gedo and Bakool and the amount of its losses. Compulsory recruitment was performed in many 
areas in and outside Mogadishu and even elders were forced to join a fight for which they had 
little appetite.  
 
A second mistake is to over rationalise the choices made by many recruits. It should be clear 
that very few have a decent understanding of the Salafi-Jihadi debates and that ideology –
though claimed – is rarely the main driver for endorsing al-Shabaab. People often are taken by 
choices made through events or by tactics but in all cases they have gone too far to even think 
retreating. This is not uncommon in war situations and the fact that ideologies are religiously 
based does not affect much this dynamic.  
 
Yet, there are differences and one should careful not to confuse for instance Hisbul Islaam 
militias and al-Shabaab militias just because their leaders have been put on the same terror list 
by the US government.  
 
 
1.1. Coerced recruitments 
Al-Shabaab has never been a strong military organisation (see Chapter IV for details), first of 
all because it has never been numerous enough to match its ambitions. Its strength has been the 
weakness of its opponents.  
 
Forced recruitment has been practiced at different times by al-Shabaab commanders, either 
because they wanted to launch an offensive and needed canon fodder or because they lost too 
many fighters and needed to refurnish the front lines before getting better trained supporting 
troops. As far as possible, they intend to train the new recruits before they reach the frontline 
in order to avoid backlash or insubordination later on.  
 
In all cases, forced conscription is not popular but at the same time it is not so unpopular. There 
is a tradition of forced recruitment in the Somali civil war (not to remind what happened under 
Mahamed Siyaad Barre): factions – especially in the first years - needed manpower and were not 
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shy to request elders to provide it. What makes the difference today is that Sheekhs more 
often than elders perform those calls no more during lineage meetings but in Quranic schools 
and other educational institutions. In both cases, the call is made for the youth since it is not 
mature enough to argue about the reasons for which suddenly they have to give up everything to 
fight a war that they often hardly understand the causes of. 
 
Why this system keeps working is because of the relative success of the way al-Shabaab 
socializes its new fighters. Of course, the technique used is mobilizing religious discourses but, 
beyond rhetoric, the same technology is also enforced by many secular armed groups. This 
technique is fundamentally a careful management of a de-socialization/re-socialisation of the 
recruits.  
 
Contrary to perceptions commonly shared in the West, most of the children in Islamist madrasas 
do not automatically become Islamists or Jihadists: in fact, it is often the very opposite, since 
(with a few exceptions) they are socialised in different circles and can assess on their own the 
value of what they are taught. However, al-Shabaab has a definite policy of engaging isolated 
children in Islamic schooling institutions, either orphans or those children who are far away from 
their family. As many other Islamic groups do, they provide moral support, welfare and show how 
they are good Muslims in all matters of life. According to some interviews, ideological teaching 
does not at first enter into this relationship: it is only taught once a closer relationship has 
developed.  
 
Once gathered, those new recruits are mixed with others who have been enthusiastic to join and 
are cut from their normal environment. For weeks they are kept in a closed place where they got 
some military training (mostly physical exercises) and da’wa. The whole concept is to provide 
them with a new identity as al-Shabaab fighters whose aims is to defend Islaam, kill murtadin 
(apostates) and kuffar (infidels) and eventually get to Paradise if God’s will.  
 
This recruitment strategy is far from naïve: Al-Shabaab also creates further isolation when 
needed. For instance, in spring 2009, the media in Mogadishu were full of discussions on how 
Shari’a should be implemented, and sheekhs and ‘ulemaa of all trends were on air: Al-Shabaab’ 
stances were in an absolute minority and even mocked. Child-recruits were not allowed to stay in 
Mogadishu as they could have followed those discussions and agreed with more moderate views: 
they were allegedly brought to a camp near Balladogle airport (about 90km from Mogadishu), a 
place that FM transmissions from Mogadishu could not reach. Again, al-Shabaab trainers 
obtained the monopoly on the agenda for discussions and on their terms. 
 
When they leave the training camp, they have to follow new rules in their social behaviours. The 
most important ones is that they have to look after their colleagues (spying would be a too 
strong word) and not interact as before with the lay population. For instance, they do not engage 
in talks with civilians expect for a definite purpose, they do not move alone and cannot use cell 
phones without the knowledge of their commanders. They are different and should behave 
differently than the average population.  
 
 
1.2. Economic incentives 
While its economic growth was impressive up to 2006 (especially in the period the ICU was 
ruling), after December 2006, Somalia entered into an economic downturn that has not yet 
stopped. Economic opportunities have disappeared and life got much tougher for the poorest 
section of the population.  
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Al-Shabaab, at the opposite of all factions including the TFG, has put in place a system of rules 
and regulations that provides the fighters with a salary that is not symbolical. Although figures 
varied in the interviews, this earning is between 60 USD and 200 USD for a fighter or low rank 
officer. The point is that this is paid not once a year but every month of the year.  
 
Besides fighters, al-Shabaab also employs other people to undertake clerical duties or to 
perform specific tasks. For instance, killing elders, business people or spying the teacher of a 
Quranic school could be performed by teenagers who are not fully part of the organisation. 
While they perform Jihad, they also get money…. 
 
Even suicide bombers are rewarded economically. After they have prepared themselves, their 
family got money (a tentative figure is a couple of thousands USD) and after they have 
performed this act, al-Shabaab members visit again the family to give the condolences and 
provide another sum of money.  
 
Had Somalia been at peace with itself for years, those economic incentives would not have 
worked as efficiently. But one should never forget that al-Shabaab developed in a society that 
has been brutalized for nearly two decades. Social prohibitions and life values are therefore low 
(though they still are there).  
 
 
1.3. Born again Jihadists 
Becoming very religious has been an efficient method to get rehabilitated in the Somali society. 
After episodes of havoc violence in the early 1990s, it was not rare to find former militias who 
enthusiastically endorsed the most radical understanding of religion.  
 
As explained in chapter II, this was not uncommon. The growth of the Islamic Courts provided 
another motive for religious reassertion. But the key event (not to consider more global ones) 
was the Ethiopian intervention in December 2006 that was perceived inside and outside Somalia 
as driven by Washington (whatever the truth is). The Djibouti process, because it was clearly 
limited to those Islamists accepted by the US, did not stop the conspiracy theory, though its 
supporters outside the country were less numerous.  
 
Among those who “converted” to al-Shabaab (a sociologist may argue that this is the right verb), 
one should underline those who were condemned and spent time in jail. Today, a number of 
studies are available to the role prisons play in the radicalisation process of young Muslims and 
this happens also for Somalis inside and outside the country. One should add that this is not 
completely new. A well-known example of this phenomenon in the past is Mahamed Abshir Muuse, 
a very mundane Police General when he was imprisoned by Mahamed Siyaad Barre after October 
1969 and a dedicated Wahhabi when he went out to the extent that, as a SSDF leader, he gave 
the control of Boosaaso Port to al-Itihaad in 1992.  
 
 
1.4. Recruitment of diaspora and East African radicalized Muslims. 
When the international press mentions the foreign fighters in Somalia, one should be aware that 
the term brings as much information as confusion. Many of those foreign fighters may not have 
clear affiliation and went to Somalia because they wanted to “fight for Islam” and got the 
opportunity to reach the frontline. Besides their choice, what is the most concerning is less 
their personal trajectory than the fact they were assisted by a network of dedicated people to 
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send them in Somalia. Others, a minority, are associated with Somali groups or have links with al-
Qâ’idah46. 
 
However, most of the foreign fighters are Somalis who own a foreign passport. This dynamic is 
also valid for the other side of the war since the Transitional Federal Institutions are filled with 
diaspora people. This process started in 1998, increased due to the ‘Arta conference but got 
acceleration in spring 2006. Never ever was the diaspora so deeply involved in supporting a war in 
Mogadishu as in February-June 2006 and latter December 2006-December 2009. It never 
stopped, despite a growing division outside the country reflecting the bitter infighting among 
the Islamists inside.  
 
A second part of the foreign fighters are Somali Abo (or Oromo Arusi). They came in different 
waves, some with their families got asylum in Somalia either in the early 1980s or after Meles 
Zenawi took over in Ethiopia; others were mere economic migrants; a few came after Huseen 
‘Aydiid provided the Ethiopian Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) with a sanctuary in order to 
increase the support provided by Eritrea in his war against the Rahanweyn Resistance Army 
backed by Ethiopia. They indeed are Ethiopians but should be considered parts and parcels of 
the Somali society. As a minority disconsidered by all, they had an opportunity to challenge their 
situation by joining al-Shabaab and did not miss it. One should wonder which proportion of their 
community is actually involved and to what extent they share the claimed ideology.  
 
A third part is made up of the “true” foreign fighters. In December 2006 and January 2007, 
when the Ethiopian army invaded Somalia (and US Special Forces helped them) many of those 
who were killed or arrested were Arabs, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis. Later in 2007 and 2008, 
Somalis mentioned the presence of “white” foreign fighters. Yet, in 2010, the trend seems to 
change in the sense that East Africans (Swahili speakers) seem to get more present on the front 
line. This description is based on impressionistic data and should be cross-checked. Yet, one can 
find a rationale for that change. 
 
First, although several publications quote a number of Arabs (actually Saudis) as the “genuine” 
leaders of al-Shabaab, the al-Qâ’idah operatives involved in the 1998 and 2002 bombings have 
been working closely with al-Shabaab. Those people (the Comorian Fazul Mohamed being the last 
alive after the killing of Saleh Nabhan), have been working in the Eastern Africa coastal region 
for nearly two decades and it is far from surprising that they have had some success in 
recruiting people to get trained in Somalia.  
 
Another way to assess this trend is to look at the migrations. Many Gibil ‘Ad (“white skin”) 
Somalis have family connections with Yemen or Gulf States, because they came from that region 
decades ago. It is therefore not unlikely that among the “white foreign fighters” who have been 
seen in Somalia, some are linked to that history. Moreover, at the beginning of the civil war, 
many Somalis escaped and found refuge in camps on the East African coast. Connections with 
local Muslim communities could have started and developed from then on (they actually were 
often older) and the radicalisation seen in Somalia mirrored also in Kenya.  
 
This ideological hardening was also a consequence of the counter-terrorist policy enforced a 
harsh way by the Kenyan government after December 2006. There is no need here to describe a 
                                                 
46 The authors would be interested to know more about the links between those operatives and Ussama ben 
Laden because it seems obvious for them that only very few actually have that connection.  
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process witnessed elsewhere when intimidation, blackmailing and threats are directed to one 
community despite the fact that only a few dozens or hundreds individuals are concerned.  
 
One should also keep in mind that the real front of al-Qâ’idah today is not in Somalia, but in 
Yemen and, though it is only an educated guess, one may believe that many “white” foreign 
fighters at one point preferred to leave Somalia and go to Yemen where all people speak Arabic 
and are Arabs (not black Africans) and where the stakes are much higher in terms of future for 
the Arabian Peninsula or Global Jihad.  
 
Other reasons are at play that may be similar to what we witness in the Western world. For 
instance, over the last two decades conversions to Islam increased in the Kenyan highlands and 
newly converted people may provide a fertile ground for those who proselytise radical Islam at a 
time of great economic and political frustration. But, such a hypothesis deserves an analysis that 
is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
 
1.5. Challenging the generational privileges 
Al-Shabaab’s generational challenge has to be taken seriously. It has different faces: at one 
level, it fundamentally challenges the lay political leaders and clan elders who have dominated 
the political realm for more than a generation; at another level, it provides an alternative sense 
of belonging and a possible “global model” that promises access to a wider world than the 
parochial universe of daily experience.  
 
Somalia has been at war with itself for more than twenty years: those who have been at the 
forefront in the early days of the conflict have now aged and often enjoy a foreign passport. 
They also have failed to solve the crisis. Elders, who are respected by the international 
community and indeed still legitimate for a majority of the population, are also seen as having 
failed through their inability to propose a brighter future for the young generation.  
 
The victory of the Islamic Courts in June 2006 in Mogadishu meant the collapse of a factional 
system framed by years of civil war. It may be difficult for outsiders to appreciate the rage and 
bitterness of an entire population toward leaders it had followed for years and who were never 
able to bring improvement. To this political bitterness, we should add the economic frustration 
of young adults graduated from the many “Universities” in Mogadishu who are unable to find a 
skilled job. Although remittances and the safety net represented by the clan were able to help 
to some degree, most of those born in the late 1980s and early 1990s cope with a bleak future.  
 
Somali youth face a crisis of belonging: they have been raised to honour their clans, but those 
same clans seem to have destroyed the hope of a better future. They want to belong, but what 
they belong to? This question is especially raised among the diaspora youth and has no easy 
answer.47 Clan is still paramount for the largest part of the Somalis; yet it appears also to be an 
explanation for the continuing stalemate and an excuse for procrastination.  
 
Al-Shabaab offers several alternatives for these issues and also empowers its conscripts as 
soon as they endorse its ideology: its religious ideology edges out historical debates about fiqh 
                                                 
47 Andrea Elliot, “A call to Jihad from Somalia, answered in America”, New York Times, 12 July 2009. 
Jerome P. Bjelopera and Mark A. Randol, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, 
Washington, Congressional Research Service, 20 September 2010. 
 
 45 
and shari‘a, allowing youth to believe that their interpretation of Islam is correct and that they 
can therefore confront whoever is not behaving “properly” in the public space – including elder 
and wadaad (religious men). The version of Islam professed by al-Shabaab also offers another 
advantage to the youth. It constitutes another pathway to globalisation and a way to practice 
their faith in any context:  as Olivier Roy explained, the Salafi approach allows the believer to 
cut him/herself off from his/her local context and seek out a less parochial environment48.  
 
Somali youth also have been very sensitive to a number of crises (the Intifada in Palestine, the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, coercive migrant policies in the West) that have affected their 
imaginations and their expectations. Many have been offended by their perception that at the 
same time teenagers were fighting in Muslim countries against “invaders”, they were increasingly 
denied the possibility to find asylum abroad. A more rational attitude would involve the 
realisation that the latter scenario was unlikely for most, but the humiliation reported by 
friends or relatives in the West hardened the view of many and provided an easier ground for 
radicalisation.  
 
 
 
2. Shorts notes on the media policy of al-Shabaab 
Al-Shabaab has an astonishingly sophisticated media policy, compared both with that of other 
armed groups and its own prohibitions. As explained earlier, the age of the recruits and their 
often rural origin means that the media can have a powerful influence on their opinions. Often 
and rightly, observers point to al-Shabaab’s use of the internet; furthermore, they also 
disseminate widely and retain for their membership a broad set of videos, pictures and da’wa 
speeches. It is paradoxical that a group which so strictly prohibits movies relies so heavily on its 
own videos to gain potential recruits.  
 
From the outset, we must keep in mind that the internet content Al-Shabaab offers Somali 
audiences may not often be factual. Therefore, basing an analysis on website videos and clips 
may be dubious. Moreover, it would focus quite unilaterally on what al-Shabaab wants people to 
listen, not much on what actually they do. Moreover, even videos related to genuine facts are 
often not referring to the truth, especially when suicide bombers are the issue. 
 
Al-Shabaab’s internet strategy has three aims. First it is born of the distrust al-Shabaab shows 
for other media. Contrary to what is often assumed in the West, al-Shabaab had no trust in 
journalism, even al-Jazirah style (maybe because this channel favoured other groups within the 
ICU) and strongly reacted against some Arab media that were misinterpreting their actions. 
Second, it proves that al-Shabaab is a very modern movement since it is the only faction able to 
maintain websites (although the US often closes down its servers) and produce video clips in 
such a professional manner49. Third, it also allows the group to communicate directly with the 
Somali Diaspora wherever it is settled and the global Jihadi movement50. 
 
                                                 
48 Olivier Roy, “The modernity of an archaic way of thinking” in Globalized Islam: the Search for the New 
Ummah, New York, Columbia University Press, 2004. 
49 Other groups, including Sheekh Shariif’s, try to do so but there is little doubt that al-Shabaab is more 
efficient. 
50 One could see sometimes a “copy and paste” attitude. After the Taliban killed aid workers accused to 
Christianize Afghans, al-Shabaab realized that the NGO World Vision that had been for more nearly 20 
years in Gedo was indeed a Christian organisation… 
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As a way to attest its growing strength, al-Shabaab websites have also evolved. At the beginning 
(with www.heegan.net in 200751), the websites offered little: images of “shahiid”, biographies of 
leaders killed in the Jihad and news update on al-Shabaab operations. The only language used was 
Somali. Videos were limited in numbers and marked by an anti-Ethiopian fury.  
 
The improvement (technical of course) came with the second generation of websites 
(www.almujaahid.com and www.kataaib.net or www.kataaib.info and www.kataib.org) : there were 
more videos and the websites looked more professional. Among the materials posted, there were 
more references to al-Qâ’idah and its leaders.  
 
The maturity age (if one can say) came with those websites quoted in Chapter I: Arabic and 
English are used and the quality of the videos has improved dramatically. This could be linked to 
the association with a virtual organisation called the Global Islamic Media. The videos presented 
by http://amiirnuur.com, http://SomaliMidnimo.com, http://Somaliunited.com and also 
http://somalimemo.net/ reassert the difference between al-Shabaab’s websites and the other 
Somali websites.  
 
The former use fresh information on events in the areas they control or on the frontline with 
frequent updates. The videos are shot in a way to prove that they tell the truth in terms of 
location and timing. Even, when they lose a position, they talk about it and provide some rational 
explanations. Besides, there are many speeches related to da’wa and muhadara that comment on 
the news. Those points (the French would say “éléments de langage”) are repeated by other 
Shabaab Sheekhs in their own mosque or places.  
 
Because of the videos and the consistency of their discourses, lay people may actually believe 
what they are saying. They also play another card that is interesting: they give the people who 
watch their videos the impression that there are no filters and that compared to the usual 
websites, journalists do not cook their own news. Needless to say that al-Shabaab’s webmasters 
got their degree in IT. So the people easily trust what they are saying.  
 
Furthermore, the movies al-Shabaab shoots are interesting in many ways, not the least of which 
is their often very varied tones. Some, as for Iraq and Afghanistan, pretend to show a military 
ambush or a victorious battle against the “Kuffar and Crusaders”. Others are more peaceful and 
use the same techniques as the usual Islamic movie production to visualize the paradise, the 
movement’s numerous shahiid, their forty hural’ayn and the like. What is interesting is how they 
translate very traditional narratives into a strikingly radical discourse that allows the use of a 
legitimate traditional repertoire and jihadi discourse.  
 
A semiological analysis would certainly stress the ability of these materials to incite viewers’ 
emotions. Al-Shabaab’s movies go beyond the “romanticism of the AK-47” that so captivated 
Western teenagers in the 1960s, given that they transform an initial sense of humiliation 
through faith into a military ability to react and the reassertion of the individual subject. The 
language (Somali, Arabic and even occasionally English) is also worthy of attention. 
 
 
 
3. Recruitment among political “minorities” 
                                                 
51 In 2011, the website just lists how to get access to young ladies from different countries… 
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In a country and a conflict in which clan appeal has played such an important role, it is difficult 
to avoid reading al-Shabaab through a clan lens. This raises a few intriguing questions. Al-
Shabaab rank and file is more representative in clan terms of the Somali population at large than 
other armed opposition groups which got a clear delimited clan constituency. For instance, 
Hisbul-Islam was made up of four groups which (with some exceptions) largely recruited in 
specific clans and sub-clans. Al-Shabaab can claim to have a broader recruitment market: 
Somalilanders(mostly Haber Ja’alo, Arab and Sa’ad Muuse sub-clans from Isaaq) and Puntlanders 
also belong to the movement and, in south-central Somalia, no clan has a clear ascendancy.  
 
However, Somalis and observers alike are surprised by the fact that certain clans or sections of 
clans seem much more represented than others. For instance, Jareer/Bantus and Rahanweyn 
(who account also for a fairly significant section of the population) are well represented in the 
group’s membership52, and specific lineages of formerly powerful clans seem keener to join al-
Shabaab than others: Murosade/Sabti/Israafiil (the sub-clan that the current al-Shabaab 
spokesperson belongs to), Haber Gidir/‘Ayr/Kulmiye Absiye (the sub-clan that the late Aadan 
Haashi ‘Ayrow belonged to), Haber Ja’alo, and Duduble.  
 
The usual Somali explanation is that Al-Shabaab is recruiting among minorities. It is interesting 
that while elsewhere in the Islamist rhetoric, the term mustasaf (under privileged) is used to 
legitimize a recruitment strategy, in Somalia people got the term “minority” whose use is 
problematic and basically refers at a organisation of the society through clans lens, a vision that 
is drastically contested by the Salafis and al-Shabaab in particular.  
 
While one may doubt that this is simply true, al-Shabaab has a definite policy of recruitment 
that emphasizes the specific status of certain clans. One may also argue that this is an outcome 
of their strategy to penetrate new populations by creating confusions and problems so that when 
they take over, everyone enjoys security53. 
 
It is true that Bantus never were accepted as potential political players in Somalia despite their 
huge number and were relegated, at best, to the position of followers rather than leaders54. It 
would not therefore be surprising that they would join an organization that gives them some 
recognition. At the same time, Jareer have their own internal competitions and they do not 
always share the same definition of their community: there are little commonalities between the 
Makane who are settled near the Shabeelle in Hiiraan and the Jareer of Lower Shabeelle, for 
instance.  
 
The “minority” argument is less convincing when the Rahanweyn are concerned: the Transitional 
Federal Government of 2004 offered more opportunities to this clan’s elites than anytime 
before. These elites are also well-connected with other components of the opposition, so to view 
them as a minority is debatable. A simple explanation for the level of Rahanweyn recruitment 
                                                 
52 The place and role of the Rahanweyn in the TFG, by comparison, would be very interesting to analyse 
since the TFG offered (by necessity) many positions in the army and Security sectors.  
53 Their tactic is often to provoke inter clan killings (by targeting figures of competing clans to raise the 
animosity) and make sure that among the victims are the respected elders or intellectuals who are vocal 
against al-Shabaab.  
54 Even under Siyaad Barre, they were also disqualified; the first time a Jareer was promoted General was 
in 2007; 
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could be that a member of this clan was al-Shabaab’s spokesman, Mukhtaar Roobow55, for two 
years, and this convinced his kinsmen to join his movement in large numbers; he also behaved in a 
way that showed his respect for his clan on numerous occasions, even at the risk of creating a 
row within the organisation.56  
 
The presence of charismatic leaders of certain sub-clans in al-Shabaab leadership may 
therefore explain the relative overrepresentation of specific sub-clans in the organization. 
Although each of these belongs to a powerful clan and cannot in that sense be regarded as 
minority, each of them has been either cornered or edged out by intra-clan politics for a 
significant period under the warlords.  
 
For instance, the overrepresentation of Murusade and Duduble is interesting. One should notice 
that in the 1990s both clans were junior players in Galgaduud because of the Haber Gidir/‘Ayr 
whose number and military hardware made them the “natural” Hawiye leaders. Both clans 
developed therefore a will to revenge. In the 1990s, the relations between Murusade and 
Duduble were not good at all until Ahmed Nuur ‘Ali Jimaale (Duduble), al-Barakat’s CEO, took the 
initiative to invest in the region (he himself built two boreholes to cool down a bloody conflict 
between the two clans) and used his fame to bring (Salafi) Islamic charities to work in that 
region.  
 
After June 2006, al-Shabaab developed a policy of influence in that part of Galgaduud for 
basically three reasons. First ‘Eel Buur was not located near the main road and an Ethiopian 
offensive could be seen in advance; it was also far from the coast where Western war ships were 
patrolling. Second, al-Shabaab troops (then parts of the ICU) were welcomed by the Murusade 
sub-clan called Israafiil because they had Israafiil commanders (Abuu Qutayba, Sheekh ‘Ali 
Dheere and Timo Jili’)57 among their leaders. Moreover, the Israafiil had no member in position 
of potential leaders associated with other dominant factions: the secular faction leader (and 
close ally of Ethiopia), Mahamed Qanyere, and the ICU leader, ‘Abdirahmaan Mahamuud Faarah 
Janaqoow, were respectively Murusade/Fool’ulus/Haber Mahamed and Murusade/Fool’ulus/Haber 
‘Eeno. Furthermore, the Israafiil were historically the sub-clan that provided the Sheekhs and 
wadaads (religious figures) to the Murusade58. Before the civil war, they entertained a tradition 
of Sufism. But, the presence (and the achievements) of the Salafi charities in the 1990s 
transformed this pattern. Beyond the Israafiil, most Murusade/Sabti were opposed to their 
alleged clan leader, Mahamed Qanyere, and thought that a radical change would guarantee them 
a better and safer life.  
 
The case of the Duduble is also interesting. Duduble militias were in their great majority 
recruited by the al-Barakat holding company in 1996 to secure its assets, particularly its money 
transfer and telecom businesses. Since the top management team59 belonged to al-Itihaad, it 
                                                 
55 His sub-clan, Leysan, can hardly be considered a minority in Rahanweyn clan politics since a good part of 
the clan is urbanized in Baydhabo, has an economic and political elite and, thanks to the TFG and al-
Shabaab, a military elite today (which was never the case before).  
56 For instance, he allowed 8 TFG MPs to leave Baydhabo alive when he took the city in January 2009, even 
though they were considered kuffar by his organisation.  
57 As alluded to in the previous chapters, one was the head of Mogadishu Security throughout ICU and a 
founding member of al-Shabaab; the second was a trader in Bakaraaha market in Mogadishu and left al-
Itihaad to join al-Shabaab early 2006; the third one is a leading technician for heavy weaponry.   
58 In most Somali clans, it happens that a specific sub-clan is specialized in religious activities.  
59  They nevertheless were active in the muqawama. A deputy of Ahmed Nuur Jimaale and influential 
commander of Muqawama, ’Abdullaahi Aspro (also put on the US terror list), was killed in August 2007 in 
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was edged out after November 2001 when the US government decided to freeze al-Barakat’s 
assets. This event radicalised several militias’ commanders, who subsequently joined al-Shabaab.  
 
Involvement in al-Shabaab may therefore be linked to two factors, namely the inability to gain 
influence in intra-clan matters and the existence of charismatic leaders who, willingly or not, 
promote the movement among their lineage or sub-clan.  
 
Al-Shabaab leaders are not naïve and know how clan appeal can play out in their society. They try 
their best to use it without being in thrall to it. To a great extent, this replicates the tactics 
used to spread Islam (or varieties of Islam) in a clan society. When they attempt to take control 
of new territory, they put members of local clans in the forefront without involving them in 
coercive operations against the locals.  
 
For instance, in ‘Eel Dheere, an al-Shabaab contingent became the guests of a sub-clan of the 
Ma’allin Diblawe (which is a sub-sub clan of Abgaal) because some of its members were from that 
extended lineage. Then, al-Shabaab tried to take over the administration of the town and 
created tensions with other lineages and sub-sub-clans. When elders argued against harassing 
qaat traders and the like, they were beaten. But expelling al-Shabaab by force would have 
divided the local community. The only solution was to bring people from Mogadishu who belonged 
to the same lineage that was protecting al-Shabaab in order to reverse the decision to provide 
hospitality, and ask them to leave, which they had to do under the threat of force. The same 
thing happened in Gure’eel and Dhuusa Marreeb where al-Shabaab fighters were guests of the 
Kulmiye Absiye, the Aadan ‘Ayrow’s ‘Ayr sub-clan.  
 
Another more sinister implication is that when al-Shabaab is established somewhere and faces 
opposition from the local community, those who act to get rid of the opponents are not known 
locally thus preventing clan becoming an issue and threatening al-Shabaab’s stay. The use of 
strangers is not simply an imitation of a global tactic by the Muja’ed (fighter); it also prevents 
the association of al-Shabaab members or sympathizers - who may have to act within the local 
community - with abhorrent deeds. 
 
Al-Shabaab needs indeed to challenge social structures that close any opportunity for its 
development and prove that it was offering a genuinely revolutionary option to the youth, as the 
Somali Youth League did in the 1940s. That is why when fully in control of an area, al-Shabaab 
tried to humiliate the powerful local clans in order to prove that clanism should be eradicated. It 
also happened in Merka in a very obvious way since al-Shabaab searched the houses of the locally 
most powerful clan figures to show that its domination was over.  
 
There are other aspects that would deserve detailed analysis. For instance, in Merka, after 
taking over the city, al-Shabaab commanders appointed in various positions of the 
administrations Reer Mayo, Jareer/Bantu and Gibil ‘Ad (maybe because they have Arab origin?) 
ostentatiously not to give any positions to Dir/Biimaal and Hawiye/Haber Gidir, the two clans 
that have been competing over the last two decades for the leadership of the city60. This has 
gone even further, since al-Shabaab members got married with daughters of those “minority 
                                                                                                                                                        
Galgaduud by the Ethiopian Army. He was very vocal against al-Shabaab. He was second deputy of the ICU 
Shura and a deputy of ARS chairman, Hasan Daahir Aweys. 
60 The funny conclusion of the story is that after having collected taxes for the drought, they just shared 
the money within their own kinsmen at the furore of al-Shabaab commander who transferred them and had 
to put in charge better trained members… 
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clans”. The practice has not been uncommon in the 1990s since the wife’s family can expect a 
greater social respect and money (Shabaab fighters are paid). In the 1990s, the mahr (dowry) 
had been paid by the new son-in-law by protecting the family-in-law business. With al-Shabaab, 
the dowry is paid by teaching Quran. Last but not least, by doing so, al-Shabaab got access to 
the family in law and could recruit new people from those minority clans.  
 
Denouncing clanism in Somalia is easier said than done and Somalis are not the last to describe 
al-Shabaab internal debates or public arguments through clan lens. To deny this vision, the 
Jihadi movement has not many possibilities. In contrast to other groups, the movement is led by 
a Shura rather than just one leader (see chapter I), therfore reducing the influence of clanism. 
It is interesting that while the ICU had to compromise on clan issues even at the leadership level, 
al-Shabaab leaders were extremely blunt in their staunch opposition to it. After the Kismaayo 
take-over on 22 August 2008, they appointed a governor who was a strong advocate of global 
Jihad and belonged to the Isaaq clan that has no presence there. It was felt that he could rule a 
multi-clan area where his own clan has no stake. The same happened in Merka where al-Shabaab 
appointed a member of the Majeerteen clan as the local leader, and in Bay where Jareer got key 
positions. Yet, of course, clan may eventually influence al-Shabaab internal interactions while not 
being used as an explicit element in arguing for or against a decision.  
 
Even if one accept this loose use of the term “minority”, one should wonder why al-Shabaab is 
unable to spell out a political project that would repair those humiliations and rectify the society 
to make the minorities the equal of the others. This agenda does not yet exist. Al-Shabaab 
seems interested of recruiting them because these latter may feel the outrage of living this way 
and cultivate a sense of revenge. Again, while by many such choices, al-Shabaab could build a 
political project for Somalia (whatever we think about this project), the very military nature of 
the organisation seems to reduce it to a marginal aspect.  
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
The first point to be highlighted is that al-Shabaab has framed a recruitment policy. It does so 
by identifying people inclined to be religious (often sympathisers of other Islamist groups such 
as al-Itihaad and al-I’tisaam), isolated youth and people from “minority clans” who are somewhat 
interesting in revenge.  
 
The strength of the system is at different levels. First, recruitments are often voluntary in the 
sense that coercion is not enforced openly: at the contrary, what is often showed is an 
alternative way of life that makes the recruit share better his religion with new friends. The 
process of de-socialisation and re-socialisation is both very simple and very complex since it 
intends to cut the emotional links with the former environment of the recruit (friends and 
relatives alike) and provides a new one.  
 
One should analyse the messages witnessed on al-Shabaab websites carefully and without 
ideological motivations. Those messages do not radicalize people by themselves, they need other 
elements that are provided by al-Shabaab propaganda in Somalia or by recruiting networks 
overseas. Among those elements, one should not forget that many State policies in the West are 
also much more radicalized than any time before. There is no need here to remind statements 
made by European leaders on Islam or the debatable initiatives in the US to bear this remark in 
mind.  
 
 51 
While a political analysis can show that al-Shabaab benefited from the counter-terrorist policies 
of the US and Ethiopia, a sociological one underlines how its strength grew due to several social 
and cultural dynamics among Somalis in country and abroad. There is a deep distrust toward the 
conventional political arena and a real bitterness towards the clan system because both have 
failed to provide a future for the generation born at the beginning of the civil war. Al-Shabaab 
offers different ways to empower youth: clan hierarchies do not play a major role; the ideology 
effaces the subtleties of Islam and sums it up as a set of short rules and regulations; and the 
group a link to the “far-away” beyond its often-quoted references to the “lion of Islam”, Usama 
bin Laden. 
 
Certainly, policy makers focus on the implications of al-Shabaab survival. In our views several 
should be discussed and are not currently, though al-Shabaab is no more a young organisation. 
The first one is the depth of its influence in Somalia, East Africa and the diaspora. Western 
countries over the last years have been often prisoners of their own mistakes and were not in a 
position to assess the negative impact of polices they recommended for Somalia and the region. 
The current military victories and unpopularity of this organisation may convince people that the 
nightmare Somalia has been in for 5 years would be over. Our analysis intends to show that this 
is not going to happen soon.  
 
Al-Shabaab got roots in the Somali society and expresses (certainly in a perverse way) a number 
of blockages and stalemates both at the social and political levels that no one is interested to 
challenge at this stage. Al-Shabaab offers its solutions which are unacceptable to the greatest 
majority of the Somalis and the international community. 
 
If al-Shabaab seems to have failed in southern Somalia (as flows of population out of the areas 
it controls illustrate), its failure in the diaspora is less evident because overseas the perception 
of what is happening in Somalia is in trompe l’oeil and reframed by the different ideological 
context diaspora people live in. Although the term radicalisation is now becoming fashionable, it 
has different meanings for different people and policy makers need to make their understanding 
clearer. Wahhabism is on the rise in the West, which will translate socially in much more 
conservative behaviours and therefore more tensions with secular Europeans and other Muslim 
schools of thought present in Western countries. Yet, one should not confuse this level 
(problematic for women rights for instance) with a political one where security concerns have to 
be addressed. But al-Shabaab plays in that ambiguity and may have more echo than thought.  
 
Another aspect is the emergence of a Jihadi threat in the Horn of Africa, especially in East 
Africa (and maybe South Africa). This should not be a surprise since all policies followed after 
2006 were based on an oxymoron: al-Shabaab is a global Jihadi organisation that can be 
defeated by a containment war in Somalia. Ten years after 9/11, African States and their allies 
may be smarter to respond to this kind of terrorist challenges. Our view is that this is not yet 
happening. 
 
The current Western paradigm is to defeat al-Shabaab by destroying its leadership. Yet, those 
enforcing this policy should be able to measure whether killing old commanders actually weakens 
the organisation or simply brings fresh blood more extremist than the old guard. There is no 
easy answer to that question. That might provide a further justification to start a policy review. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AL-SHABAAB MILITARY TACTICS 
 
 
 
 
Analysed by these two authors (who, by the way, are civilians), the military tactics used by al-
Shabaab seem less a transplant of doctrines experimented elsewhere than an adaptation of the 
local knowledge gained throughout the various war episodes under the factions from 1991 to 
2006.  
 
This is hardly surprising since many al-Shabaab fighters were already involved in combat before 
Al-Shabaab was even founded. Moreover, especially throughout the Ethiopian presence, Al-
Shabaab requested former military officers to contribute to the training of its combatants: this 
was a way to both increase the quality of their foot soldiers and check the allegiance of those 
officers vis-à-vis the Ethiopian intervention.  
 
Many former military officers were also coerced, some killed61, in the early stage of al-Shabaab 
existence from 2003 onwards, though one may argue that those targeted killings were 
responding to others undertaken by pro-Ethiopian and US surrogate forces. It is doubtful that 
the perpetrators were only to belong or belonged to al-Shabaab and that those officers were 
only killed for not offering their military expertise. Yet, the end result was the same: avoiding 
that other factions got better trained at a time a new movement wanted to make a show of 
force.  
 
However, there are many differences that may or may not be strategic, but these latter attest 
al-Shabaab’s ability to draw (at least elementary) lessons from other conflicts worldwide, with a 
special focus on Afghanistan and Iraq without any surprise. This has been made possible thanks 
to foreign fighters with an experience of those wars but also the presence of those latter in all 
al-Shabaab contingents where they advise and fight alongside their fellow comrades. Among 
aspects that require an attention, five could be quoted here: 
 
a- the use of IEDs and suicide bombers, which are basically new war technologies for Somalia, 
with the caveat of General Mahamed Faarah ‘Aydiid’s fight against UNOSOM II and US forces 
from June 1993 to October 1993;  
 
b- a reshaping of the combat unit based on 9 elements, while the Somali army had developed 11 
member units and Ethiopian army 6 member unit. This number has some religious connotations;  
 
c- a clear focus on infantry at the difference of the usual factional tactics that were coupling 
the use of foot soldiers and technicals in all environments. This situation could be explained 
different ways, either in terms of low expertise of the fighters or difficulty to supply 
ammunitions for heavy weaponry; 
 
d- a high mobility of troops that could be explained for political reasons (in order to avoid 
creating local warlordism as discussed elsewhere in this report) but also by a need to 
                                                 
61 Such as General Mahamed ‘Abdi (Abgaal/Harti) was a prominent Qadiri sheekh and a vocal critic of the 
Salafi movements early 2006. 
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compensate the limited number of fighters vis-à-vis the huge territory and population they need 
to control.  
 
e- at the opposite of the factions, the very distinctive deployment of troops by al-Shabaab. Al-
Shabaab troops are massed on the borders of the territory they control and very few are 
settled in main urban centres they have taken over. This plan of action reflects or dictates the 
politics of fear enforced upon urban civilians. This setting has never been used by al-Shabaab 
enemies to launch offensives despite the clear psychological effect, the control of a main city 
for a few hours could have.  
 
This military paradigm is not static and one can imagine that innovations are discussed specially 
after significant defeats such as that had resulted from the Ramadan month‘s offensive or the 
massive loses after the last round of military operations led by the AMISOM and TFG’s army 
(plus surrogate militias that may from time to time be more decisive that the trained TFG 
soldiers) late February and early March 2011. This section concludes with a tentative assessment 
of the consequences the current AMISOM/TFG offensives may have. 
 
 
 
1. The modernization of war and the globalisation of suicide bombers 
With the benefit of hindsight, the newest strictly military tactics of the war are two: the 
intensive use of improvised explosives devises (IEDs) in urban warfare; suicide bombers. To be 
rigorous, the IEDs are not completely new in the Somali civil war. Throughout the hunt against 
General Mahamed Faarah ‘Aydiid in summer 1993, they were used in many occasions but not in 
the systemic manner of today. The number is indeed so large that the authors have renounced to 
even provide an educated guess. 
 
A last more political aspect should be added. Al-Shabaab acknowledges its small numbers of 
fighters in front of its ambitions and intends to involve as many as possible in the war against 
the “Crusaders” (AMISOM) and the apostates (murtadin). The war is also seen as an opportunity 
for al-Shabaab to convince the population to confront those enemies. Therefore, as explained 
below, al-Shabaab does not initiate skirmishes everywhere on the frontline, it does only where 
and when civilians could be engaged. What is perceived by foreign observers as a tactic to get 
human shield is promoted by al-Shabaab as the way to convince Muslims of good faith that Jihad 
is the only path.  
 
While the IEDs are responsible for killing and wounding many people (mostly civilians), there 
should be qualifications in the sense that every society does react a certain way when casualties 
are high. Without discussing here the case of AMISOM soldiers, one can be inclined to believe 
that the atomisation of the urban society is such in Mogadishu that the number of people 
injured does not directly impact with public opinion’s demands for a tougher or a more 
compromising attitude towards or against the insurgency. Families are destroyed, relatives are in 
tears but the system is not put in danger by those casualties, as far as the TFG continues to 
keep AMISOM support.  
 
The AMISOM does produce figures of killed and wounded people after incidents but increasingly 
they look politically motivated. As a policy, the AMISOM intends to downplay collateral damages 
(even when its own soldiers shoot randomly). Victims from al-Shabaab and from friendly fires 
are considered the same. AMISOM’s behaviour not to acknowledge its own mistakes angers 
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recurrently the population and paradoxically does not create the expected outrage against al-
Shabaab.  
 
Concerning AMISOM’s own casualties, it is difficult to figure out the extent of internal debate 
raised by the growing number of casualties, though one may guess that it is taking place among 
soldiers and officers on the ground. However, no significant political public discussions have yet 
started on the concept of operation both in Bujumbura and Kampala.  
 
In 1993, the use of IEDs was made possible by training ‘Aydiid’s officers in military camps in 
Sudan. Although Ussama bin Laden was not sparing with his own alleged actions to defeat US 
forces in Mogadishu, the involvement of the Sudan military was a more discreet and effective.  
 
The resurgence of this tactics is rooted in the globalisation of combat techniques used by the 
Iraqi muqawama (that included a great number of Iraqi military officers and special units of the 
Ba’ath Party) and the militants in Kashmir trained by Pakistani military officers. There is no 
doubt that this know-how was transmitted either by Somalis who had in the previous years 
fought in Afghanistan and other conflicts (Chechnya, Lebanon) or by foreign fighters who were 
trained by al-Qâ’idah.  
 
Suicide bombing is of course a radically new choice that never was part of the Somali culture of 
war until 2006. This chart intends to provide an overall view of the 2006-2010 incidents. 
 
Action Location  Date   Target  Remarks  
Car  
 
Baydhabo Parliament  18/09/200
6 
TFG President    
Car  Baydhabo road 
control  
19/10/200
6 
TFG/Ethiopian 
soldiers  
 
Car  Darmooley , near 
Bal’ad  
27/3/200
7 
Ethiopian 
military base  
First Somali suicide 
bomber against Ethiopian 
military. 
Car  
 
 
HQs of the Prisons 
Administration ,  
15/3/2007 Ethiopian 
military base 
Suicide bombes used a oil 
tanker.  
Car  
 
House of General 
Gabre 
20/4/200
7  
Ethiopian 
military 
commander  
Suicide bomber failed to 
reach his target.   
Car 
 
UAE Sheikh Zayed 
farm in Afgooye.  
24/4/200
7 
Ethiopian 
military base  
 
Car  
 
TFG Prime Minister 
office in Karaan  
03/06/20
07 
‘Ali Mahamed 
Geedi  
Al-Shabaab used Prime 
Minister guards.    
Car  
 
Afgooye bridge 
control  
30/7/200
7 
Ethiopian 
military  
 
Car Baydhabo Hassay 
Industry near Bar 
Bakin  
10/10/200
7 
Ethiopian 
military base  
 
Three cars Hargeysa (three 
locations) 
29/10/200
8  
Somali land 
authority, 
UNDP, 
Ethiopian 
The action was 
coordinated. Foreigners 
involved. 
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business 
attaché    
Car 
 
Boosaaso , PIS 
office  
29/10/200
8 
Puntland 
Intelligence 
and  CIA 
 
Car  
 
Maka al-Mukarama 
street  
24/01/200
9 
AMISOM 
military base 
Hodan district 
(Labour House)   
Many civilians killed by 
Al-Shabaab or AMISOM. 
Foreigner involved     
 Somali national 
University  
22/2/200
9 
AMISOM/Buru
ndi military 
base  
 
Car 
 
Hamar Jajab, ex oil 
deposit.   
24/5/200
9 
TFG military 
base for 
training 
Foreigners involved. 
Car   
 
 
Beled Weyne  18/6/2009 Minister of 
security, ‘Umar 
Haashi Aadan 
and former 
Ambassador to 
Ethiopia 
Laqanyo.   
More than one hundred 
civilians killed including 
traditional elders, such 
as the Ugaas of Jejeele.  
Cars with , 
UN 
emblem  
  
 
Wadajir district 
(Halane military 
school)  
17/9/2009 AMISOM HQs Many AMISOM soldiers 
killed or wounded 
including the Burundian 
deputy and a Somali 
general 
Person  ,     
 
Wadajir at Hotel 
Shamow  
3/12/2009 4 TFG 
ministers, 
intellectuals 
and university 
students     
Suicide bomber, from 
Denmark; 4 ministers 
died and more than 20 
students and journalists   
Person  Waberi district at 
21 October base  
4/01/2010 TFG military 
base  
This mission failed and 
only the suicide bomber 
died     
Minim bus 
and car  
   
 
Hodan district, 
Maka al-Mukarama 
street  
15/02/201
0 
Minister of 
defence, 
Indha’adde   
Though TFG president 
was accused, al-Shabaab 
websites claimed the 
bombing 
Truck Car 
 
Commercial Bank in 
Shangani  
27/04/201
0 
AMISOM 
military base  
 
Three 
persons  
 
Hamar Weyne , 
Hotel Muna  
24/8/2010 TFG MPs, One of the three was 
from Sweden , another a 
staff of Roobow  
Two Car  Mogadishu airport  9/9/2010 TFG/AMISOM 
leadership 
meeting 
 
Person.  
 
Villa Somalia 
presidential house  
21/9/2010 TFG/AMISOM Suicide bomber 
previously body guard of 
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the Minister of Interior, 
‘Abdulqaadir ‘Ali ‘Umar  
 
 
This list allows drawing a few conclusions. First and foremost, one can see that suicide bombings 
grew throughout the Ethiopian troops were in Somalia. The joint actions in Somaliland and 
Puntland would deserve a deep analysis but the information released to the public has been 
minimal. This is an extra-ordinary event especially when we compare it to the last episode of 
fighting early March 2011 when two suicide bombers behaved in such a hectic manner that they 
were identified long before they reached their target. Again, no clear conclusion can be drawn 
from that series. If al-Shabaab is managed by al-Qâ’idah as it is often said by US experts, then 
one should wonder why no other bombing incident has reached that level of sophistication?  
 
Never before Ethiopian intervention was the radicalisation so high and were people so numerous 
to be ready to lose their life to fight those they considered occupying forces. This again shows 
that al-Shabaab despite its repeated claims on Jihad had more success and followers as an ultra-
nationalistic organization. After Ethiopian soldiers left Somalia, the suicide bombings did not 
stop. While the targets are understandable, there is one aspect that could be underlined. All 
major bombings took place after al-Shabaab influential commanders were either killed or 
defeated in a humiliating manner… 
 
A major concern is also the role played by the diaspora as a strategic supplier of suicide 
bombers62. One can see an alarming pattern for countries that host huge Somali communities, 
although the number of people joining al-Shabaab (and suicide bombers) is in proportion very low. 
This indeed raises questions on the sophistication of the recruiting networks, their possible 
ability to reach out other Muslim communities or indigenous people who got converted.  
 
Of course, not only suicide bombers are recruited in the diaspora but also many Al-Shabaab 
commanders who travel to Somalia for few months and then go back to their family, also collect 
money and convince others to join the fray. It is not so extraordinary. For instance, many 
Darfuri students at Khartoum universities had their period in the field and went back to their 
study after several months of absence from the University. What makes the situation both 
comical and concerning is that people claiming in Somalia to be committed to Jihad just take a 
break from time to time to visit their relatives and collect their welfare allowances.  
 
Another aspect deserves attention. Despite all claims on madrassas that brain wash children, the 
number of local suicide bombers is minimal. Moreover, they seem to obey one pattern: to have 
been in the inner circle of leaders. Mukhtaar Roobow Abu Mansuur is a good example of this 
situation since at a minimum twice some of his bodyguards committed suicide. That should, if not 
alter, at least question the image of moderation he enjoys easily among foreign diplomats. The 
last September attempt killing of the TFG President offers also some food for thought. The 
suicide bombers was part of ‘Adbulqaadir ‘Ali ‘Umar’s militias and defected after an argument. 
Joining Al-Shabaab for him was not a Copernician revolution. Again, the borders, foreign 
observers draw too easily do not always make sense for Somalis.  
 
                                                 
62 A recent case being Bashir Qassem (from Bagadi clan) who spent a long time in Kuwait and came back to 
become suicide bomber (against the TFG police station) late February 2010. His father was a well-known 
and respected police officer. His personal history was discussed by many Somalis since he seems to be 
typical of recruits for suicide bombing who are known to be psychologically fragile.  
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Al-Shabaab’s aim is also to get the population involved in the fight. This can be understood two 
ways. One is rooted in its ideology: Jihad for al-Shabaab ideologues is a personal decision but 
they expect events to prove those reluctant to follow them that they are wrong and should join 
the battle. The second one is the comparison its leaders can make between the popular sympathy 
and active support they enjoyed while Ethiopian forces were in Somalia, and the fear and 
escapism people show after January 2009 toward them. This golden age is bygone but al-
Shabaab is not shy to educate people with its own methods. 
 
 
 
2. Organizing the coexistence of foreign and local fighters 
Al-Shabaab has reformed the military organisation in a way that is not decisive but yet may 
question some assumptions. First, the basic unit is made up of 9 fighters and its higher level is 
4063. Second, the contingents are always mixed as foreign fighters have to be immersed among 
lay soldiers. Third, the location of the troops is based on possible threats and not on strict 
control of the population. Four, the relations with the population are regulated and al-Shabaab 
fighters kept most often isolated in order not to engage the locals and rebuild ties with civilians. 
Five, this relative isolation provides them with a greater capability to move from one area to 
another. Those points are developed hereafter. 
 
Ethiopian patrols in Mogadishu use to move by unit of 6 armed with one rocket propelled grenade 
(RPG) or one bazooka and one machine gun (like PKM). In the Somali army, the basic unit was 
made up of 11 soldiers: one specialist in radio, one nurse and 9 combatants. Strangely enough, al-
Shabaab kept the core combatant unit at 9 fighters equipped either with the same or with 2 
bazookas and 1 PKM. The number 9 is also a religious reference: Tabligh people proselytise by 
groups of nine.  
 
The commanders of the 40 unit deserve some comments. At the difference of the chiefs of 
basic units or most foreigners, they show their face and are known even to the civilians. This is 
both an insurance (if they defect, they can be located and eliminated) and a need since they have 
to talk in the mosques, make da’wa and be involved in increasing civilian administrative duties. 
 
This identification is important because it obliges al-Shabaab to deal with clan issues. Most 
often, the commander does not come from the area he is operating. His appointment takes the 
importance of the area and its statute in the war into consideration. For instance, if the area is 
at the border with a territory controlled by the enemy, then the commander belongs to the main 
clan, that owns that territory. If the commander operates in a safe area for al-Shabaab, he will 
be from a clan outside the zone, except if al-Shabaab has a specific agenda towards a local clan 
it want to win entirely in that area. If there are clan problems, the commander should be an 
outsider.  
 
Moreover, a commander and his fighters do not stay too long in an area in order to avoid more 
intimate relations with the lay population and/or defections. This pattern shows how al-Shabaab 
could be both highly decentralized and still hierarchical in its functioning. When some 
commanders become too popular, they also could be removed and tasked with more bureaucratic 
                                                 
63 40 is an important number. When 40 Muslim males stay in a place, they have to pray collectively on 
Friday. If they are only 39, everyone can do it his own way. The community of the believers starts at 40. 
This explains also why this size is said to correspond to one district. Whatever happens, they can pray 
together without civilians. 
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or secretive duties that keep them aloof of their fighters or the lay population. Observers 
should for instance analyse very carefully the way Mukhtaar Roobow won Bay and Bakool and 
mostly lost of his influence through a series of appointment made by Abuu Zubeyr after July 
2009. 
 
Al-Shabaab technicals are armed mostly with B-10 recoilless guns, 75 mm BK and 106 cannon. In 
particular the B-10 is often used against AMISOM tanks and armoured vehicles. When al-
Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu, it does so using civilian shelters. Because the fighters know that 
AMISOM will shell the location they are in a matter of few dozens seconds, they do not use 
anymore cars that can be easily monitored but walk.  
 
One should underline that al-Shabaab at the difference of the clan factions prefers to use more 
infantry than technicals. This might be linked to different considerations. First, ideologically, al-
Shabaab is a very populist militaristic movement and the romantic cult of the AK 47 is closer to 
that mindset than the comments of David Galula’s teaching. Second, their adversary (i.e. the 
AMISOM) is much better equipped to destroy technicals: a confrontation would be hopeless and 
very costly in terms of military hardware lost. Al-Shabaab has developed trenches (not only in 
Mogadishu as recently found by AMISOM) and also in the Central Region. It is repeating what 
happened in the first years of the civil war in Ballanballe, ‘Aabudwaaq and Galka’ayo.  
 
The last reason is the supply of ammunitions. At the opposite of many other experts (including 
the UN Monitoring Group that made itself known for this), the authors intend to believe that 
the supply of ammunitions to al-Shabaab is one enduring problem that has not been solved. 
Months ago, a number of TFG officers were arrested and accused to sell huge amounts of 
ammunitions (especially for heavy weapons) to al-Shabaab. This latter has not really recovered 
from the loss of this supplying source, though the organisation still seems to have the financial 
means to buy quantities of ammunitions.  
 
Very often, in the past, al-Shabaab was provoking the fight but not reacting to it until TFG 
soldiers had sold a good share of their bullets on the market. This description was often heard 
in 2009 and 2010 and, if true, made the war a self sustained exercise paid for by the 
international community and Ethiopia.  
 
It would be foolish not to believe that Al-Shabaab got weapons and ammunitions from outside. 
Yet, the quantities seem too little to fulfil the needs of that organisation. The authors never 
heard that ASWJ people were selling (Ethiopian) ammunitions to al-Shabaab, while the TFG was 
recurrently accused to do so. This may only prove once more that al-Shabaab first and foremost 
is strong because of the weaknesses of its adversaries64.   
 
While AMISOM officials mentioned the presence of 600 foreign fighters in Mogadishu early 
February at Wilton Park conference, it seems difficult for the authors to have a precise idea of 
their approximate number. First, as explained in the previous section, increasingly foreign 
fighters come from the region and it is not easy to differentiate between Somali Abo (Oromo 
                                                 
64 The decision taken by the TFG President to fire key military and intelligence officials early March 2011 
is said to have been provoked by two overlapping reasons. The first one is that most of them were 
supporters of the Speaker and could claim their share in what appeared as a victory against Shabaab.  The 
second is that some were allegedly suspected to cooperate with al-Shabaab either for clan reasons or 
money.   
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Arusi) and Somalis (without discussing the number of passports they hold), and between 
Zanzibari or Coastal Tanzanian and Kenyan people and Jareer (Somali Bantus).  
 
Secondly, and this should be considered the main point, because the foreign fighters are merged 
with Somali fighters. The existence of a strict difference between foreign and local fighters 
would indeed create quickly deep tensions and suspicions between them, because of the 
allocation of resources (heavy weapons, ammunitions, medicines,…). In the same way, commanders 
of the 40 are all Somalis first and foremost for the ability to speak fluently the Somali 
language.  
 
Yet, though the authors are not sure this is a systematic policy, commanders have often a 
foreigner as deputy but it is difficult to delimitate the competences between the two. Over 
time, especially throughout the offensive of May-July 2009 in Mogadishu there seems to have 
been arguments between them but with few exceptions, it is difficult to differentiate between 
the TFG/AMISOM propaganda and the reality on the ground65.  
 
Before the late February and early March 2011 offensive, the agency of al-Shabaab troops was 
very different from what one should have expected from Somali factions. In the 1990’s, troops 
were located in the main urban centres because their control was always contested from within 
and the livelihood of militias was much easier in towns than in the countryside where looting 
could not be repeated indefinitely. In the case of al-Shabaab, controlling populations in cities 
they have taken over has been achieved often in a matter of a few weeks. There is no wish from 
al-Shabaab commanders to witness their foot soldiers sympathising with the lay population (at 
the difference of the usual Somali factions). When the population seems coerced enough to obey 
(see chapter V), al-Shabaab troops deploy often at the borders of the territory they control 
and only make a show of force for few hours or days in big cities that are located inside their 
territory.  
 
This situation should be read in a radically different manner. It is a way to keep al-Shabaab 
fighters as dissocialized as possible and put them in the sole stance they have been trained for: 
defending Islam land against murtadin and crusaders…  
 
 
 
3. Military misadventures 
Throughout the last week of February and early March 2011, several important military 
operations took place in Mogadishu, Hiiraan, Lower Jubba, Galgaduud and Gedo against al-
Shabaab: militias supported by Ethiopia, TFG army and the AMISOM acted for the first time - 
if not coordinated, at least simultaneously - on different fronts putting strain on al-Shabaab 
forces beyond expectations.  
 
In Mogadishu, the main fighting took place at the ministry of Defence, near Bakaraaha market 
and in Dayniile. It was the first time Burundian troops reached those places that were important 
                                                 
65 One case is interesting in that it sheds light on inter-clan relations within al-Shabaab. In August 2007, a 
full colonel ‘Ayr/Absiye was killed by al-Shabaab after his post was taken over. It appeared that he was 
helping that movement and supplying them (Ethiopian) ammunitions by mimicking fake attacks. But that 
time, a al-Shabaab fighter (from Ogaadeen clan) told him that whatever he was doing he was an apostate 
(murtad) and shot him dead. A few hours after, this al-Shabaab member was executed by some of his ‘Ayr 
colleagues.  
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in the military logistics of the jihadists in Mogadishu. The battle was bloody and it seems likely 
that a few hundred al-Shabaab fighters died or were wounded (“up to 400”, said AMISOM 
sources). This was enough to generate a fresh hope to defeat militarily al-Shabaab. Early March, 
the offensive was repeated with more success. Casualties seemed again very high on all sides 
though no figure was available at the time of writing.  
 
Yet, this period of fighting highlights weaknesses of the AMISOM/TFG army. Victory seems 
possible in Mogadishu but a lasting challenge to al-Shabaab needs more efforts to be put on the 
political side and on the military guidance of TFG troops.  
 
The AMISOM (actually Burundian troops) fought more than decently but got impressive loses. 
While the official figure of AMISOM soldiers killed in the fight was first estimated publicly to 
6, diplomats and journalists went over 50. The number of wounded soldiers was such that there 
were no more free beds in Kenya to cure them and that some Burundians were sent to Djibouti 
with French and US support. The AMISOM media policy, by denying high losses, can be 
understood but its impact on Somali perceptions of the situation may become quickly counter-
productive: if all major actors are playing propaganda, then nothing is true. Lies and conspiracy 
theories may sort out Al-Shabaab problems more than AMISOM’s.  
 
The main show of weakness from AMISOM side was not military, it was political. The TFG army 
was unable (or unwilling according to the versions) to keep the positions won over al-Shabaab. 
The end result was that the population that sided with the TFG and AMISOM had to find refuge 
to safer TFG areas. The trust AMISOM and TFG army should have built among the civilians just 
evaporated as fast as the TFG soldiers. Early March, a new attempt was more successful but the 
TFG army had yet to prove its credibility in front of the population in not looting properties, in 
protecting civilians and in keeping positions despite a likely al-Shabaab counter-attack.  
 
This is a recurrent problem that has not yet been decisively addressed by the international 
community. This lack of intermediary level in the TFG army is not solved by the TFG leadership 
since this latter prefers the AMISOM to do the job and not create an instrument that may 
make them increasingly irrelevant. Moreover, after 20 years of crisis, many have not forgotten 
the potential for a strong military man to orchestrate a palace coup. A way to contrast this 
scenario has been to appoint very generously senior officers despite notional military expertise 
and to call respect for the 4.5 formula at a time most of the foot soldiers belong to Rahanweyn 
and Abgaal clans (with a slight percentage of Haber Gidir Saleebaan). 
 
The AMISOM is expecting 4000 fresh troops in the next months. With them, it may pretend to 
take over the whole capital city by the end of the transition on 21 August 2011 since it is going 
to have the man power and the military hardware to do so. Yet again, concerns should be raised 
on two aspects.  
 
On the one side, if there is no TFG back up in this process, Mogadishu would appear controlled 
by foreign forces, which sooner or later would push sections of the population to endorse al-
Shabaab. This risk exists and the current cabinet has not proven different from the previous 
ones in its capacities to pledge and not deliver on this very dimension.  
 
On the other, people should remember that between January 2007 and December 2008, the 
Ethiopian army – well trained and well equipped – also occupied the Somali capital city but had 
eventually to leave. Because of the lack of any decent political strategy (since all efforts are put 
on a non–delivering TFG), AMISOM may win all battles and lose the war… 
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Yet, al-Shabaab was beaten in a way that provoked a near panic of their commanders, to the 
extent that they went in all neighbourhoods they controlled in Mogadishu requesting civilians to 
join them and fight to death. Reinforcement was also sent from Lower Jubba and Middle 
Shabeelle, including a fair number of foreign fighters. This explains the violence of the fighting 
early March. Al-Shabaab was not taken aback by the new AMISOM/TFG offensive and fought 
accordingly.  
 
This situation showed that the vociferous statements on Jihad and the often announced collapse 
of the TFG and AMISOM have yet to meet the reality. Key commanders decided to go to Merka 
or Baydhabo to promote the ultimate fight against the “Crusaders” and show bodies of Burundian 
soldiers to convince the population that al-Shabaab delivers what it has been promising for so 
long. They were not on the forefront to oppose the AMISOM and TFG offensive early March. 
 
This behaviour could hardly be seen as a sign of strength by the Somali public. Actually, many 
were ashamed by the way Burundian corpses were mistreated by al-Shabaab. Moreover, uneasy 
questions were raised on the way many al-Shabaab fighters and commanders just run away to 
escape death: what Jihad is it if those claiming to be ready for martyrdom just run away? Let us 
not be naïve on the theological debate but the “deconsecration” of al-Shabaab as a Jihadi 
organisation went deeper after these fighting episodes and increasingly make people consider al-
Shabaab as one another armed group in the Somali civil war. Also people notice that the children 
of the most important commanders are not waging Jihad, as the warlords‘ offspring was often 
out of the country.  
 
Another aspect has to be taken care of: the defectors. This phenomenon actually started during 
the first significant offensive against the TFG in May 2009. The battle was tough and many foot 
soldiers or even al-Shabaab commanders (mostly Hawiye) defected from then on: their number is 
not accessible for the public (and the authors) but a rough estimate may be less than 150 by 
March 2011. No major commanders defected and one should be careful about data collected 
through their debriefing.  
 
The TFG propaganda machine often sells a greater number of defectors to the AMISOM and 
the international community, as a proof that they are delivering and that al-Shabaab is near to 
collapsing. Early January 2011, on a cluster of 6 defectors, only 2 were actually coming from Al-
Shabaab, the others were either members of Hisbul Islaam or simply associated in a way or 
another with the TFG.  
 
Beyond the discussion on why TFG officials consider telling stories to their key allies the best 
game in town, one should raise two major concerns. First, the TFG army is far from homogenous 
and many former ICU militias have been integrated into that body or in surrogate clan militias. 
This just follows the same regulations as in the 1990’s: defeated militias join the winning one 
though they have not leading positions. It is more a sedimentary paradigm than militias cleansing. 
A significant section of those former ICU militias have not been involved in the various battles 
(because they do not want to help “Christians” defeat other Muslims) and parts of the “genuine” 
defectors are actually working to convince them to rally openly or not Al-Shabaab. These 
complicities can become very lethal as illustrated by the killings at Muna Hotel in August 2010.  
 
The second concern is that the TFG has done nothing to prove young al-Shabaab fighters that 
they could have a living if they defect: there is no facility to gather the defectors, screen them 
and help them to get another life (vocational training and the like). Most often, as just explained, 
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they stay as fighters within surrogate clan militias or the TFG army. This is both dangerous and 
short-sighted. If economic incentives play a role in al-Shabaab recruitment, the TFG and its 
allies should be in a position to propose an alternative: this is hardly the case today after 4 
years of AMISOM and TFG presence in the capital city…  
 
In Gedo and Hiiraan, Somali militias faced also very difficult time despite the backing of 
Ethiopian forces and the indulgence of Kenya. While in Hiiraan, despite a first moment of panic 
of Al-Shabaab commanders who left the town, the situation is still under al-Shabaab’s control, in 
Gedo, the fight was more bitter and only early March were the ASWJ militias and TFG troops 
able to get the control of that city. For the record, during the first offensive late February, 
those forces took refuge on the other side of the border, in Mandera (Kenya), to shell the city 
controlled by al-Shabaab and used schools and civilian buildings to do so. Al-Shabaab does not 
have the monopoly of this kind of deadly strategy.  
 
Last October, Barre Aadan Shire Hiiraale forces and ASWJ Gedo fought one against the other. 
ASWJ Gedo was mostly made up of Rahanweyn and Dir fighters, while Barre Hiiraale fighters 
belonged in their greatest majority to Mareehaan clan. Al-Shabaab beaten, clan and political 
ambitions explained the tensions between the two groups. As often witnessed over the last 
three years, al-Shabaab is not always considered by Somalis as the paramount danger: it is only a 
very dangerous group that could be manipulated to get advantage on other clans or political 
groups. This fact deserves a much deeper thinking from many within the international 
community.  
 
But Ethiopia changed its policy. Barre Hiiraale lost the leadership of the military and the TFG 
soldiers involved in Buulo Haawa fight belong to various clans with a prominence of Rahanweyn 
and Mareehaan. As witnessed also in Hiiraan, Ethiopia does not anymore believe its more 
powerful interlocutor, listens to many stakeholders and shows a more sensitiveness to clan 
issues. The time of ‘Abdullaahi Yuusuf and ‘Ali Mahamed Geedi seems over as far as those 
offensives reflect the change of mood in Addis-Ababa66. 
 
One can also add that this attack was a message to Kenya, since the Kenyan authorities seemed 
to have reached an agreement of no strategic aggression with al-Shabaab on the border until 
March 2011. This situation did not please Ethiopia and the troubles in Buulo Haawa were, one 
more time, a reminder of the dangers created by such passivity. The arrest of 9 Al-Shabaab 
officers, the participation of Kenyan forces in combats in Buulo Haawa and elsewhere as well as 
the public debate about Al-Shabaab recruitment networks in Kenya might mean that the lull is 
over.  
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
One cannot conclude this section without raising questions on al-Shabaab military tactics. What 
has been happening late February and early March just duplicates the butchery that occurred at 
the very beginning of the Ethiopian intervention in December 2006. Although al-Shabaab 
conscripts were facing a professional and well equipped army, they just thought that waves of 
                                                 
66 However, one of the authors still believes that more time is needed to make a solid assessment. What 
has been happening over the last weeks provide the TF P Speaker with an increased influence on the ground 
at a time Addis-Ababa wants to get rid of the TFG President. Military successes may only be a condition 
for Meles Zenawi to reassert his influence in Mogadishu. 
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infantry fighters could defeat it. In a matter of few hours, all people recruited in November and 
December 2006 in Mogadishu to fight against Ethiopia were just dead.  
 
While in rural areas, al-Shabaab has been able to play the clan cards in often smart ways (yet, 
not always), in Mogadishu their strategy looks childish. They do not have the military hardware 
to defeat the AMISOM and the human cost of their skirmishes is high for no result at all. One 
can assume that at the beginning, al-Shabaab promoted martyrdom but after so many 
defections, uproar among fighters and fighters butchered, one should look for other reasons. 
The less unreasonable one is that al-Shabaab is testing its newly trained fighters there and give 
them a direct experience of urban warfare. Yet, the amount of loses does not allow this to be 
the final answer.  
 
Nevertheless, al-Shabaab is still a rational actor. After what appeared to them as a coordinated 
offensive in Gedo, Central Region and Mogadishu, its leaders called their troops to change 
strategy and go back to the more usual guerrilla tactics of hit and run and targeted killings. This 
shift of strategy (or the return to the 2007-2008 tactics) was made clear by statements made 
in Arabic on their websites.  
 
One can play with paradoxical conjectures. On one side, the fact that this order was published in 
Arabic could be one further proof that al-Shabaab is obeying its al-Qâ’idah patrons since most 
local commanders do not read Arabic enough to get the meaning of that statement. On the 
other, one can sustain exactly the opposite. For nearly two years, al-Shabaab leadership 
enforced a ruthless and hopeless strategy that deprived the movement of hundreds of fighters. 
Writing such an order in Arabic gives a feeling that it has religious motivations and should not be 
argued, only swallowed: let us not forget that most al-Shabaab militias have a very rudimentary 
religious education focussed on few warlike episodes.   
 
It cannot be by chance that a al-Shabaab commander, ‘Abdinaasir Huseen ‘Ali nicknamed Jaban 
(“Japan”) after months under arrest was sentenced to death and executed by Shabaab for 
having killed innocent people at this very moment. This commander previously was in charge of 
targeted killings and hated by most civilians for that reason. He also was known to have robbed 
money transfer companies in Suuq Ba’aad (Qaran Express) and Bakaraaha (Dahabshiil local 
branch).  
 
This move by al-Shabaab leadership alongside others described in the previous sections of this 
report intend to show that Shabaab intends to win back the popular support it has lost after the 
departure of the Ethiopian forces and the prohibition of humanitarian access throughout the 
drought.  
 
There is no doubt that after the Ramadan offensive, what happened early March sounds as 
another defeat to that organization. Its reaction is to go back to amore accommodating stance 
with civilians, a more traditional (and effective) guerrilla tactics strengthened by the same 
techniques of fear and intimidation through targeted killings. To a large extent, this military 
victory has yet to find its political expression. 
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CHAPTER V 
FUNDING AN APPARATUS AND RULING A POPULATION 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this last chapter is to review two civilian components of al-Shabaab, specifically the 
way this organisation sustains itself and pays for a number of expenses that are necessary for 
its logistics and, linked to that purpose, the local administrative structures that have been put in 
place.  
 
At the risk of repeating ourselves, we believe that the stronger input achieved by foreigners in 
the organisation is the setting up of bureaucratic institutions described in Chapter I that have 
allowed the movement to survive the killing of some of its commanders, while in the usual clan 
faction system those losses would have brought this armed group to a collapse or to recurrent 
splits.  
 
This ability to function with a decent administration provides al-Shabaab with increased 
leverage on the population it controls. First and foremost, its troops are basically following 
orders, which is not so the case for the TFG army. Second, they keep their distance with the 
population and contribute by doing so to asserting the notion of an authority, of different nature 
than the social body. Third, it offers an image of order that is largely missing in the environment 
the population lives in. A last point is that working this way has also an impact on foreigners and 
diaspora since it reinforces the credibility of al-Shabaab and, therefore, the need to support it 
and endorse its political agenda overseas.  
 
Al-Shabaab does not seem anymore eager to announce the establishment of an Islamic State. It 
may want, first, to control the capital city (which will be a surprising resilience of a State that is 
said to have collapsed for so long!). This silence may, more likely, be a hesitation on the practical 
consequences, especially the need to address the grievances of the population and its legitimate 
requests more than it does today. If al-Shabaab were willing to do so, it would need a much more 
powerful civilian organisation to not fail dramatically. To a large extent, the continued situation 
of Jihad provides this organisation with a very good excuse to escape many responsibilities 
linked to governing a population.  
 
Yet, through the routinisation of a number of processes, al-Shabaab has been able to build what 
we should call local administrations. The way it did it is not radically different of what some clan 
factions or claimed governments did in the past. Yet, in many regards, al-Shabaab seems to do 
better than previous attempts. Clan sensitivities are considered in a more realistic and neutral 
way and corruption is much less apparent, while the Jihadi organisation builds again a public 
sphere and shows people that the authority cannot be manipulated (for long) through clan and 
personal networking.  
 
However, this success is limited by different blockages. The level of fear is such that if those 
administrations collapse today, no one would be interested to keep some of its achievements. 
Despite a claim that all have to obey Shari’a, many incidents that involve al-Shabaab militias are 
kept unresolved by its own Courts: the very notion of justice is increasing put in question by the 
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population67 . Last but not the least, al-Shabaab has yet to spell out its view on promoting 
development and economic growth beyond the destruction of forest and the export of charcoal.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. A first section looks at the way al-Shabaab sustains itself 
financially. Both external and internal sources of funding are reviewed. The reader should not 
expect many surprises going through that section. A second section tries to describe how local 
administrations are set up. The description points out to differences and tries to make sense of 
them. It also explores the rationale for taxation (al-Shabaab prefers the term qitma, services) 
and explains to what extend al-Shabaab is de facto engaged in a State-Building process. The 
issue of drought is also discussed to prove the reactivity of that organisation when it is 
challenged. The conclusion discusses the legacy of such a system.  
 
 
 
1. Getting Money for al-Shabaab 
One should keep in mind a number of patterns that single al-Shabaab out. First, despite now five 
years, there are few known cases of corruption within the organisation. That is a signal that the 
phenomenon is kept under control (though militias may steal or kill for looting). The implication is 
that the running costs of al-Shabaab are much less than if this organisation were the usual 
Somali armed movement. This plain argument should ring painfully at the ears of TFG’s donors.  
 
Another pattern is that Somalis are more impressed if the rules are enforced day after day and 
not only on occasions, by chance. To a certain extent, the possibility of al-Shabaab not paying 
salaries for a month would have a greater impact in sapping the credibility of the movement than 
the defection of a Commander. Efforts are therefore directed to that continuity and make a 
radical difference with any other organized bodies in Somalia (being the government of 
Somaliland, the TFG or the ‘Abdi Qaybdid faction to take this example).  
 
A third pattern is that, despite recurrent claims that al-Shabaab got millions of US dollars at 
any time from Saudi Sheekhs, Eritrea, pirates and al-Qâ’idah, this movement shows a genuine 
sense of saving money. For instance, the claim to get its share of the booty in all battles was a 
cheap way to get the ownership of heavy weapons, whose cost is much higher than the usual AK 
47 and RPG. In the same way, the cost of ammunitions has become a crucial theological argument 
for Jihad, since a high price of bullets keeps the call for Jihad only at a rhetorical level. In the 
same way, al-Shabaab made efforts to have INGOs – international staff won’t be allowed to stay 
but the supply line won’t be cut - working in the health sector to guarantee that its wounded 
fighters would get adequate treatment.  
 
As said, those behaviours show that either al-Shabaab medium rank has learnt a lot at the 
difference of their fellow citizens who are not Salafi Jihadists or that foreigners with a better 
understanding of the needs of an armed movement play a strategic role in those choices and 
their routinisation. Let us not bet on the first option. 
 
One can review the various sources of funding. It should be clear that this description does not 
evoke anything very new, only sometimes procedures are interestingly original.  
                                                 
67 This is another justification for the speech made by Ahmed Godane late January 2011. By reminding 
regional governors that they were responsible for the behaviour of their militias, al-Shabaab leader wanted 
more attention to be paid to incidents between those latter and the lay population. See Chapter II for 
further details.  
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1.1. Collecting money outside the country. 
At first, Islamists movements got financial support from wealthy Gulf States citizens (some 
being of Somali origin) and charities. The key moment is the month of Ramadan when zakaah is 
distributed. Until now, this system works with some success, though the TFG officials are not 
the last ones to visit the Gulf at that period to get their share68. These donations continue and 
the only real issue is to figure out how the money reaches Somalia or is used outside.  
 
Donations by the Somali diaspora are more common and not placed in a specific moment of the 
year. There is a custom to collect money among diaspora people for clan matters (qaaraan) or 
more political issues. Al-Shabaab does not innovate in that regard. Again, the problem is how to 
make sure that the money reaches Somalia.  
 
As illustrated recently by the arrest of some Somalis in the US, sending money through money 
transfer companies (hawaala) may be riskier even it the amounts are not so important (less than 
20,000 USD in the quoted US case). This money can be sent through individuals but of course 
the new modus operandi of the Somali money transfer companies after 2001 can provide the law 
enforcement agencies data on whether the transfers are the same overtime (the identity of the 
sender and receiver are also much clearer). But, at least, two alternatives exist. 
 
The first one is primitive but still operational. Someone has to travel to Somalia (it may be more 
often to Northern Somalia than Mogadishu), Djibouti or Nairobi and provide the money in cash. 
As an Eritrean diplomat found out in March 200969, this may not always be successful… 
 
The other alternative is much more elaborated but needs a substantial amount of money, not a 
few thousands USD. The principle is elementary: a normal trading operation is organised (for 
instance importing sugar, wheat flowers, computers and staple commodities); the goods are sold 
in Somalia but the whole money (less a percentage) is given to al-Shabaab. The difficulty is to 
get a professional trader in Somalia able to do this. In general, al-Shabaab may select someone 
who has his family or many properties in Mogadishu. He does not need to share the same views as 
al-Shabaab and can be a true secular person. For him, at the end of the day, it is a licit 
commercial operation and he can make 15% benefit though he has not taken any risk. If he does 
not respect the conditions, he and his relatives can be targeted and his properties destroyed.  
 
These commercial transactions seem to have happened on a regular basis because they cannot be 
traced. Only at the moment funds are gathered, can law enforcement agencies intervene.   
 
There is also another way to move money: it is to make a donation for building an institution that 
is legitimate in Somalia: a big mosque, a health centre or a school. Donations are gathered in 
Somalia but there is no easy way to know actually the amount of money collected. Part of that 
money may be used for the announced purpose and the rest goes elsewhere.  
 
A last remark can be made about State support. By far and large, the only State that has helped 
al-Shabaab is Eritrea. The authors have no views whether Asmara keeps doing so despite the UN 
sanctions passed in December 2009 and, more importantly, whether this support is strategic for 
al-Shabaab as claimed by the UN Monitoring Group without providing much evidence. As in 1993 
                                                 
68 As always, this money is never accounted by the Somali Central Bank… 
69 http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/636472/-/item/0/-/oixpit/-/index.html 
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when Sudan helped General Mahamed Faarah ‘Aydiid, in 2006 when Eritrea provided military 
hardware and training to the ICU for letting ONLF fighters move into Ethiopia through 
Galgaduud, the main benefit a State could provide this kind of movement is logistical (but these 
days, an Eritrean passport is not a gift), training (Eritrea has a long tradition doing so for armed 
movements from Sudan and Ethiopia) and access to certain military supplies (heavy weapons and 
their ammunitions, explosives).  
 
 
1.2. Getting funding from Somalia: the maximisation of the protection economy 
The first think to keep in mind is that al-Shabaab does not work as the ICU which was 
dominated by Hawiye and focussed on south central Somalia (despite the attempt to set up an 
Islamic Court in Gaalka’ayo). Al-Shabaab, as explained in Chapter III, has a national reach (even 
international, some would say); the implication is not only that Puntland and Somaliland may 
become the target of subversive actions (as already happened in October 2008) but also that al-
Shabaab supporters are present there, especially among the youth and the business class. A 
reminder of that connection is what happened in spring 2006. More than 200 fighters from 
Somaliland joined the ICU (and mostly al-Shabaab) to fight against the pro US factions’ alliance. 
Puntland did not send many people but its financial contribution to the war was more important 
than Somaliland’s.  
 
Today, the situation is more confused since many Somali Salafi Sheekhs who in the past showed 
sympathy for al-Shabaab and encouraged the business people to support it financially are more 
reluctant to do so. Yet, al-Shabaab has not lost all his supporters in the Northern regions and 
has also cultivated personal links that can be mobilised if the situation got serious enough.  
 
The first source of funding is provided by the business people who are in agreement with al-
Shabaab. As alluded to in Chapter II, those people represent a genuine constituency in the 
Somali main markets though they are not often their biggest economic operators. In Bakaraaha 
for instance, many traders in the IT sectors are supportive of al-Shabaab but this sector is a 
minor one there. Social stratification therefore plays a role.  
 
Al-Shabaab also has developed links with some economic operators on the basis of common 
interests. The charcoal export is a good case because it shows that al-Shabaab developed a more 
integrated agenda than ordinary thought. Not only al-Shabaab envisions the gains made by 
servicing those exporters at Baraawe and Kismaayo ports but also bets on jobs creation that 
would increase its popular support in both cities and the taxes they can raise.  
 
This is only a small part of the money al-Shabaab is collecting. The main amount is provided by 
the protection economy. If people do not want to pay, they are subjected to threat and even to 
death to prove that obedience is not negotiable. However, there are some amazing specificities. 
 
Starting February 2010, al-Shabaab decided that it would collect the zakaah of business people. 
This created an interesting theological discussion (as in Iran in 1980) because zakaah is one of 
the five pillars of Islam and therefore a direct junction between the believer and God. In 
mainstream Islam, the believer has to make his mind on the amount of money he should 
distribute to poor people around him once a year. Al-Shabaab made clear that it would make the 
right decision for all and also would decide when zakaah is collected.  
 
Another argument broke out when people moved from one region to another and had to pay 
zakaah twice. This is not compatible with any reading of Islam but yet it happened. This created 
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a few bloody confrontations and proved that people should be given receipts to avoid 
misunderstandings. Al-Shabaab also published a decent booklet to explain people how to 
calculate the amount of zakaah they should pay.  
 
Besides zakaah, al-Shabaab has been collecting sadaqa fii sabiililaahi (donations for God’s grace) 
from the economic operators. This takes place under a veiled threat of retribution, if people are 
reluctant to exhibit their generosity. The debate can also go theological because sadaqa is 
supposed to be absolutely voluntary, which is not often the case.  
 
In 2010, while for the first time al-Shabaab called for the centralisation of zakaah under its 
responsibility, it also formalized a taxation system (described in the second section of this 
chapter) and called it qitma (services). Interestingly enough in a Somali context, it requests 
people to pay for services it actually delivers and, more surprisingly, each region has developed 
its own set of taxes according to the characteristics of the local economy, which may intend to 
prove that al-Shabaab is more federalist than the current TFG... 
 
The prohibition of qaat is also an interesting point since this question has divided al-Shabaab 
leadership for years. On the one hand, one faction is willing -yesterday and today- to forbid the 
imports of qaat since it is perceived as a drug. On the other, many commanders have a more open 
minded view point. Qaat distribution provides jobs for the poorest people; taxes are collected 
(1,000 USD by plane plus landing fees) and people could be allowed to chew it at home and only 
there as it happens for cigarette smokers. Over the last year, qaat has been allowed, prohibited 
and allowed again under those latter conditions.  
 
The international community, led by the USA, has taken a uncompromising position on 
humanitarian access in areas controlled by al-Shabaab. The analysis supporting this decision 
sounds fragile to the authors. Moreover, the prohibition is basically impossible to enforce. Early 
2011, two British NGOs (Muslim Aid UK and Islamic Relief UK) were working in areas controlled 
by the Jihadi movement through a mediation undertaken by the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference. Some INGOs also use their local partners to keep their project alive (for instance 
in the livestock sector).  
 
Al-Shabaab has spelled out its policy concerning INGOs. Without discussing here the status of 
the foreign staff, it seems that the cost to operate is 10,000 USD by year. In pure accounting 
terms, this is much cheaper than what the TFG and its multiple roadblocks cost over the same 
period. Yet, they want to exclude foreign witnesses but are ready to accept some of the 
activities of the NGOs, under the assumption that they screen their staff, have a full knowledge 
of the projects (including their budgets) and control all moves beyond the NGO HQs.  
 
There are two other sources of funding, often quoted in the international press, that deserve a 
cautious analysis: kidnapping and piracy. Kidnapping is less an industry today in Somalia due to 
the overall security situation. Foreigners are very few and often entrenched behind AMISOM or 
local private armies (as in Gaalka’ayo). Yet, in the past, there is no doubt that al-Shabaab and 
Hisbul Islaam (among others) were adamant to get control of hostages since the ransoms became 
very high and that pure criminal greed could be concealed behind a political discourse framed by 
the hostility against the West and its spies.  
 
A good indication that al-Shabaab is not bankrupt is that it has not yet released the hostages it 
got. For instance, in the case of the French secret agent, it seems to have added sensitive 
political conditions (concerning the release of its members condemned in Hargeysa after the 
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October 2008 bombings) besides the usual ransom. Therefore, there is no hurry to get 
additional financial resources.  
 
Piracy is much less simple to assess because there are many different layers of explanations70. 
In the West, often, there is a trend that would like to merge all threats in one common 
narrative. For instance after 9/11 some journalists wanted to associate Ussama ben Laden and 
the Sierra Leone’s RUF. Others tried to link al-Qâ’idah and Iraq and were more successful… for 
a while. In Somalia, many wanted from the very beginning to associate the Islamists and the 
pirates despite the fact that pirates were operating from Puntland and an area from south 
central Somalia that was not under Islamists control. Former staff of the UN Monitoring Group 
were not the last to agitate those allegations. More recently early March 2011 an AP dispatch 
again created a new momentum, arguing that al-Shabaab got 20% of all ransoms.  
 
The facts are as follows. In 2006, despite huge amounts of money proposed by the pirates, the 
ICU obliged them to stop operating in the areas they controlled. Theformer started again 
because of the collapse of the ICU. In Puntland, pirates’ gangs have little stamina for Islamism 
and donations seem the most unlikely. In the Harardheere and Hobyo areas, the situation can be 
more ambiguous. Those benefiting directly from piracy have never shown a specific religious 
inclination; what they have proved over times is to be wise business people and respectful of 
clans regulations. Over the last three years, al-Shabaab has never authorized pirates to use the 
ports it controls. Yet, pirates’ leaders have been able to move freely in areas controlled by the 
Jihadi organisation.  
 
Scenarios could be three, according to the data collected. First, there is no link and al-Shabaab 
is right when it denies any connections with the pirates. Honest Muslims do not interact with 
thugs. Second, al-Shabaab and the pirates actually recruit among the same sub-clans (Haber 
Gidir/Saleebaan/Faarah and Haber Gidir/’Ayr/Absiye) and the magnificence of their way of live 
requires the pirates to offer money to their relatives. Moreover, in Somalia as in other 
countries, it is seen as common wisdom to offer some money to the powerful actors who may 
interfere with your business. Al-Shabaab benefits indirectly from piracy but has no formal deals 
with the pirates. The third scenario is that a secret deal has been struck between some al-
Shabaab commanders (in interviews, the names of Hasan Afrah and Sheekh ‘Ali Dheere were 
often quoted)71 and the pirates.  
 
The authors are divided on which scenario is the most likely. Scenario two has been valid for long 
and the sense is that eventually scenario 3 is going to be true but further evidence is needed.  
 
 
 
2. Building local administrations 
After two decades of civil war, Somalia has developed certain procedures to keep security at 
the local level. Those procedures have been analysed by INGOs and donors as they could provide 
                                                 
70  See Roland Marchal’s contribution in James Cockayne and Adam Lupel, eds. Peace Operations and 
Organized Crime: Enemies or Allies?, London, Routledge, 2011; and Roland Marchal, “Somali Pircay: the local 
contexts of a global obsession”, Humanity, vol. 2, n° 1, May 2011.  
71 Hasan Afrah belongs to the Saleebaan clan and also to the same sub-sub clan as the most important 
pirates’ leader, Mahamed Afweyne (who initiated the kidnapping of the two French secret agents). Sheekh 
‘Ali Dheere is the spokesperson of al-Shabaab and belongs to the Murusade clan. This may explain why 
recently a new gang that recruited mostly among Murusade started operating near Harardheere, far from 
their clan territory, to say the least… 
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a blueprint for a more national process. Yet, the localized nature of those arrangements could 
not be duplicated without putting at risk the whole situation.  
 
Clan factions and the various alleged governments, including the TFG, therefore always claimed 
territories but never were able to build decent local administration structures. The very notion 
of controlling a territory had to be understood in its most rudimentary terms: no other political 
actor was able to have a military presence.  
 
Another paradox of the situation is that if compared to Somaliland and Puntland, the presence 
of the State has been much deeper in southern Somalia and therefore an administrative culture 
should have survived despite the duration of the war. It is not the case and one can blame the 
political elites in that part of the former Somalia to have shown so little determination to 
rebuild even at the most modest level a State.  
 
Yet, there are two systemic reasons that explained this failure and the difficulties for those 
elites to radically challenge this stalemate. One is the demographic distribution of clans as well 
as the balance between different modes of productions. A quick glance at a map representing 
the clan territories proves that in Somaliland and Puntland clans are living together but mostly in 
towns and elsewhere the pastoral economy is arch dominant; meanwhile in the South (except 
Galgaduud and south Mudug), clans are intertwined and both urbanisation and farming have taken 
the lead on the pastoral economy. Therefore clan competitions can potentially be more numerous 
and intractable. The second systemic difficulty is that no faction has ever been powerful enough 
in the civil war to actually control an area and its urban centres for long: always compromises 
with sections of the local population were needed and the very sense of absolute domination 
never was reflected by the reality; bargaining was also based on fragmenting the local 
populations in different groups and making alliance with one of them.  
 
Al-Shabaab experiment in local administration has to be understood in that context. The aim is 
not to build a proper administration but govern populations that sooner or later would have to 
contribute to Jihad. Yet, this is not what is happening on the ground. On the one hand, al-
Shabaab got involved in local situations and could not just enforce simplistic rules. On the other, 
although the Jihadi project is paramount, the routinisation of the state of war means that 
cadres are increasingly involved in mundane issues and are also looking for concrete personal 
achievements. The echo created by dissident al-Shabaab commanders in January 2011 just 
reflects this tension between those who believe that the establishment of an Islamic State 
would be the most powerful message to their opponents and those who fear that the energy and 
resources spent in that direction may be lost for waging Jihad.  
 
 
2.1. Taking over a region 
There is a genuine methodology used by al-Shabaab over the years. The first thing is to create a 
conflict (or use an existing one) in the area to create the perception of a fast deteriorating 
situation and use the conflict to covert the targeted killing of potential opponents. Among them, 
one should single out three social categories. Influential elders as well as civil society activists 
who are too outspoken and not inclined to Salafi ideas have to be eliminated. The last group is 
made up of wadaads who may express differing views than the organisation on the political 
process and the implementation of Shari’a.  
 
Whenever a region is taken over, al-Shabaab implements the second step of its agenda. Its 
fighters go to all houses owned by people who were working for previous administrations and 
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search for weapons and documents that would illustrate their connections with the TFG and its 
international allies. The properties of the key leaders are looted, though in the descriptions the 
authors got, no one was able to say whether the booty went to the organisation or to the militias 
who did it.  
 
As alluded to in Chapter IV, there are two main differences with the past. The first is that the 
old militias have had to escape to save their live. They won’t be allowed to simply integrate the 
new ruling military forces. Eventually some may be allowed to do so but they would have to give 
up their weapons and go first to a training camp to follow several weeks of “re-orientation”. The 
second difference is that the clans that benefited from the former administrations are 
humiliated as transparently as possible. As explained in Chapter III, it is less a way to promote 
those who were humiliated than to use the taste for revenge to build a constituency.  
 
The third moment is also framed by coercion. Al-Shabaab wants the areas it controls absolutely 
secure since it has a limited manpower and needs to use it on the borders with its enemy. It is 
very common that after a few weeks, the Court controlled by al-Shabaab decides to amputate a 
thief or stone a woman (or a girl). The rationale is to make the population understand that al-
Shabaab won’t mollify and that Shari’a is enforced without qualifications (a claim that no one can 
decently oppose).  
 
The last moment is the establishment of a Shura that would meet twice a week and handle the 
problems of the city or district. What is interesting is that al-Shabaab plays the clan card more 
than it is used by it. Let us give examples.  
 
In Merka, after taking over al-Shabaab gave a greater space to “minority” clans (see chapter 
III) but did not deny the presence of those that were powerful under previous administrations. 
Their share was smaller and the involvement of a couple of al-Shabaab operatives meant that 
those clans would not be able to reassert themselves in the Shura without clashing with the 
Jihadi group. For once, humility was on their agenda.  
 
In Kismaayo and Lower Jubba (al-Shabaab seems to often share the idea that a district is 
congruent with its capital), the situation was different. At first, the 25 member Shura 
reflected the involvement in the battle to take control of the port city. Two major clans were 
given the upper hand on the Shura, even if others were nominally represented: Mareehaan and 
Ogaadeen (plus a few seats for the Harti). But, this setting was creating uproar among the 
Hawiye (Sheekhaal especially) and the Dir (above all, Biimaal) clans. After a short while, 
Ibraahim al-Afghani pushed for amendment of the Shura and Gaalje’el and Biimaal got their 
seats.  
 
Jowhar is a different case. The capital city of Middle Shabeelle was taken by a coalition of 
Ogaadeen and Murusade (plus a few ‘Ayr and Abgaal/Reer Mataan) militias. To a large extent, 
the Shura became an instrument in settling old scores. The Shura indeed was including Daarood 
and Rahanweyn representatives plus Gaalje’el and Jareer beyond the usual Abgaal sub-clans. In 
particular, the Harti Abgaal72 sub-clan that used to dominate the region throughout the civil war 
got as many representatives as the Jareer! The inclusion of the Gaalje’el in the Shura was not 
only an acknowledgement of their military role in the battles to take over Middle Shabeelle but 
                                                 
72 Among prominent Harti Abgal, one should quote the former leader of Jowhar was Mahamed ‘Umar Habib 
Dheere who belongs to Harti Abgaal/Warsengeli clan and the TFG President, Sheekh Shariif Sheekh 
Ahmed who is Harti Abgaal/ Agoonyar. 
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also a reference to the long conflicts they waged in the region in the 1990s73; No need to say 
that the Harti Abgaal clan is furious and pretends that behind al-Shabaab, there is a coalition of 
allogenous clans that want to confiscate its land… This humiliation is in the view of the authors a 
direct consequence of the role Mahamed Dheere played against the Islamists before June 2006 
and after January 2007.  
 
In Beledweyne, al-Shabaab played a different card but it is unsure whether it is going to work 
for clan reasons. In the 1990s, the conflict in Beledweyne was framed by the opposition of two 
groups, the Hawaadle on the one side and on the other the Gaalje’el, the Jeje’el, the Jareer and 
the Sheekhaal. After 2007, Hisbul Islaam was supported by the Hawaadle and al-Shabaab by a 
coalition of other clans. In July 2010, al-Shabaab got the support of the Hawaadle and took over 
the city (rumours mentioned that the Hisbul Islaam governor received a significant amount of 
money and sold his heavy weapons to the rival movement!) but bet on the “minorities within 
Hawwadle. The conflict situation is indeed largely due to Hawaadle internal divisions. There is 
one important sub-clan, ‘Ali Medhaweyne, that pretends to the leadership of Beledweyne at all 
costs. Because the other Hawaadle components are much smaller, they have to endorse this view 
while their interest is different. They have common borders with groups ‘Ali Medhaweyne fought 
against and have (as Hawiye) common enemies (notably the Ethiopian Daaroods). Al-Shabaab is 
therefore trying to keep a fragile coalition made up of Hawaadle “minority” sub-clans and a 
representation of the other coalition by allocating positions to both in the region.   
 
 
2.2 Building an authority 
The policies put in place are remarkable by their bureaucratic procedures. For instance, all 
NGOs would have to provide their archives and any data on the staff (including foreign), their 
budget would be checked and questions made on salaries and the like. This was what Siyaad 
Barre was doing and the dream of all faction leaders for years. When al-Shabaab did loot 
equipments, there was some loose political justification. However, there is a permanent order to 
grab whatever drugs and medical instruments that can be used to cure the wounded fighters. 
Except that, al-Shabaab did not “confiscate” other medicines and medical equipment.  
 
For the time being this movement seems to have three main priorities. First, al-Shabaab pays 
attention to the Quranic schools; it has limited the number of the audience at 50 students and 
made sure that all students would find a place for the religious teaching. They even mobilize 
some of their members if the teachers are not numerous enough. They also intervene in those 
places and talk specifically about Jihad.  
 
The second priority is the health sector. There is of course a vested interest to keep it alive or 
even to develop it since curing the wounded fighters is a heavy duty (too heavy, it seems, after 
the Ramadan offensive in August 2010). In Merka, two al-Shabaab staff have been appointed at 
the hospital; their duty is to make da’wa every morning at 7 A.M. and make sure that the 
personnel is on time (if not, they are sent home and lose a day salary); the last duty is to check 
the CVs of the health staff and make sure that their degrees are not fake.  
 
Al-Shabaab also appointed a regional coordinator for health who has to make sure that any 
health emergency is given care of. This regional coordinator would ask local NGOs to carry out 
                                                 
73 At one point, General Mahamed Faarah ‘Aydiid was able to control Mahaas and Jalalaqsi thanks to the 
Gaalje’el clan  
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some specific tasks or respond to requests made by the population outside the main urban 
centres.  
 
One should highlight the fact that they are developing in sectors (education and health) where 
the social demands are the highest and where popularity could be won easily. One should also 
notice that they entertain the students with da’wa but do not interfere with the curricula of the 
schools, though they publicize the learning of Arabic against English at any time.  
 
The third sector they develop is the justice system. In all regions they control, Islamic Courts 
have been established and the judges follow the Hanbali and Shafi’i codes74. Hanbali is the 
preferred code for the Salafis but in general Somalis use the Shafi’i one. The judges have to be 
close to the organisation. Again, their behaviour is congruent with what was happening under 
Mahamed Siyaad Barre.  
 
For private cases, the Court allows the elders to be involved. The court has to be informed about 
the outcome of the case. If one party is unhappy, then the Court may decide to intervene and 
make the final ruling. No external actors are allowed in case of penal cases and Shari’a is 
supposed to be enforced with no hesitation. But there are moments when the judges may decide 
to change the character of a case. For instance, property rights in Somalia are today a very 
cumbersome issue since fake documents are often used to build a case and get some money. The 
judges have made those cases criminal cases because someone has been abusing the authority of 
the State.  
 
A caveat to that reassertion of the authority is the complacency when al-Shabaab militias 
misbehave. It is difficult of course to be sure that it is a definite policy but in the few cases 
that were discussed publicly, al-Shabaab did its best to protect its own fighters even if the 
organisation had to pay diyya.  
 
Especially because of the drought but also for the sake of providing the Shura and al-Shabaab 
with some budget, systems of taxation have been put in place. The interesting aspect is that al-
Shabaab did not try to polish the old system (as Somaliland and Puntland did) but built a new one 
that takes into account the war situation. While in Somaliland and Puntland, the main (and often 
sole) source of the revenues is the import/export trade, al-Shabaab has been trying to enlarge 
the fiscal plate. 
 
First, of course, commercial operations are taxed at about 10%75; public transportation has also 
to pay a reasonable fee. At this point although tariffs are reasonable, this is still very close to 
Somaliland and Puntland systems of taxation. Differences are on three important aspects.  
 
First, all salaries are taxed 5% because of the drought but one may suspect that this tax won’t 
disappear overnight. The money goes to a Drought Committee that either gives cash or provided 
the affected people with food and cloths. When the collected amount is not important enough, 
al-Shabaab goes to the market place and asks the traders to make a (“voluntary”) contribution.  
                                                 
74 in Sunni Islam, there are four legal schools (Madhab) accepted : Shafi’i, Hanbali, Maleki and Hanafi. A 
Madhab is a school of thought or method of interpreting religious material in the three major areas: belief, 
religious practice and Shari’a; 
75 In Kismaayo, selling a camel generates 1.5 Million Somali shillings (Sosh) – roughly 50 USD - while the 
price of the camel is about 10 million Sosh. A cow would generate a tax of 0.5 Million Sosh for a price of 5 
to 6 Millions Sosh and a goat would generate 100,000 Sosh for a price of 700,000 Sosh.  
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Second, al-Shabaab intends to put a levy on the houses that are rented. This is highly uncommon 
in post civil war Somalia; a side effect of this decision is that people have to prove that they are 
the legitimate owners of the houses they rent. Compared to the many promises made by the 
TNG and TFG on clarifying the property rights, this is a clear achievement. 
 
Third, al-Shabaab has not showed a will to evict people who are settled in buildings that 
belonged to the Somali State or other public entities. However, they request them to pay a fee 
for the use of public properties.  
 
Before the offensive of late February 2011, it had become clear that all those revenues were 
used to counter the unpopularity created by the refusal to give humanitarian access to the areas 
affected by the drought. While, months ago, al-Shabaab was full of contempt for those who 
were arguing about the predicament created by the drought, a number of demonstrations in 
areas al-Shabaab thought were fully under its control showed that drought riots could add to its 
deteriorating relations with the Somali population (see Chapter II for other reasons).  
 
The anti WFP discourse is easy when people do not face hunger. This was not anymore the case 
in the last months of 2010 and al-Shabaab had to react. Setting up this taxation system is a 
first answer and at the difference of other armed groups the money collected was used for the 
right people.  
 
One can wonder whether this taxation system would stop with the drought (without discussing 
here the military situation). The authors are convinced that it will last because the past months 
demonstrated to al-Shabaab the need to respond to public grievances in other ways than the 
discourse on Jihad and the coercion, or to use a Gramscian jargon, to better balance coercion 
and hegemony. The difficult military situation provides them another reason to regain the 
sympathy of the population that needs more than da’wa and roads to make a living or to 
sympathise with a Jihadi organisation.  
 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
Al-Shabaab has been able to build an impressive system for collecting funds. In order to do so, 
it has been mobilising not only its supporters among the Somali diaspora but foreigners who 
share its global Jihadi agenda. While techniques for remitting funds are not very sophisticated, 
they are also not easily traceable. Al-Shabaab may benefit from this support because its 
international image keeps being more positive than its perception inside Somalia.  
 
A notable aspect is that State support to this movement is minimal and this only fact shows its 
determination to keep receiving money from outside and creating its own source of revenue 
inside Somalia (including Somaliland and Puntland).  
 
Intimidation and protection are the two faces of the same policy towards the Somali private 
sector. Despite a real support in some strata of the business class (all over Somalia and not only 
in south central Somalia or in Mogadishu), al-Shabaab has been putting the main economic 
operators under strong pressure. Beyond those revenues, al-Shabaab has benefited from certain 
economic activities because they generate revenues in the ports it controls and gives new 
economic opportunities to the population.  
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Starting February 2010, a taxation system has been built that needs local administrations to be 
effective and contributes to strengthen them. The main reasons to develop this system has been 
the drastic negative impacts of drought and the need for al-Shabaab not to be accused to let 
the population die for not accepting international aid. 
 
Al-Shabaab reacted slowly to this challenge but over the last months, undertook a number of 
rescue operations that prove the population that it is both sincere in its refusal of international 
aid and its will to provide an alternative. The current degradation of its military situation –if 
lasting- would raise the question of a shift of priorities and of the current allocation of 
resources.  
 
Willingly or not, the structures of a nascent Islamic State are taking shape. This attempt is 
much more developed than any other throughout the civil war. By coercion and manipulation, al-
Shabaab is rebuilding a public realm, social services and the sense of legality. One may think 
about Charles Tilly well-known thesis: States makes war and wars make State. 
 
But two questions would deserve more discussion in the next months: whether the level of 
violence is such that institutions and rules set up by al-Shabaab won’t survive its military defeat; 
whether the new recognition given to the population would affect the strict logic of the current 
Salafi–Jihadi agenda supported by al-Shabaab leadership. 
 
